

Journal of Army Special Operations History

PB 31-05-2 Vol. 6, No. 1, 2010

Veritas

ARSOF IN THE KOREAN WAR: PART I





Veritas

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The Azimuth of the USASOC History Office



The first 2010 issue of *Veritas* dedicated to Army SOF in Korea, 1950-1953, grew too large. Hence, the topic has been divided and will be covered in two special issues, 1:2010 and 2:2010. We needed to do more research on the six Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne) that served in Korea and the UN Civil Assistance Command role in South Korea, 1951-1953. The disaster relief & humanitarian assistance role assigned to ARSOF during Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE in Haiti will be introduced in *Veritas* 4:2010. A special *Veritas* issue on Haiti will kick off 2011.

Mariano Santillan, one of our illustrators, received two very prestigious commercial art awards (a 1st Place and a 2nd Place) from the North Carolina Press Association in March 2010. We've included a picture spread of the USASOC Fallen Warrior Memorial Wall at the back of this issue. It will be first unveiled at the family ceremony on 27 May 2010. The Memorial Wall and "Rising Eagle" designs were done by Mr. Daniel W. Telles, the *Veritas* Art Director. Mr. Lorenzo Ghiglieri, whose world-renowned animal and bird sculptures

grace the Vatican and the White House, sculpted the "Rising Eagle" medallion atop the wall.

Our basic chronological boundaries for U.S. Army SOF history are World War II to the present. Articles submitted for publication consideration in *Veritas* must be based on primary research and contain veterans' "voices." A "new spin" on ARSOF history based on secondary sources likewise falls short. Topics that stretch the current definitions of special operations to include Revolutionary, Mexican, Civil, and Spanish-American Wars and WWI (except PSYOP and Civil-Military occupation) actions need not be submitted. The line between mythology and actual special operations is sufficiently murky without adding "great leaps of logic" to the mix. Since official publication provides credibility, our standards and reputation for presenting well-documented history based heavily on primary research will not be jeopardized. We appreciate the great support from our Army SOF soldiers, veterans, families, and friends. Thanks. CHB

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SUBMISSIONS: Submit manuscripts, art, illustrations, and photos to the address above. Digital format is preferred. All article submissions must cover ARSOF topics from WWII to the present, be based on primary sources, and have active participant voice. See articles in *Veritas* for examples. Please provide contact information for all submissions. If you have an article topic that falls outside these key parameters, please email one of our editors. The USASOC History Office reserves the right to edit all submissions for publication.

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Timeline: 1942 – 1950

1942

January – Representatives from twenty-six nations, including the U.S., Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and China sign the United Nations Declaration, pledging that no nation would make a separate peace or armistice with a common enemy throughout the remainder of WWII.

6 August – U.S. B-29 bomber *Enola Gay* drops the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan.

8 August – U.S.S.R. invades Manchuria.

9 August – *Bockscar* drops the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, Japan.

August – The U.S. and U.S.S.R. agree to divide Korea along the 38th Parallel. General Douglas A. MacArthur is named Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Japan (SCAP), and is tasked with post-war reconstruction in Asia.

1943

November – President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston L. Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek meet in Cairo and agree to make Korea an independent state at the end of WWII.

November-December – At the Teheran Conference, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin agree to the need for a post-war international peacekeeping organization.

September – General MacArthur proclaims that all governmental operations in South Korea would be supervised by the U.S. Army. The Soviets exercise comparable authority in North Korea.

December – U.S. minister James F. Byrne, British minister Ernest Bevin, and Soviet minister Vyacheslav Molotov establish a five-year-long Korean trusteeship at the Moscow Conference.

1945

February – At the Yalta Conference, Stalin tells Roosevelt and Churchill that three months after the defeat of Nazi Germany, the U.S.S.R. will enter the war against Japan in exchange for the Kurile Islands, the southern half of Sakhalin Island, and an occupation zone in Korea. The trio also agrees to create European occupation zones after the war, with governments in liberated states formed by a mandate from a free electorate.

April-June – Delegates from fifty nations meet in San Francisco to draft the United Nations Charter. When finalized, the UN consists of the Secretariat, the General Assembly, and the Security Council. The new peacekeeping organization possesses the ability to levy economic and diplomatic sanctions, as well as request and deploy troops from member nations to troubled areas, which the League of Nations, created at the conclusion of WWI, could not do. After six days discussion, the U.S. Senate ratifies the UN charter by an eighty-nine to two vote.

June – Following the death of President Roosevelt, President Harry S. Truman, Prime Minister Clement Atlee (who replaced Churchill after British parliamentary elections), and Premier Stalin meet at the Potsdam Conference in an atmosphere plagued by confusion, misunderstanding and discord. The meeting nonetheless results in dividing the remainder of Europe and establishing occupation zones in Berlin.

January – The inaugural meeting of the UN General Assembly is held in London. The U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) is established.

March – Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill publicly recognizes the Soviet “Iron Curtain” in his speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri.

1946 – The U.S.S.R. begins exerting pressure on Iran, Turkey and Greece in efforts to bring them into the Soviet sphere. The U.S. takes steps to counter their influence and halt the spread of Communism.

1947

March – President Truman announces that it will be U.S. policy to “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures.” The “Truman Doctrine” eventually results in \$250 million in aid for Greece and \$150 million for Turkey to resist Communist influence.

July – Mr. X (State Department Soviet expert and former deputy head of the American mission in Moscow, George Kennan) publishes “Secrets of Soviet Conduct,” in *Foreign Affairs*. The article outlines what will become the policy of containment.

July – The National Security Act of 1947 creates the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense (which replaces the former War Department), and an independent U.S. Air Force.

November – The Second UN General Assembly recognizes Korea's claim to independence and makes preparations for the establishment of a government and the withdrawal of U.S. occupation forces.

1948

February – The UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) observes South Korean elections. Communists prevent UN representatives from observing elections in North Korea.

March – Great Britain, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands sign the Brussels Pact, a fifty-year treaty of alliance and economic cooperation.

May – U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall announces the European Recovery Program. Over the next four years, the United States offers an estimated thirteen billion dollars in loans and grants to western European nations to promote development of a free market as an alternative to Communism.

June – The Soviets interdict land routes into Berlin. During the ensuing 321 day-long-blockade, U.S. and British aircrews transport more than 2.3 million tons of food and supplies into the city in what becomes known as the Berlin Airlift.

August – Dr. Syngman Rhee is elected as President of the Republic of (South) Korea. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge begins the withdrawal of USAMGIK forces.

September – North Korean Prime Minister Kim Il Sung proclaims the establishment of a "People's Republic," claiming authority over the entire peninsula.

October – Communist Chinese forces drive the Nationalist Chinese from Manchuria.

1949

April – The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is formed by the U.S., Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal and the Brussels Pact nations. The Soviet-sponsored Warsaw Treaty Organization is not established until 1955.

June – The last USAMGIK forces depart South Korea, leaving 241 members of the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) behind.

August – The Soviets successfully detonate their first atomic bomb.

December – Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Chinese Army flee to Formosa (Taiwan). Mao Zedong and the Communists establish a government in China.

1950

April – National Security Council Memorandum 68 (NSC-68) announces U.S. intentions to rebuild conventional forces and ready them to fight the spread of Communism.

June – North Korea invades South Korea. As the attack begins, the Soviet delegate to the Security Council boycotts the meeting to protest the presence of Nationalist China and the refusal to seat the Chinese Communist delegation to the UN. The Soviet absence from the Security Council allows the U.S. to secure UN approval for assistance to South Korea within twenty-four hours of the first Communist attacks.

June – President Truman orders U.S. troops to Korea, acting under UN Security Council mandate, which permits American participation in the "police action" without a Congressional declaration of war. By the end of conflict, the U.S. provides ninety percent of the UN contingent, though fourteen other UN member nations will send ground, naval or air forces, and five will send medical units.

September – President Truman announces "substantial increases" of U.S. forces in Europe. By the end of the year, four additional U.S. Army divisions are ordered to Europe to support the two divisions already stationed there.

December – The Brussels Conference of foreign ministers of NATO nations approves its plan for the defense of Western Europe, naming General Dwight D. Eisenhower to command Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE).

SOURCES:

- Michael Schaller, Virginia Scharff, and Robert D. Schulzinger, *Present Tense: The United States Since 1945*, second edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996); Richard B. Morris and Jeffrey B. Morris, eds., *Encyclopedia of American History* seventh edition (New York: Harper Collins, 1996); George Brown Tindall and David E. Shi, *America: A Narrative History* fourth edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996).


OVERVIEW

WAR IN THE LAND OF THE MORNING CALM: THE KOREAN WAR

by Robert P. Wettemann



The Korean War stalled at the Panmunjom Peace Talks. Beginning in June 1951, representatives from North and South Korea haggled over POWs and territorial concessions before signing an armistice in July 1953.



In the predawn hours of 25 June 1950, more than 100,000 North Korean soldiers crossed the 38th Parallel to invade South Korea. The move by the North Korean People's Army (NKPA), a force possessing tacit and material support from the Soviet Union and combat experience gained during the 1940s Communist takeover of China, instantly turned the Cold War hot. The immediate cause of the 1950 North Korean invasion can be linked to the closing days of WWII, as two emerging superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, struggled to exert their influence over the Far East. The long-term causes of the Korean War, however, have much deeper roots, and are a product of centuries of interaction between Korea and its neighbors – China, Japan and Russia.

A LAND OF CONTRAST

A small but beautiful country, Korea occupies a peninsula separating the Sea of Japan from the Yellow Sea, only twenty-five miles northwest of Japan across the Tsushima Straits. Its northern border with China is the Yalu (Anmuk) River, and with the former Soviet Union, the Tuman (Tumen) River. About the size of Utah, Korea shares the same approximate latitude as San Francisco, CA, Wichita, KS, and Philadelphia, PA, but has a much more varied climate. Summers are generally hot and

humid, with average July temperatures of 80° F (27° C). Winters are long and bitterly cold, with temperatures in January averaging 17° F (-8° C). Icy winds sweeping down from Manchuria make it feel much colder. The monsoon season, which lasts from late June through mid-August, turns normally dusty lowlands into seas of mobility-hampering mud.¹

Korea is between 90 and 200 miles wide, and between 525 and 600 miles in length, with a 5,400 mile-long coastline. Over seventy-five percent of the country is mountainous. Most of these mountains are in the northern Nangnim and Hamgyong *sanmaeks* (ranges). The tallest peak, Paektu-San [9,003 feet (2,744 meters)], sits astride the border with China. The Yalu and Tuman Rivers flow north of the northern mountains towards the west and east respectively. In the south, the T'aebaek ("Spine of Korea") *sanmaek* dominates the eastern side of the peninsula, and is bisected by the Sobaek *sanmaek* running northeast to southwest. To the northwest, the watershed slopes towards the coast, and the Han River flows northeast through Seoul. These southern ranges also define the Nakdong River basin, which generally flows through agricultural plains found throughout the south and southeast. The western coast of the Korean peninsula has numerous offshore islands, as well as many natural harbors and waterways. The west coast tides, particularly at Inch'on, vary as much as thirty-two feet and greatly complicate coastal navigation and maritime commerce. In contrast, mountains that reach the very



THE TWO KOREAS:

The Korean Peninsula, located between the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, borders China and Russia. North Korea is mostly mountainous with considerable natural resources, contrasting with the agricultural plains located throughout South Korea. The country's aging railroad system, and sparse road network could not support the transportation demands of modern commerce or warfare.

and P'yongyang to other regional centers. A branch to the South Manchuria Railway at Sinuiju linked Korea to Asia and the rest of Europe. During WWII, rail traffic supported the external needs of Japan and trade within Korea was nonexistent. After the war, this aging system deteriorated further due to a lack of resources and attention. A sparse road network followed the rail line routes. These narrow, gravel roads with sharp curves and light-duty bridges could not support heavy vehicles, further reducing interregional traffic.⁴

KOREA AND ITS NEIGHBORS: ANCIENT TO MODERN

Discord between Korea and its neighbors, dating back thousands of years, is part of the region's rich history and politics. Korea's close proximity to Japan, and shared borders with China and Russia (later the Soviet Union) made it vulnerable to all three nations. Each left its imprint upon Korea, and all three, coupled with the post-WWII presence of the United States, were linked to the outbreak of war between a divided Korea.

Ancient Korea was originally comprised of numerous walled town-states. By the third century AD, three kingdoms dominated Korea: Paekche surrounding present-day Seoul, Koguryŏ in the north, and Silla in the central part of the peninsula. An alliance with China's Tang Dynasty allowed Silla to unify the peninsula by 668 and introduce Confucianism and Buddhism to Korea. Under Chinese patrimony, the Silla Dynasty exercised autonomous control for three centuries until its replacement by the Koryŏ Dynasty in 918. Under consistent leadership of the Koryŏ (918-1392) and Chosŏn (1392-1910) dynasties, the consolidated Koreas flourished culturally, repelling attacks from the Khitans (920s), Mongols (1230-1270), Japanese (1592-1598) and Manchus (1620-1630).⁵

China allowed Korea to manage its domestic concerns, but controlled all foreign affairs. With China's gradual decline in the mid-19th century, other nations sought access to trade with Korea. The United States, Great Britain, and Russia secured trade treaties in the 1880's, but Japan remained the greatest threat to Korean autonomy, because it hoped to dominate the entire Yellow Sea region.⁶ The Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), effectively demonstrating Japanese martial improvements made since the Meiji Restoration, ended China's dominion over Korea. The Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) granted Korea total independence from China, but opened the way for Japan to gain control.⁷

Czarist Russia challenged Japanese hegemony in Asia. When Chinese nationalists failed to end western

edge of the eastern coast emphasize the importance of ports like Hungnam, Wonsan and Pusan.²

Differences between North and South Korea extend beyond geography. There are stark contrasts in regards to resources, industry and agriculture. For much of their history, North and South Korea complemented each other and trade was active. By the end of WWII, the Japanese had concentrated most industry in the north, where hydroelectric dams and power facilities enabled the exploitation of gold, iron, tungsten, copper and graphite deposits. Mineral wealth was absent in the south. There, the population was chiefly agrarian. Rice, wheat, millet, corn, and soybeans were cultivated using centuries-old methods in the "breadbasket" region.³

Modern transportation was key to developing the Korean peninsula but the terrain posed a serious challenge. One major rail line, built by the Japanese in 1906, ran north from Sinuiju on the Yalu River, southward through P'yongyang, and eventually to Seoul. A second line joined at Seoul, linking the capital with Pusan on the southern coast. Feeder lines connected Seoul



Korea and its neighbors share a legacy of warfare and cultural exchange that, coupled with the arrival of the United States after WWII, shaped the history of modern North and South Korea.



Theodore Roosevelt, (center) with peace envoys from Russia and Japan at the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth, 1905.

influence during the Boxer Rebellion (1900), Russia moved troops into Manchuria and occupied northern portions of the Korean peninsula. Japan and Russia later agreed to jointly occupy Korea, dividing it along the 38th Parallel. The two unsuccessful invasions of Japan launched from Korea by Kublai Khan in 1274 and 1281, caused the Japanese to regard the peninsula as a “dagger pointed at the heart” of their country. Japan and Russia subsequently came to blows over the joint occupation of Korea in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).⁸ Unable to achieve a decisive land victory at Mukden, the Imperial Japanese Navy delivered a deathblow to the Russian fleet at Tsushima. The Treaty of Portsmouth, brokered by U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905, forced Russia to abandon Korea and recognize that the entire peninsula lay within a growing Japanese “sphere of influence.”⁹

Korea became Tokyo’s colony for the next forty years. On 1 March 1919, American-educated Syngman Rhee and other Korean leaders led thousands of their fellow countrymen in peaceful demonstrations against the Japanese. The marchers read a proposed declaration of independence and carried a prohibited Korean flag. Outraged by the overt display of Korean nationalism, Japanese authorities cracked down unmercifully. Hundreds of thousands of Koreans fled the country or joined underground revolutionary movements. Between 1921 and 1937, Korean expatriates tried to secure foreign

United Nations

In 1916, before the United States entered the “War to end all Wars,” American President Woodrow Wilson proposed a League of Nations to maintain international stability and prevent future conflict. Designed as a mediating body to prevent war among nations of the world, the League could impose economic sanctions but could not uphold its own mandates with military force. When the victorious European nations punished the Triple Alliance for starting the Great War, support for Wilson’s League collapsed in the United States. The Senate subsequently rejected the League’s charter, preventing an American role in the organization. Lacking American participation and without any appreciable military power, League sanctions failed to stop the rise of aggressive regimes in Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan in the 1930s.

Because of the League’s impotency, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill agreed in the 1941 Atlantic Charter that a “permanent system of general security” was needed in the post-WWII world. When Soviet entry into the war threatened the European balance of power, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill secured approval for an international peacekeeping organization from Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin at the Teheran Conference in 1943. Two weeks after President Roosevelt’s death in 1945, delegates from fifty nations at war with Germany and Japan met in San Francisco, California to draft the charter for the United Nations (UN). On 25 June 1945, the delegates unanimously approved a UN comprised of a General Assembly (the policy-making body with representatives from all member nations), a Secretariat (the Secretary General and administrative apparatus), and a Security Council (represented permanently by ambassadors from the “Big Five” – U.S., Great Britain, U.S.S.R., France, and China – plus six other nations on rotating two-year terms). Unlike the General Assembly, which met annually, the Security Council remained in constant session to mediate any emerging international dispute, with permanent members possessing the power to veto any council resolution. This new organization represented a significant improvement over the League of Nations because the UN could levy economic and diplomatic sanctions and use military force to settle international disputes.

In 1946, the UN General Assembly held its inaugural session in London. By the end of the first meeting, Cold War attitudes emerged, as both the U.S. and the Soviet Union denounced each other in the General Assembly and the Security Council. The second General Assembly, however, supported Korean independence, creating the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to observe future elections in the divided country. While UNTCOK supervised elections in South Korea in February 1948, the Soviets denied access to international commissioners observing elections in the north.



The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council held their first meetings on 10 January 1946 at Westminster Central Hall in London. Representatives from fifty-one nations attended.



During the Korean War, troops from seventeen nations served under the UN flag. Of the 616,000 UN troops that fought in the conflict, 90 percent came from the United States.

At the time of the North Korean invasion in 1950, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were again at odds in the UN. The Soviet Ambassador boycotted the Security Council’s meeting because the council refused to seat Communist China. This absence precluded a Soviet veto of the Security Council resolution to stop the invasion of South Korea and name General Douglas A. MacArthur as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC). While subsequent military action in Korea remained a UN mission, the U.S. provided ninety percent of the forces, and command remained wholly in American hands throughout the course of the war. Nonetheless, the conflict marked the first time that the UN mobilized member military forces to mediate an international conflict, establishing a precedent that continues today.

Sources:

1950 UN Yearbook, available at <http://unyearbook.un.org/unyearbook.html?name=1950index.html>, accessed 8 December 2009. “The Teheran Conference, 1943” at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/104429.htm>, accessed 16 March 2010.



In 1919, Korean protestors in the “March First Movement” opposed the Japanese occupation, marching peacefully after reading their own Declaration of Independence. The Japanese violently suppressed this display of Korean nationalism.

support for national independence. In the United States, the future South Korean President Rhee advocated democracy. Others like Kim Song-Ju (later Kim Il Sung) briefly led guerrilla groups against the Japanese in northern Korea before joining with Communists in China, who were supported by the Soviets during WWII.¹⁰

WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH


Japan incorporated Korea into its “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” during WWII. Although the Korean population grew from twenty million to twenty-five million between 1930 and 1944, they suffered terribly during the war. Koreans faced Allied bombings, conscription into the Imperial Japanese Army, or work as forced laborers, as well as economic hardship and psychological strain at the hands of the Japanese. Korea’s natural resources, particularly its timber, supplied the Japanese war machine for almost twenty years.¹¹

During WWII, the “Big Three” – U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston L. Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin – met repeatedly. Korean independence was a regular topic, as was an international organization that possessed the power to maintain peace in the postwar world. Although plans were underway for a United Nations by early 1944, Allied leadership reached no decisions regarding Korea prior to President Roosevelt’s death in April 1945. At Yalta in February 1945, Stalin agreed to enter the war against Japan three months after the Allies defeated Nazi Germany. Two new western leaders (President Harry S. Truman and Prime Minister Clement Atlee) joined Stalin at Potsdam in July 1945, but international cooperation was already unraveling.¹²

On 8 August 1945, two days after the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Soviet



Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at Yalta, February 1945.



Born Kim Sŏng-ju, Kim Il Sung led the Communist movement in Korea from 1946 until his death in 1994. During WWII, he fought against the Japanese with support from the Soviet Union.

troops attacked Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea to gain increased political leverage in Asia. Despite the Soviets’ delayed entry into the Pacific War, President Truman offered to share the occupation of Korea, dividing the country along the 38th Parallel. When Allied foreign ministers met in Moscow six months after implementing this plan, they agreed that Korea would be reunited after a five-year UN trusteeship.¹³ Although both the United States and the Soviet Union accepted the idea of a unified and independent Korea, numerous obstacles became apparent in the wake of the complicated post-war economic reconstruction and attempted social and political reconciliation.¹⁴

After the Japanese surrender on 2 September 1944, General Douglas A. MacArthur became Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), overseeing the

creation of a democratic Japan for the next six years.¹⁵ In the southern half of Korea, Lieutenant General (LTG) John R. Hodge, XXIV Corps commander, directed the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), following orders from Washington to carry out a Korean reconstruction program.¹⁶

From the outset, the U.S. Department of State desired a democratic South Korea while the Soviets organized a Communist government in North Korea. Meanwhile, the recently organized nine-member United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) announced countrywide elections of a National Assembly in Korea, a preliminary step towards unification. Soviet officials countered by announcing that UNTCOK would not be permitted to visit North Korea in early January 1948.¹⁷

Highlighting the ideological clash between the superpowers, democratically-minded Koreans competed with the Communists for control of the country. The result was two Korean governments, one north and one south, both seeking dominion over the entire peninsula. In May 1948 elections observed by UNTCOK, South Koreans voted in a two-hundred-member National Assembly chaired by Syngman Rhee. This Assembly adopted a constitution to institute a Republic of South Korea, and elected Rhee president. At this point, LTG Hodge announced the end of the U.S. occupation and initiated troop withdrawals. President Rhee soon stated his desire to reunify the peninsula under one flag.¹⁸ In July 1948, Communist supporters of Kim Il Sung formed the North Korean People's Council and drafted a resolution calling for the formation of the Supreme People's Assembly of Korea. Convened in August, this Communist-supported body adopted its own constitution and selected Kim Il Sung to be the Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.¹⁹ Neither Korean leader was satisfied. Local

An anti-Communist demonstration in South Korea, July 1948.



British Prime Minister Clement Atlee, President Harry S. Truman, and Premier Joseph Stalin at Potsdam, July 1945.



Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) General Douglas A. MacArthur greets South Korean President Syngman Rhee upon his first visit to Korea in August, 1944.





Writing as “Mr. X,” George Kennan advocated limiting the spread of Communism, a policy that would dominate U.S. conduct throughout the Cold War.

The “Truman Doctrine” pledged U.S. assistance for “free peoples . . . resisting subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures.”



Following Mao Zedong's takeover of China, most Americans believed all Communists took orders from Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin. Soviet support for North Korea and the Chinese intervention in the Korean War did little to allay these fears.

In the aftermath of WWII, the ideological conflict between the Communist Soviet Union and American free-market Democracy evolved into an all-or-nothing political competition for global dominance. After former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill pronounced in 1946 that an “Iron Curtain,” had descended across Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union entered into a Cold War that lasted until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.¹ Central to the Cold War was the American desire to expand capitalism and democracy and limit the spread of Communism, particularly in Europe.

In the wake of a growing Soviet involvement in Turkey, Greece and Iran, President Harry S. Truman announced his “Truman Doctrine” in 1947, eventually providing \$400 million in aid to “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures.”² Shortly thereafter, U.S. State Department Soviet expert George Kennan, writing under the pseudonym “Mr. X,” gave a name to this policy that lasted throughout the remainder of the Cold War. In an article published in *Foreign Affairs*, Kennan, the former deputy head of the American mission in Moscow, advocated a “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” Kennan explained that the Soviets were essentially paranoid, and would never be able to convince themselves that the West did not threaten their way of life. To protect themselves, the Communists probed into areas of perceived weakness, hoping to establish a new Communist cell and perpetuate the worldwide revolution. To counter these threats, Kennan believed that the United States (and by implication, the West), should be prepared to make the appropriate “application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points,” thus “containing” Communism.³ Americans generally considered “containment” in a European context. Beginning in 1948, the United States provided more than

\$13 billion in aid and loans under the terms of the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), transported more than 2.3 million tons of food and other supplies into Berlin during the Soviet blockade of the city, and helped found the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The 1949 success of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communists over Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalist *Kuomintang* complicated this Euro-centrism, though most analysts continued to maintain that Communists worldwide took their marching orders from Moscow. The invasion of South Korea by the North Korean Communists supported by the Soviet Union helped validate this monolithic view of Communism. The Chinese intervention launched on 25 November 1950 provided further evidence of the supposed connection between P'yongyang, Beijing, and Moscow. Efforts to rollback the spread of Communism on the Korean peninsula, however, soon foundered on fears that the regional conflict might become a global conflagration between the United States and the Soviet Union. Always conscious of the threat to allies in Europe after 1951, the U.S. limited the conflict in Korea to stabilizing the border between North and South Korea along the 38th Parallel. By the time both sides agreed to the 1953 armistice, containment was an institutionalized cornerstone of American foreign and defense policy, and would be applied in Europe, South America and Asia until 1991.

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- 3 X, “Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs* 25 (July 1947), 566-82; “Kennan and Containment,” <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/17601.htm>, accessed 22 February 2010. The content of Mr. X's article did not come as a surprise to the Truman Administration. A year earlier, Kennan had sent his “Long Telegram” to Secretary of State James Byrnes, examined the roots of Russian policy and outlined a recommended American response. The content of Kennan's earlier “Long Telegram” provided much of the justification for the Truman Doctrine.

violence erupted, but the U.S. continued its unilateral military withdrawal from the peninsula as Washington's focus shifted to Europe.

A SIMMERING CAULDRON

The United States repeatedly demonstrated its resolve to limit Communist influence in Europe with the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and response to the Soviet blockade of Berlin. American commitment to the Far East seemed to be diminishing except for the occupation of Japan. During WWII, the United States supported Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Chinese, despite General Joseph W. "Vinegar Joe" Stillwell's belief that the Nationalists were more interested in fighting Mao Zedong and his Communists than they were the Japanese. Concurrent with the U.S. occupation of Korea, Washington provided more than three billion dollars in aid to Chiang Kai-shek, now totally focused on his Communist rivals. North Korean army units supported the Chinese Communist forces, in the process gaining valuable combat experience against the Nationalist *Kuomintang* (KMT). By 1949, Chiang and his Nationalists were fighting a losing battle.²⁰

In December 1949 the defeated KMT fled to Formosa (Taiwan), and Mao established the People's Republic of China. Two months later, Mao and Stalin signed a Sino-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance, establishing what appeared to be a monolithic Communist bloc that, in American eyes, would promulgate Communism worldwide. The Cold War now divided Asia into two camps, one aligned with the Soviet Union, the other with the United States, a political reality best demonstrated on the Korean peninsula.²¹ When China fell to the Communists, it appeared that democracy was losing the Cold War in the Far East.



KMAG SSI

To add to a growing sense of power loss, the United States' atomic energy monopoly gained during WWII soon ended. In late 1949, atmospheric readings revealed that the Soviets had detonated a nuclear weapon. The fall of China, coupled with Russia's acquisition of the bomb caused the United States' government to rethink its global strategic commitments, and strengthen its atrophied conventional forces.²²

In a January 1950 speech before the National Press Club in Washington, DC, Secretary of State Dean Acheson implied that South Korea lay outside the American "defensive perimeter," a sweeping Pacific ring that included Alaska, the Ryukyu Islands, Japan, and the Philippines.²³ Given the rise of Communist China on the Asian mainland, the necessity for a significant United States military presence in the Pacific appeared reasonable. At the time of Acheson's speech, however, only the United States Military Advisory Group to the

Republic of Korea (KMAG), a 241-man element attached to the U.S. Embassy and tasked with training, logistical support and advising the young Republic of Korea Army (ROKA), remained on the peninsula. Aside from this small force, the principal U.S. contingent in Asia, the Eighth Army (EUSA) remained in Japan in an understrength post-war organization (See Troy J. Sacquety, *25 July 1950: Three Combat Forces*).²⁴

Anticipating a U.S. strategic realignment, the National Security Council (NSC) took steps to overcome the post-WWII deterioration of American military power. NSC Memorandum 68 (NSC-68) called for a massive increase in conventional military assets. While NSC-68 did not specifically address South Korea, the document made it clear that the containment of Communism dominated American foreign policy.²⁵

KOREA BOILS OVER

Communist forces prepared to test the American policy of containment before NSC-68 affected the status quo in the Far East. While critics cited Secretary Acheson's January 1950 speech as encouragement for Kim Il Sung to launch an attack, the North had invasion plans in place well before June 1950. Kim Il Sung met repeatedly with Stalin, who had furnished Soviet military aid to the NKPA as early as November 1949. On Sunday, 25 June 1950, thirty minutes of preparatory artillery fire broke the pre-dawn stillness, paving the way for the North Korean invasion south.²⁶ The NKPA targeted ROKA troop concentrations that protected road or secondary rail junctions at Ongjin, Yonan, Kaesong, Tongduch'on-ni, and P'ach'on (north of Seoul), Ch'uch'on (in central Korea), and Kangnung (along the eastern coast). NKPA infantry and armor shocked ROKA troops and their KMAG advisors, who had discounted reports dating as early as 12 June that the NKPA was massing troops along the border.²⁷

The attack caught the United States and most of the world totally unaware. As the Communist forces drove southward, the United Nations (at the urging of the U.S. government) responded. In the absence of the Soviet Ambassador, the Security Council passed a resolution authorizing member states to "repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security to the region." To halt the North Korean advance General MacArthur, now Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), ordered elements of the 24th Infantry Division into South Korea. Task Force SMITH, named for Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Charles B. Smith and comprised of 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment and augmented by a section of 75 mm Recoilless Rifles (two guns), two heavy mortar platoons from the regiment, and a battery of artillery (52nd Field Artillery Battalion), was ferried across the Tsushima Strait to delay the Communists at Osan.²⁸

Lacking an effective command and control network and logistical support, unable to communicate with ROKA forces, and with no way to coordinate air support, Task Force SMITH was little more than a "speed bump" for the North Korean juggernaut. When additional Eighth

U.S. Army (EUSA) units failed to stop the Communist offensive and MacArthur made plans to establish a defensive “toe hold” around the port at Pusan, there was no doubt that the Korean situation was far more critical than previously believed. Within five weeks, the Communists drove shattered ROKA elements and LTG Walton H. Walker’s remaining EUSA forces across the Nakdong River and into the Pusan Perimeter.²⁹ Realizing that units in theater lacked the cohesion and capability to counter the NKPA advance, General MacArthur hoped to save the withdrawing forces by reducing pressure on what remained by interdicting the enemy’s supply line. The CINC, familiar with the Alamo Scouts and 6th Ranger Battalion from his South West Pacific command during WWII, supported the creation of the GHQ Raider Company and the Eighth Army Ranger Company from other GHQ assets.³⁰ Largely out of a sense of desperation, MacArthur’s decisions renewed the Army’s interest in Special Operations. From June 1950 until April 1951, the U.S. Army mobilized a wide variety of Army SOF to fight in Korea against Communism. These units formed a legacy for today’s ARSOF elements. ♣

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IN THEATER

25 JULY 1950: THREE COMBAT FORCES

by Troy J. Sacquety

When war came to the Korean peninsula, only the North was prepared to wage the struggle to unify the two Koreas. Although designed from the start to be a defensive force, the South Korean Army was ill-prepared for the task. Likewise, the U.S.—which had not even acknowledged the possibility of war—was caught flatfooted.

NORTH KOREA

Unlike either the United States or South Korea, North Korea had been preparing for war since 1946. Details on its armed forces at the time are spotty. The ground forces were separated into two “branches.” The first was a heavily indoctrinated 50,000-man internal security force that included an 18,600-man Border Constabulary organized into five brigades, most of which were as well-equipped as the regular infantry forces.¹ The second branch was the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA).

Although estimates vary widely (as high as 223,038), most sources in June 1950 report that the NKPA fielded nearly 117,000 troops (in addition to the Border Constabulary) in the invasion force.² These soldiers were organized into two Corps consisting of seven assault infantry divisions, an armored brigade, three reserve divisions, a separate infantry regiment, and a motorcycle reconnaissance regiment.³ At full strength the NKPA infantry divisions—organized on the Soviet model—stood at eleven thousand men with an integral artillery regiment and SU-76 self-propelled gun, medical, signal, anti-tank, engineer, and training battalions.

Despite the discrepancies in troop levels and unit organization, however, sources do not disagree that the North Korean troops were better trained than their counterparts. Many North Korean soldiers were combat veterans, having served in WWII and after in the Japanese, Soviet, and Chinese Armies. The number of soldiers with prior service in the Chinese Communist Forces’ war against the Nationalist Chinese and Japanese in WWII was estimated at a third of all North Korean forces.⁴ In addition, Soviet advisors served at the division level.⁵ The North Koreans were also better armed and possessed heavier weapons than the Allies.

Chief among the heavy weapons for which the Allies had few counters was the Soviet-produced T-34/85 tank. Widely considered one of the best tanks of WWII, the T-34/85’s thick

U.S. troops pass a disabled Soviet-produced T-34/85 tank. As one of the most successful tank designs in WWII, the T-34/85 outclassed American armor early in the war.



North Korean units relied on the SU-76 as a self-propelled artillery platform. A very successful Russian vehicle from WWII, the SU-76 mounted a 76 mm gun.



The South Korean Army was not prepared to meet the onslaught from the North. With only light weapons—in this case WWII Japanese rifles—the South Koreans could not match the firepower of North Korean units.



armor and 85 mm gun meant that the Allies did not have an equal on the peninsula to counter the approximately 150 North Korean ones.⁶ The NKPA also had heavier artillery with longer ranges. Additionally, their Air Force possessed at least forty Yak-9 and Yak-3 fighters and seventy Il-10 light bombers (all propeller-driven Soviet-produced WWII aircraft) for which the ROK had no counters.⁷ The capability advantages of the NKPA were clearly demonstrated in the early days of the war.

SOUTH KOREA

Like the U.S. Army advisors and the Far East Command, the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) was also surprised by the North Korean invasion. However, in contrast to the U.S. Army, it was rapidly building up, not cutting capabilities. The ROKA dated to November 1945, originating as a police constabulary. Both South Korea and the United States recognized that a constabulary was an inadequate defense force. In 1948, efforts were made to transform the paramilitary police forces into an army modeled on current U.S. structure. A large pool of former soldiers who had served with the Chinese or Japanese in WWII were available as recruits. By June 1950, the ROKA had rapidly transformed into a ninety-eight thousand-man force organized into eight infantry divisions and a cavalry regiment.⁸ However, only four of the infantry divisions were at their full ten thousand-man authorization. Three of these full-strength divisions, and one understrength one, were deployed along the 38th Parallel. The remainder performed security duties or fought North Korean sponsored guerrillas in the countryside.⁹ In contrast to the North Koreans, the ROKA had neither tanks nor long-range artillery. And, aside from a few training and liaison aircraft, the South Korean Air Force had nothing to oppose the fighter and bomber assets of North Korea.

UNITED STATES

In 1950, the U.S. Army was a hollow shell of the force that helped win WWII; Its wartime eighty-nine divisions had been reduced to ten that were underequipped and understrength.¹⁰ With a field strength of 591,000 men, the U.S. Army was nearly 40,000 men short of its authorized

levels. Still, this ten division force had worldwide commitments.¹¹ In the divisions each regiment had two battalions and these had two companies each (one short at each level). This meant that the regiments had less than half their combat power.¹² For instance, on 6 August, the 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Benning, GA had 5,179 personnel of its authorized 18,894; some companies just had 43 of 311 authorized personnel.¹³ Only the 1st Infantry Division in Germany and the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, NC were close to full strength. The Army National Guard (ARNG) manning was just as bad. Although it had 23 infantry and 2 armored divisions, 20 regimental combat teams, and 1,353 non-divisional units, with 324,000 men, it was short 25,000 troops.¹⁴ Most significantly, the ARNG had only forty-six percent of their assigned equipment and post-war cost-saving measures meant that each unit was authorized just half of their enlisted complement. Army budgets were appalling; in fiscal year 1948, the Ordnance Department requested \$750 million for procurement and distribution of munitions, maintenance of armament manufacturing plants, training, and research and development.¹⁵ It received a little over \$245 million. The other services had experienced post-war cuts.

The entire Marine Corps strength in 1950 was 74,279. They had just two understrength divisions. At 11,853 men, the First Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, CA, including its separate air wing was, number-wise, a reinforced regimental combat team.¹⁶ The Second Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, NC was not much better. Forces overseas were less operationally ready than stateside units.

The U.S. Army had 108,500 men in General (GEN) Douglas A. MacArthur's Far East Command (FECOM), responsible for 265,000 square miles of Asia and the Pacific. They were based in Japan, the Philippines, and the Marianas, an area whose climate varied from sub-Arctic to tropical. The majority of these troops were administrative. FECOM's main combat force, the Japan-



Eighth U.S. Army
SSI

1st Cavalry
Division SSI

7th Infantry
Division SSI

24th Infantry
Division SSI

25th Infantry
Division SSI

2nd Infantry
Division SSI

5th Regimental
Combat Team SSI

based Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA), had the 1st Cavalry, and 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions. All four were short 7,000 men of their authorized war-time strength of 18,900 men.¹⁷ In addition, they were woefully undertrained. Budget cuts, limited space for regimental-size exercises, and equipment shortages were major factors.¹⁸

FECOM had received no new military equipment since WWII, and had to rely on war resources from that conflict. That had its consequences. Most vehicles were simply worn out. Of eighteen thousand Jeeps in Eighth Army, only eight thousand were serviceable.¹⁹ Just M24 Chaffee light tanks remained because Japanese roads and bridges could not handle anything heavier. But, infantry divisions only had 14 percent of their complement. Artillery units had fewer batteries and the infantry was short heavy crew-served weapons and anti-tank munitions.²⁰ The strongest element was the U.S. Air Force. They had a significant presence in the Far East and could quickly react to contingencies.

Far East Air Forces (FEAF), led by Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, had five fighter, two bomber, and one transport wing, with 1,172 aircraft.²¹ Of these aircraft, 553 were in operational units; 365 F-80s, 32 F-82s, 25 RF-80s, 26 B-26s, 22 B-29s, 6 RB-29s, 24 WB-29s, 26 C-54s, 23 SB-17s, and 4 SB-29s.²² The largest unit was the Fifth Air Force at Nagoya, Japan. Its main aircraft were F-80C fighter jets, F-82 night fighters, and B-26 light bombers. FEAF also had the Twentieth Air Force on Okinawa, with B-29 medium bombers and photo-reconnaissance planes, as well as F-80C and F-82 fighters. The Thirteenth Air Force in the



Developed as a light tank in WWII, the M24 was the only tank available to American forces when the North Koreans launched their invasion. It was no match for the T-34/85.



The F-80C was the most numerous fighter present in the Far East Air Force (FEAF) when the war began. Because of its short range, light bomb load, and a lack of replacements, many F-80C squadrons soon converted to the more durable and longer range WWII-era F-51, which the U.S. Air Force had in plentiful numbers.

Disposition of FEAF Tactical Units

2 July 1950

ITAZUKE
8 FTR BMR GP
35 FB SQ
36 FB SQ
80 FB SQ
9 FTR BMR SQ
4 FTR (AW) SQ
68 FTR (AW) SQ
339 FTR (AW) SQ (-1 FLT)

ASHIYA
8 FTR BMR SQ
FLT D 3 RESCUE SQ

IWAKUNI
3 BOMB GP
8 B SQ
13 B SQ
77 RAAF SQ


YOKOTA
35 FTR INTCP GP
39 FI SQ
40 FI SQ
41 FI SQ
8 TAC RCN SQ (PJ)
512 RCN SQ
339 FTR (AW) SQ (1 FLT)
FLT B 3 RESCUE SQ

TACHIKAWA
374 TROOP CARRIER GP
6 TC SQ
21 TC SQ

JOHNSON
FLT A 3 RESCUE SQ

MISAWA
49 FTR BMR GP
7 FB SQ
FLT C 3 RESCUE SQ





Although much reduced since WWII, the U.S. Navy quickly reacted to the emergency and provided air and shore bombardment support to the allied forces.

Philippines was equipped with F-80C, C-54, and RB-17 aircraft. All were supported by the Tokyo-based Far East Air Material Command.²³ In contrast, the U.S. Navy in the Far East was “largely a housekeeping command.”²⁴ Two Task Forces served in Japanese waters. Task Force 96, with one cruiser, four destroyers, a British patrol frigate, one submarine, and ten mine sweepers represented the naval combat capability. Task Force 90, with an amphibious command ship, an amphibious transport, an amphibious cargo ship, a Landing Ship, Tank (LST), and a tugboat, had recently arrived to train EUSA infantry regiments in amphibious warfare. The Seventh Fleet operated out of the Philippines, but postwar cuts reduced it to one aircraft carrier, one heavy cruiser, and eight destroyers.²⁵ The Japanese had a fleet of twelve freighters and thirty-nine LSTs in the Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine (SCAJAP). These vessels were leftovers from the postwar repatriation of ex-soldiers and civilians to Japan and the return of “guest” laborers in Japan to their home countries. This maritime lift would prove invaluable. [see Troy J. Sacquety, *History in the Raw* (Veritas Vol. 5, No. 3, 2009), 58-62.]

Although U.S. ground units were not prepared for the major combat operations needed to stem the NKPA onslaught, GEN MacArthur filled his combat forces from theater garrison and staff elements and rushed the 24th, 25th, and 1st Cavalry Divisions to Korea, while asking for stateside reinforcements. The Department of the Army soon sent the 2nd Infantry Division from Fort Lewis, WA, and 5th Regimental Combat Team from Hawaii. The U.S. Marine Corps created the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, with USMC Aircraft Group 33 at Camp Pendleton. Its 6,534 men arrived at Pusan on 2 August.²⁶ Despite this operational condition, American units enabled the ROKA to withdrawal into the Pusan Perimeter. But weakened, the combined forces needed help to hold against the better armed and larger NKPA. The defensive perimeter around Pusan was tenuous but there was little GEN MacArthur could do until United Nations reinforcements and heavier weapons arrived.²⁷ ▲

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- Field, Jr., *History of United States Naval Operations: Korea*.
- Rottman, *Korean War Order of Battle*, 63. Because of post-war downsizing, each of the Marine battalions had two companies instead of three.
- Jonathan M. House, *Towards Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1984), 148; Rottman, *Korean War Order of Battle*, 3–5.

IN THEATER

BORN OF DESPERATION: EARLY SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN THE KOREAN WAR

by Charles H. Briscoe

"They were desperate times and every headquarters was ready to try anything,"
—Lieutenant (j.g.) George Atcheson.


The initial efforts of the South Korean military and General Douglas A. MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Allied Forces Pacific (SCAP) and Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command (FECOM) to halt the June 1950 invasion from the north were unsuccessful. The Russian-equipped, trained, and advised North Korean People's Army (NKPA) routed the poorly-led Republic of Korea (ROK) ground forces across a wide front. After Seoul fell to the enemy juggernaut, South Korean units conducted delaying actions southward. General MacArthur, plagued by limited naval assets and airlift, committed piecemeal under-strength (two regiment divisions with two battalion regiments), poorly trained U.S. occupation troops from Japan to bolster ROK forces. When Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) commander, decided to form a defensive bastion around the southeastern port of Pusan, enemy pressure had to be reduced on the ROK and American forces to enable them to withdraw into that sanctuary.

In late July 1950, after continual setbacks in South Korea, desperation drove General MacArthur to order the formation of commando/raider forces from FECOM headquarters, to solicit British Royal Navy Far East support, and to press U.S. Commander, Naval Forces Far East (COMNAVFE) "to conduct harassing and demolition raids against selected North Korean military objectives and execute deceptive operations in Korean coastal areas" to disrupt enemy lines of communications and supply and to deceive the enemy.¹

"They were desperate times and every headquarters was ready to try anything," said Lieutenant (junior grade) George Atcheson, after his



Lieutenant General
Walton H. Walker,
Eighth U.S. Army
Commander



General Douglas A. MacArthur, Supreme Commander
Allied Powers and Commander in Chief, Far East Command.

Underwater Demolition Team 3 (UDT-3) element was pulled off a beach survey mission in Japan to successfully destroy a railroad bridge on the south coast of Korea on 6 August 1950.² While this was happening, the FECOM Adjutant General (AG) screened records for candidates to organize a "Raider Company" from General Headquarters (GHQ) volunteers.

The Pentagon was no better prepared to deal with a conventional war in Asia than was General MacArthur's Far East Command in 1950. The Russians had gotten the A-Bomb. Mao Zedong's Red Army had pushed Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Chinese Army



Eighth U.S. Army
SSI



Far East Command
SSI



General Headquarters
Raiders SSI



Above: GHQ Honor Guards salute GEN MacArthur and his aide-de-camp, COL Bunker at the entrance of the Dai Ichi building, Tokyo, Japan.



GEN MacArthur's limousine and entourage were protected by GHQ Honor Guards and given a wide berth as sirens announced its approach. At night the Five-Star vehicle plates were lit up by lights.



Far East Command was located in the Dai Ichi building in Tokyo, Japan.



U.S.M.C. Mobile Training Team Able at Camp McGill, Otawa, Japan.

from the mainland to Taiwan (Formosa), but the defense of Europe against postwar Soviet expansion was the primary U.S. military mission. Most of the Army's WWII special operations forces (six Ranger Battalions, the First Special Service Force, Merrill's Marauders, MARS Task Force, Alamo Scouts, and the Mobile Radio Broadcasting companies) had been deactivated in the massive demobilization that followed V-J Day in 1945.

On 6 August 1950, the Commanding General (CG), Headquarters and Service Group, GHQ organized a provisional unit consisting of six officers and one hundred enlisted men as part of a Raiding Forces Group.

Organizational equipment was to be provided from station and/or depot stocks, the HQ & Service Group and/or Eighth Army.³ The Provisional Raider Company was to be organized into three ten-man squads per platoon and three platoons in the company. Unit armament varied with the mission but was light, basically M-2 .30 cal. carbines and M1911A1 .45 cal. automatic pistols, with a M-1 .30-06 cal. Garand rifle, a M1918 .30-06 cal. BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle), and a M1919A2 .30-06 cal. light machinegun or 60 mm mortar per squad. A special Raider Company weapons platoon (4 officers and 56 soldiers) was to be trained and equipped, depending on the mission, with either M1A1 75 mm pack howitzers, 81 mm mortars, or 60 mm mortars.⁴


The GHQ Raiders trained at the EUSA amphibious training center. It had been established in the spring of 1950 at Camp McGill, near Otawa, on the east coast of Sagami Bay, sixty miles southwest of Tokyo. Nearby Chigasaki Beach was suitable for landing exercises.⁵ U.S.M.C. Mobile Training Team (MTT) Able [First Lieutenant (1st Lt.) James A. MacDonald, Jr., Technical Sergeant (TSgt) H.C. Mitchell, and Staff Sergeant (SSgt) Marlan A. Knobbs], augmented by additional Marine sergeants and unit officers for weapons instruction and marksmanship, began training the Raider candidates on 9 August 1950 at Camp McGill, three days after the first UDT demolitions raid.⁶

MTT Able trained the Raiders on day and night rubber boat operations from submarine and naval vessels, demolitions, and amphibious reconnaissance techniques.⁷ U.S. Navy UDT-1 officers [Lt. Shutler and Lt. (j.g.) Smith] taught surf launching and landings with the large ten-man rubber boats (RB-10s), tactical open water formations, and surf swimming before conducting practice day and night amphibious raids on Nagai Beach with live munitions, 7-8 August 1950.⁸ Tough physical conditioning, particularly long distance open water swims, and constant mental stress were a part of the culling process to select the best soldiers and to eliminate those not suited for special operations combat missions. Critical infantry skills, small unit tactics, and hand-to-hand combat were taught by the WWII veteran officers.⁹

The United Kingdom (UK) Volunteers (eleven enlisted naval ratings and three Royal Marines from the British Fleet in the Far East) joined the Raider training.¹⁰ Simultaneously, the 41 Independent Commando (225



GHQ Raiders board rubber boats from the ASSP-313 *Perch* for another training exercise.



The GHQ Raiders conducted rubber boat exercises from the ASSP-313 *Perch* (above) and the Destroyer APD 123 *Diachenko*.


Submarine ASSP-313
Perch Patch



Raider PFC Martin L. Broussard at Ascom City.



Raiders relax on Sunday at Ascom City.



Camp McGill map. (Inset: Orientation Map.)

personnel) was formed at Camp McGill with Royal Marines from England and Hong Kong.¹¹ In EUSA G-3 Operations, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) John Hugh McGee, an escaped WWII POW and guerrilla leader in the Philippines, and Pacific theater regimental commander (169th Infantry Regiment, 43rd Infantry Division) proposed guerrilla operations in North Korea. He was given the mission to recruit a WWII-style Alamo Scout or Ranger Company. EUSA General Order No. 237, dated 24 August 1950, authorized the formation of the seventy-six man (three officers and seventy-three enlisted men) Eighth Army Ranger Company.¹²


After an intense 30-day training regimen, MTT Able rated the GHQ (Provisional) Raider Company "operationally ready" on 10 September 1950. The UK Volunteer Force led by Captain E.G.D. Pounds was qualified four days later as an independent unit capable of carrying out small amphibious raids, demolition missions, and reconnaissance raids. Raiders referred to the fourteen-man British element as "Pounds' Force."¹³

In the meantime, General MacArthur's orders to conduct harassing and interdiction raids behind North Korean lines along the coasts led to unilateral action by the services and the United Kingdom. Coordination was minimal as the

U.S. Navy commenced to launch special operations. The combined, joint Raiding Force Group of GHQ Raiders, 1st Marine Division Reconnaissance Company, UDT-1, United Kingdom (UK) Volunteer Force, and the 41 Independent Commando Royal Marines fell apart before it could be assembled. But, South Korea supported the concept of carrying the fight behind enemy lines. Three hundred specially-selected ROK military and policemen were sent to Camp McGill on 19 September 1950, to receive thirty days of raider and guerrilla training. A U.S. Army advisory team, led by LTC William G. "Mike" White, was assigned and they became the Special Attack Battalion (SAB) of the Special Activities Group (SAG), the name selected for MacArthur's Raiding Force Group.¹⁴

The Special Operations Group (SOG) of Amphibious Group One (PhibGruOne) that had the USS *Bass*, *Begor*, *Diachenko*, and *Wantuck* [(APDs 124, 127, 123, and 125), UDT-1, and the U.S. Marine 1st Recon Company (-) assigned conducted a series of demolition raids against railroad targets (tracks, bridges, and tunnels) along the east coast of Korea, 12-15 August 1950.¹⁵ The PhibGruOne staff operations officer, most recently the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the Navy's Amphibious Reconnaissance School, Coronado, California, USMC Major Edward P. Dupras, was a WWII Raider Battalion veteran. The APDs (by U.S. Navy Hull classification AP = transport and D = destroyer) had been specially modified to support Raider operations during WWII and operational UDT elements were already in Japan for the EUSA amphibious training program.¹⁶

In reference to the PhibGruOne SOG, "We were ready to do what nobody else could do, and what nobody else wanted to do," said Lt. Teddy Roosevelt Fielding, the Executive Officer of the UDT-1 detachment.¹⁷ Still, attempting to destroy railroad tunnels with explosives proved to be an exercise in futility, though the explosion at night was "a sight to behold" according to Lt. (j.g.) K.J. Christoph, UDT-1. The tunnels remained intact even when an ammunition train found hiding inside added to the explosive power. "It simply blew a huge fart out both ends," clarified Lt. (j.g.) George Atcheson.¹⁸ Part of the



U.S. Navy and Marine Corps maritime raids in Korea in 1950.
(Dwyer, *Commandos From the Sea*, 260)



WWII U.S.M.C.
Raider SSI



Lt. George Atcheson, UDT-3
(Dwyer, *Commandos From the Sea*, 122)



Destroyer APD 123
Diachenko Patch



Destroyer APD 123 *Diachenko*

deception plan to mask General MacArthur's counter-offensive against the North Korean Army was a subsequent mission assigned to the PhibGruOne SOG.

Rear Admiral James H. Doyle (PhibGruOne) tasked the SOG to carry out several beach recons on the west coast to locate possible alternative landing sites for Inch'on. Doyle and Major General (MG) Oliver P. "O.P." Smith, the 1st Marine Division commander, were leery of the dangerous tidal ranges and flat beach gradients at Inch'on. During darkness on 21 August 1950 the USS *Bass*, carrying the UDTs and Recon Marines, arrived just off the first objective, a beach at the opening of a narrow bay 60 miles south of Inch'on. Two other destroyers accompanied the *Bass* to provide fire support if needed. To take advantage of high tide the



Rubber boats on HMS *Whitesand Bay*.

beach landing party had to operate under an almost full moon. But, everything went as planned. The *Bass* recovered all personnel and moved further south to Kunsan, the second objective.¹⁹

The next beach reconnoitered had an airstrip nearby guarded by North Korean troops living in a barracks to the north. This beach was protected by a centrally-located machinegun bunker above the sand dunes. The Marines landed after receiving an "all clear" signal from the scout swimmers and scattered to establish a defensive perimeter. While the UDT teams prepared to make depth soundings and measure beach gradients, an enemy patrol was spotted approaching the Marine perimeter. A loud warning shout in English triggered the enemy machinegun team to rake the beach with heavy fire, badly wounding the Marine sergeant who sounded the alarm. With the recon compromised, an immediate withdrawal was ordered. Because loaded rubber boats created bigger targets in the moonlight, everyone slipped overboard to swim them out of small arms range. Some of the boats, hit by the gunfire, were barely usable. In the confusion of breaking contact, men were left behind.²⁰

A rescue party had to be launched from the *Bass* to recover nine Marines and a UDT-3 seaman, Mack Boynton. Rifle and machinegun fire greeted the rescue force, but the Marines, including two wounded, were recovered. Finding his boat deflated by gunfire, Boynton swam the two miles back to the APD. Luckily, he got to the vessel shortly after the rescue party was recovered. He was pulled aboard after shouting, "Ahoy the *Bass*."²¹ Three weeks later the GHQ Raider Company and Pounds' Force returned to reconnoiter the Kunsan beaches.²²

The last major feint to distract the North Koreans from the Allied invasion site at Inch'on was done by Army and



The Royal Navy Frigate HMS *Whitesand Bay* took the Raiders and Pounds' Force to Kunsan, a 100 miles south of Inch'on, where they disembarked in rubber boats to reconnoiter three beach areas.



3rd Squad, 3rd Platoon less Joe Myers on HMS *Whitesand Bay*.
Standing L to R Davis, Ulshoefer, Cooper, Bach, Bates; kneeling L to R Young, Hisao, Miklovic.; sitting L to R Unknown, Boyer.

British Raiders of General MacArthur's Special Activities Group. The GHQ Raider Company (106 personnel) and the 14 men of the UK Volunteer Force (Pounds' Force) received the 13 September 1950 mission. This combined raiding element, attached to COMNAVFE for operations effective 7 September and "chopped" to X Corps on 9 September were led by Major James H. Wear, a WWII combat infantryman. The new SAG commander, artillery Colonel Louis B. Ely, accompanied them.²³

The Royal Navy frigate, HMS *Whitesand Bay*, carried the two elements just below Kunsan, about 100 miles south of Inch'on, where the raiding force disembarked in ten-man rubber boats to reconnoiter four separate beach sites. The northern element, the 3rd Platoon (1LT Louie W. Donoho) GHQ Raiders led by MAJ Wear, the central force (1LT Albert T. Noreen, Jr., 2nd Platoon), and the smallest, LT Pounds' Force (accompanied by MAJ D.L.S.M. Aldridge, executive officer, 41 Commando, observing) headed to their assigned beaches on the mainland while 1LT Daryl G. Robb, accompanied by COL Ely and escorted by 1LT James W. Clance, a battlefield-commissioned WWII paratrooper, headed toward Sokae-do to secure that island and cover the withdrawal from the Kunsan beaches. MAJ Wear with 3rd Platoon (north) was separated from the center beach site (LT Noreen and 2nd Platoon) by a promontory on the mainland. Pounds proceeded with his force to investigate the southernmost beach.²⁴

Pounds' Force encountered no resistance, but the Raider force on the northern beach began receiving heavy enemy machinegun fire shortly after the flotilla of RB-10s



The GHQ Raider & Pounds' Force conducted reconnaissance on several Kunsan beaches, 13-14 September 1950 prior to the Allied invasion of Inch'on.

grounded ashore. "When we hit the beach, we did all the right things. We grabbed the rubber boats and went up about fifteen yards, all the while stomping on small rocks. It sounded like Headquarters and Service Battalion parading down the street from the Dai Ichi building. When the machinegun opened up, I remember green and orange flashes [tracer] and the sound of air being lost from the rubber boats," said Sergeant First Class (SFC) Patrick T. Gannon, Sr.²⁵ The first burst of .61 cal machinegun fire seriously wounded Corporal (CPL) Raymond E. Puttin, crouching near MAJ Wear.

Unbeknownst to the Kunsan beach recon elements, CPL John W. Maines was killed and 1LT Clance seriously wounded on Sokae-do after scouting the island. Hearing the firing on the mainland, Robb's platoon began returning to their boats where COL Ely and some guards were waiting.²⁶ The lightly armed Raiders and Forcemen held their fire when the enemy opened up on



GHQ Raider PFC John W. Connor with Pounds' Force commando on the HMS Whitesand Bay.



X Corps SSI



The X Corps Raiders were included in the Navy Presidential Unit Citation awarded to the 1st Marine Division, Reinforced by the Secretary of Navy on 11 October 1950.

the northern beach recon party. "I was in a prone position with the bolt pulled back on my Thompson [sub-machinegun], but no orders came to fire – so, I didn't. I was happy that we had the discipline we did, because I had no way of knowing that those dim, fast-moving figures [on Kunsan beach] were our own people," recalled SFC Gannon.²⁷

Having been discovered, MAJ Wear and the other commanders ordered an immediate withdrawal. Since they were not carrying hand grenades and had no radio to call for covering fire to break contact, the withdrawal and escape in the rubber boats proved chaotic. In the confusion CPL Puttin, treated and being

sheltered by Raider medic CPL Billy D. Oneyear, was evacuated to the boats.²⁸

However, the dead Maines and mortally wounded Clance were left behind on the island of Sokae-do. COL Ely who was trailing behind the island recon force seemed to have been the only one to fire his weapon. He claimed afterwards to have "killed a few g----" in the darkness.²⁹ When the colonel turned on a flashlight and began calling the roster to account for everyone, its beam served as a magnet for enemy fire. A Raider put an end to that by knocking the flashlight into the sea. The enemy fire was so intense that PFC Robert Bach, BAR ammo bearer for PFC Delmer E. Davis, 3rd Squad, 3rd Platoon had his paddle shattered by machinegun fire.³⁰

After the elements assembled they paddled back to the Whitesand Bay. Later that night a valiant attempt to recover the two Raiders left behind on Sokae-do island was scrubbed when the volunteers discovered the shore



General MacArthur watches the bombardment of Inch'on from the bridge of the USS *Mount McKinley* with (left to right) MG E.K. Wright, Vice Admiral A.D. Struble, and MG Edward M. Almond, X Corps commander.

swarming with NKPA soldiers.³¹ Aboard ship CPL Puttin died before the *Whitesand Bay* could meet a naval vessel with a surgeon. The Raider was buried at sea late the next afternoon as the SAG forces proceeded north for their next mission.³²

During the Inch'on invasion planning, Major General Edward M. Almond, Chief of Staff, UN Command, and COL Ely had conjured up another mission to follow the Kunsan feint. The HMS *Whitesand Bay* would carry SAG forces to a transfer point between the two UN coastal blockade screening stations, 26 and 27. While at sea, they were to transfer to ROK naval vessels which would ferry them to a point off Changbong-sudo. Then, the SAG elements were to unload their RB-10s and paddle three miles on the evening tide of D-Day (15 September 1950) to land at Koajan-ni. From there, the reinforced Raider company was to move overland (twelve miles) and seize Kimpo Airfield by D+1 and hold it until relieved by 1st Marine Division. The airfield was reputedly guarded by a battalion-sized NKPA force.³³

Even though the 1st Marine Division commander, MG O.P. Smith, had convinced MG Almond to cancel the airfield assault, COL Ely chose to ignore the decision and continued on with the mission. However, transloading personnel and equipment from vessel to vessel at sea proved extremely difficult and time consuming (because it had never been practiced). Hence, by the time the ROK vessels reached the drop off point in the Han River estuary, the outgoing tide was at its peak. The current was too strong to launch the rubber assault boats. Crossing two miles of mud flats at low tide after the RB-10s grounded was still another impossible challenge for the combined raiding force.³⁴

While it was a good thing in retrospect, the Raiders' failure to get ashore caused them to be stranded aboard APA-27, USS *George Clymer*, until D+4. APA-27 had carried elements of the 1st Marine Division from Japan for the Inch'on invasion. Afterwards, it steamed offshore serving



Map of United Nations Command Offensive, 15-20 September 1950. (Boose, *Over the Beach*, 175)

as the alternate amphibious command and control vessel and hospital ship. The upper deck was rigged up as an emergency evacuation center that had "operating and recovery rooms as well as small surgical and medical wards."³⁵ The aborted Kimpo mission was the end of the Raiders' amphibious raiding role and COL Ely as the SAG commander.³⁶ However, "we had a ringside seat, just like General MacArthur did on the USS *Mount McKinley* for the Inch'on invasion," said PFC Delmer E. Davis, BAR man, 3rd Squad, 3rd Platoon of the GHQ Raiders.³⁷

"The Provisional Raider Company and the Royal Navy Volunteer Group were successfully employed in the Kunsan, Korea area on D-1 and 2 in implementation of the Cover and Deception Plan for the Inch'on invasion. They were successfully withdrawn from this area and moved to the objective area on D-Day to be debarked with objective of capturing Kimpo Airfield. This latter operation was cancelled due to inability to launch the small boats." These were General MacArthur's comments in his message to Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, after the successful landings at Inch'on.³⁸



The GHQ Raiders and Pounds' Force embarked on APA-27 USS George Clymer for three days following the aborted Kimpo Airfield mission.

BG E.W. Piburn, the CG of Headquarters and Service Command, GHQ cited the Raider Company for its significant role in the Inch'on invasion (Operation CHROMITE): "The Raider Company, particularly the diversionary attack [at Kunsan], materially aided in the success of the Inch'on invasion."³⁹ Thus, they were included in a Navy Presidential Unit Citation (as the Army Special Operations Company) awarded to 1st Marine Division, Reinforced for exemplary service from 15 September to 11 October 1950 by the Secretary of the Navy.⁴⁰

General MacArthur's FECOM Chief of Staff and newly appointed X Corps commander, MG Almond, realized the value added (intelligence collection and counter-guerrilla operations) that SAG could provide to his corps in North Korea. And, supporting ground SOF missions was much simpler than coordinating naval assets to conduct coastal raiding. The X Corps Raiders and the ROK Special Attack Battalion of SAG performed superbly in North and South Korea for MG Almond.

Special operations during the Korean War were primarily shaped by weather, moon phases (tides and illumination) and driven by availability of transport for delivery, recovery, resupply, level of unit training, service branch and/or Allied contingent support. The absence of unified command and control added to the confusion and competition for scarce delivery means. Strategic employment of special operations forces was largely ignored. Critical tactical situations at regiment and battalion level regularly caused them to be used as assault elements for infantry attacks, armor force protection, reaction forces to recapture key terrain, to "plug gaps," or simply to blunt enemy penetrations in static defensive lines.⁴¹

It was the availability of transportation that most determined what was done by special operations units in Korea. The American Raiders and Rangers in Korea shared three things in common: Both did a lot of walking; both did very little truck riding; and, they fought with distinction until their deactivations in late July and early August 1951. The GHQ/X Corps Raiders, the EUSA Ranger Company, and the six Ranger Infantry (Airborne Companies (trained at Fort Benning, Georgia) that served in Korea faded from Army rolls without fanfare less than a year after being created.⁴² ♣

Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and the Lodge Act.

Endnotes

- 1 U.S. Navy. Commander, Naval Forces, Far East (COMNAVFE) message DTG 270344Z July 1950 to CTF 90 via Operations Order (OPORDER) 11, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 2 Letter, George Atcheson to John B. Dwyer, July 1985, cited in John B. Dwyer, *Commandos From the Sea: The History of Amphibious Special Warfare in World War II and the Korean War* (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1998), 237.
- 3 General Headquarters, Far East Command, APO 500 letter AG 320 (6 Aug 50) GC-TC to CG, Headquarters and Service Group, General Headquarters, Far East Command, APO 500, SUBJECT: Provisional Group, Raiding Forces dated 6 August 1950, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 4 GHQ, FECOM, Outgoing message from CINCFE (MacArthur) to DA WASH DC, 121343 September 1950, PERSONAL FOR GEN Collins (CSA), USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 5 Donald W. Boose, Jr., *Over the Beach: U.S. Army Amphibious Operations in the Korean War* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 82.
- 6 U.S. Navy. Mobile Training Team Able, Troop Training Unit, Amphibious Training Command, Pacific Fleet, Letter SUBJECT: Report of Team Operations for the Period 24 July 1950 to 7 November 1950 dated 7 November 1950 hereafter cited as MTT Able Report and Letter ComPhibGruOne, file AT6-3/35/ceb Serial 007 dated 6 August 1950, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 7 MTT Able Report and Letter ComPhibGruOne, file AT6-3/35/ceb Serial 007 dated 6 August 1950.
- 8 MTT Able Report and Letter ComPhibGruOne, file AT6-3/35/ceb Serial 007 dated 6 August 1950.
- 9 MTT Able Report, Letter ComPhibGruOne, file AT6-3/35/ceb Serial 007 dated 6 August 1950; retired CWO-3 Delmer E. Davis, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 25 August 2009, Ft. Bragg, NC, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date, and retired 1SG Daniel W. Bish, telephone interview by Dr. Briscoe, 26 October 2009, Fort Bragg, NC, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 10 MTT Able Report and Letter ComPhibGruOne, file AT6-3/35/ceb Serial 007 dated 6 August 1950. Fred Hayhurst, *Green Berets in Korea: The Story of 41 Independent Commando Royal Marines* (Cambridge, England: Vanguard Press, 2001), 28 stated that "the Fleet Volunteers consisted of ten sailors and six Royal Marines. Petty Officer John Tate (KIA November 1950) was the senior Royal Navy rating and Corporal Raymond (Sweeney) Todd was the senior Royal Marine."
- 11 GHQ, FECOM, Outgoing message from CINCFE (MacArthur) to DA WASH DC, 121343 September 1950, PERSONAL FOR GEN Collins (CSA).
- 12 Retired COL Ralph Puckett, Jr., telephone interview By Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 15 October 2009, Fort Bragg, NC, personal notes, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC and Robert W. Black, *Rangers in Korea* (New York, NY: Ivy Books, 1989), 13-14. According to COL Puckett, LTC Hugh McGee had been searching for the 6th U.S. Army Alamo Scouts TO&E (Table of Organization & Equipment) when he found one for a WWII Ranger Battalion. He took the personnel numbers and equipment for a Ranger Company from it. McGee told Puckett that had he found the Alamo Scout authorization document first, the unit would have been the Eighth Army Scouts instead of the Rangers.
- 13 MTT Able Report and Letter ComPhibGruOne, file AT6-3/35/ceb Serial 007 dated 6 August 1950. According to Hayhurst, *Green Berets in Korea*, 42, LTC D.D. Drysdale, the Independent 41 Commando commander selected Lieutenant Derek Pounds, Royal Marines, to lead the Fleet Volunteers.
- 14 GHQ, FECOM message from CINCFE (MacArthur) to DA WASH DC, 121343 September 1950, PERSONAL FOR GEN Collins, John B. Dwyer letter to Delmer E. Davis, 26 October 1999, Subject: GHQ Raiders, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, and retired ROK MG Jangnai Sohn (former SAB platoon and company commander) email to David L. Carter, Subject: Special Attack Battalion Questions, 10 September 2009, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. MG Sohn provided reality about the ROK volunteers. Among the 300 volunteers were wounded veterans just out of the hospital and new, untrained conscripts. The training at Camp McGill was described as "very rigorous. Quite a few of the soldiers drowned while conducting rubber boat landings at night in a bad storm."

- 15 Dwyer, *Commandos From the Sea*, 239-240. The US Navy Hull classification APD meant "AP" for transport and "D" for destroyer.
- 16 Dwyer, *Commandos From the Sea*, 232, 239.
- 17 Taped recollections of retired USN Captain Teddy Roosevelt Fielding to John B. Dwyer, July and November 1985, cited in Dwyer, *Commandos From the Sea*, 239.
- 18 Letter, Rear Admiral K.J. Christoph, Jr. to John B. Dwyer, May 1994, and Letter, George Atcheson to John B. Dwyer, October 1985, cited in *Commandos From the Sea*, 240, 241.
- 19 Dwyer, *Commandos From the Sea*, 242.
- 20 Dwyer, *Commandos From the Sea*, 242-243 and Bish interview, 26 October 2009.
- 21 Taped recollections of retired USN Captain Teddy Roosevelt Fielding to John B. Dwyer, July and November 1985, cited in Dwyer, *Commandos From the Sea*, 242-243. The Special Operations Group (SOG) of PhibGruOne was awarded a Navy Unit Commendation for its 12-15 August 1950 missions that read in part: "For outstanding heroism in support of military operations 200 miles behind enemy lines on the east coast (of Korea), destroying bridges, disrupting enemy lines of communications, and conducting hydrographic surveys of enemy-held beaches." Dwyer, *Commandos From the Sea*, 244.
- 22 Hayhurst, *Green Berets in Korea*, 44.
- 23 David I. Carter, GHQ Raiders draft article corrections note to Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 23 September 2009, Fort Bragg, NC, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Davis interview, 25 August 2009; Dwyer, *Commandos From the Sea*, 243; CINCFE Memorandum SUBJECT: Prov Raider Co and Royal Navy Volunteer Grp Attached to COMNAVFE for Operations dated 7 Sep 50 [UN/18 (TS-F) Bk 1], General Headquarters, United Nations Command, General Orders No. 7: Establishment of Command dated 5 September 1950, National Archives, Record Group 7, Box 1, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC and Hayhurst, *Green Berets in Korea*, 42-44. Special Activities Group (SAG) had the mission to "organize, train, and prepare for employment a group of specially qualified U.N. command units and individuals to conduct such raiding, commando, intelligence, and other operations as may be directed by the Commander in Chief (MacArthur)." Interestingly, Seaman Johnnie Futcher, Pounds Force, had volunteered while assigned to the HMS *Whitesand Bay*.
- 24 Carter, GHQ Raiders draft article corrections note to Dr. Briscoe, 23 September 2009, Davis interview, 25 August 2009; Dwyer, *Commandos From the Sea*, 243; CINCFE Memorandum SUBJECT: Prov Raider Co and Royal Navy Volunteer Grp Attached to COMNAVFE for Operations dated 7 Sep 50 [UN/18 (TS-F) Bk 1], GHQ, UNC General Orders No. 7: Establishment of Command dated 5 September 1950, National Archives, Record Group 7, Box 1, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC and Hayhurst, *Green Berets in Korea*, 42-44.
- 25 Patrick T. Gannon, Sr. email to Delmer Davis, 25 June 1999, Subject: GHQ RAIDER COMPANY, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 26 John W. Connor, *Let Slip the Dogs of War: A Memoir of the GHQ 1st Raider Company (8245th Army Unit) a.k.a. Special Operations Company Korea, 1950-51* (Bennington, VT: Merriam Press, 2008): 106, 107; Dwyer, *Commandos From the Sea*, 243-244; Boose, *Over the Beach*, 176, and retired British MG D.E.K. Pounds' comments in Dwyer letter to Patrick T. Gannon, 14 April 2000. "My force landed on extreme right of Kongsoon (Kunsan) beach. Landing conditions were good – rising tide, half-moon, visibility 100 yds. My mission was to probe inland as far as the railway, protect the right flank, and recon enemy positions." In letters to John B. Dwyer from Colonel James H. Wear and LTC Albert T. Noreen, October and December 1994, *The Raiders* were victims of friendly fire. While the body of CPL John W. Maines was recovered several days later, that of mortally wounded 1LT James W. "Tiger" Clance, an 82nd Airborne Division WWII veteran, was not found. Source Note 10, Dwyer, *Commandos From the Sea*, 244 and Davis interview, 25 August 2009. CPL Raymond E. Puttin died of his wounds aboard the HMS *Whitesand Bay* and was buried at sea on 14 September 1950. Boose, *Over the Beach*, 176 and excerpts from HMS *Whitesand Bay* log, 12-13 September 1950 in Dwyer letters to Davis, 19 & 23 February 2000. "13 Sept. 1910 hrs. (just after sunset) speed slow ahead, the body of Pvt 1st Class R. Puttin (died of wounds rec'd ashore) laid to rest with military honors."
- 27 Gannon email to Davis, 25 June 1999, Subject: GHQ RAIDER COMPANY.
- 28 Daniel W. Bish, GHQ Raiders draft article corrections note to Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 30 September 2009, Norco, CA; Dwyer, *Commandos From the Sea*, 244; Davis interview, 25 August 2009, and excerpts from HMS *Whitesand Bay* log, 12-13 September 1950 in Dwyer letters to Davis, 19 & 23 February 2000. "First 'dinghy' carrying mission personnel left ship at 2248 on 12 Sept. Firing ashore first heard about 2 hrs. later. Then, first boat returned to ship at 0110."
- 29 Davis interview, 25 August 2009.
- 30 Davis email to Dwyer, 7 September 2001, Subject: Some Kunsan Details & Questions, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 31 David I. Carter email to Delmer Davis, 26 October 1999, Subject: GHQ First Raider Company Korean War 1950-51, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, and Connor, *Let Slip the Dogs of War*, 107.
- 32 Bish, GHQ Raiders draft article corrections note to Dr. Briscoe, 30 September 2009, Dwyer, *Commandos From the Sea*, 244, Davis interview, 25 August 2009, and excerpts from HMS *Whitesand Bay* log, 12-13 September 1950 in Dwyer letters to Davis, 19 & 23 February 2000.
- 33 Headquarters, X Corps, APO 909 (Tokyo), OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE Joint Message from CG (MG Almond), FRAGO supplementing X Corps OPOD One (26 Aug 50) dated 9 September 1950, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 34 Boose, *Over the Beach*, 186.
- 35 Bish note to Dr. Briscoe, 30 September 2009, "USS *George Clymer* (APA-27," NavSource Online: Amphibious Photo Archive, <http://www.navsource.org/archives/10/03/03027/03/03027.htm> dated 10/21/2009, Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, "George Clymer," http://www.history.navy.mil/danfs/g4/george_clymer.htm dated 10/21/2009, and Davis email to Gannon, 1 September 1999, Subject: GHQ Raider Company, Korean War, verified that the USS *George Clymer* was the command & control ship to which the Raiders were delivered after their Kimpo Airbase mission was aborted.
- 36 Boose, *Over the Beach*, 186.
- 37 Davis interview, 25 August 2009.
- 38 GHQ, FECOM Outgoing message from CINCFE (MacArthur) to DA WASH DC, 121343 September 1950, PERSONAL FOR GEN Collins (CSA). Some of the Royal Marines from Pounds' Force were integrated into 41 Commando and the seamen were reassigned to Royal Navy units in theater.
- 39 Headquarters and Service Command, General Headquarters, Far East Command, 8252d Army Unit, APO 500 Letter of Commendation to CPL Martin L. Broussard, HHC, Staff Battalion dated 31 July 1951 from BG E.W. Piburn, copy, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 40 Presidential Unit Citation (U.S. Navy) from http://www.1stmarinedivision.org/puc-nuc-citation-folder/korea.50_Page1.htm dated 11/25/03.
- 41 Retired MG John K. Singlaub, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 12 September 2008, Fort Bragg, NC, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 42 Eighth United States Army, Korea. General Order No. 584 dated 25 July 1951 cited in Black, *Rangers in Korea*, 202.

The Provisional Raider Company, 203 men, and the Royal Navy Volunteer Group, were successfully withdrawn from the Kunsan, Korea area on D-1 and 2 and moved to the objective area on D-Day to be debarked with the objective of capturing Kimpo Airfield (shown below). This latter operation was cancelled due to inability to launch the small rubber boats.



IN THEATER

GHQ RAIDERS: WONSAN TO CHANG-TO

by Eugene G. Piasecki

As Dr. Charles H. Briscoe explained in "Born of Desperation: Early Special Operations in the Korean War," the situation on the Korean Peninsula for the U.S., UN, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in mid-1950 was anything but promising. General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP) and Commander in Chief, Far East Command (FECOM), realized he had to stop the advancing North Korean People's Army (NKPA) to save what remained of American and ROK forces. In response, he directed the creation of a special commando/raider unit (GHQ Raiders) to conduct harassing and deception operations behind the lines, and force the enemy to divert valuable resources to reduce these threats.¹ Having proven themselves at Kunsan, the Raiders entered the second phase of their employment with Major General (MG) Edward M. "Ned" Almond's X Corps from October 1950 until 15 January 1951. The biggest Raider action took place during this phase and prevented elements of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) 10th Division from obtaining much-needed food supplies at Chang-to and establishing a guerrilla base in South Korea.

On 5 September 1950, FECOM established the Special Activities Group (SAG) to provide organizational control, training and support for the all-volunteer Provisional Raider Company, the 41st Royal Marine Commando, United Kingdom, the Royal Navy Volunteer Group, and the United States Marine Corps Provisional Raider Company, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific. Employed as a deception during the Inch'on invasion, the Raiders and Royal Navy Volunteer Group successfully accomplished that mission and proceeded with X Corps orders to harass and destroy key installations and personnel enroute to Seoul.² The reestablishment of South Korea's government in Seoul on 29 September 1950 temporarily left X Corps and the GHQ Raiders without missions. General MacArthur, with U.S. Presidential approval, had formulated a plan to extend his UN operation into North Korea.³ This provided



29 September 1950. Syngman Rhee and General MacArthur at the ceremony to return the capitol of South Korea to Seoul.

General Headquarters
Raiders SSI



X Corps SSI



MacArthur with two benefits. It kept X Corps and the GHQ Raiders separate from EUSA in theater and reoriented the Raiders from an amphibious to an anti-guerrilla force which could be employed as part of the X Corps effort to destroy North Korean defenses around P'yongyang.⁴

To prepare, X Corps became the GHQ reserve and the Raiders were designated as the X Corps reserve.⁵ On the same date (1 October 1950), MacArthur announced his intention to conduct a second amphibious landing at the North Korean naval base of Wonsan. The FECOM Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group concept called for X Corps to re-embark on naval transports at Inch'on, sail around Pusan to Wonsan Harbor and assault Korea's east coast by 20 October 1950. After establishing a beachhead, X Corps would occupy northeast Korea and attack west across the mountains toward P'yongyang while the Eighth Army attacked north from Seoul to the Communist capital. Dismissing concerns about splitting his forces (Eighth Army and X Corps) by terrain and distance, MacArthur believed this assault, coordinated from Japan, was in no danger of NKPA counterattacks or intervention by Chinese forces.⁶

With X Corps and GHQ focused on strategic issues, GHQ United Nations Command headquarters activated a Special Activities Group (SAG) [8227th Army Unit (AU)] with a Headquarters and Service Company at Camp McGill, Japan. The SAG and SAG Service Company, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Wallace M.

Hanes, received an additional 302 soldiers, and were assigned to FECOM, attached to UNC, and Japan Logistical Command for administrative and logistical support.⁷ The GHQ Raider Company, now labeled the 1st Provisional Raider Company (8245th Army Unit), commanded by Major (MAJ) James H. Wear, was separate from the SAG. No longer needed for FECOM amphibious operations, the 41st Royal Marine Commando under British control was attached to USMC, and the Royal Navy Volunteer Group disbanded with personnel returning to their respective ships. Then, on 13 October 1950, Wear and the Raiders boarded the attack transport USS *General W. A. Mann*, AP-112 for the 830-mile voyage to Wonsan.

The Raiders and the 1st Marine Division finally reached their destination near the Wonsan airport on 26 October 1950. Delayed by mines in the harbor, the Raiders eventually off-loaded to a Japanese-manned World War II Landing Ship Tank (LST) that took them ashore. In the meantime, FECOM had alerted X Corps to a possible mission change in the event Eighth Army captured P'yongyang. Now, X Corps was to attack north toward the Yalu instead of west. MG Almond would be the principal commander of Allied forces in northeast Korea above the thirty-nine degrees and ten minutes north parallel. The ROK 3rd and Capital Divisions had been pushing northward up Korea's eastern coast since 11 October 1950 and had swept through Wonsan. The

need for a X Corps amphibious assault vanished as the Americans floated off-shore.⁸ When Brigadier General (BG) Kim Paik Il's ROK I Corps advanced toward the industrial city of Hamhung and its port, Hungnam, the North Koreans fled in disorder.⁹ The ROK I Corps progress and the EUSA capture of P'yongyang prompted MacArthur to change the X Corps mission on 24 October 1950. It was to attack north and concentrate forces in the Hungnam-Hamhung area instead of Wonsan.¹⁰

The X Corps secondary flank attack through North Korea's Taebaek Mountains would be led by the Raiders. Beginning on 26 October 1950, Raider platoons conducted independent long-range reconnaissance patrols, established or destroyed enemy roadblocks, supported Korean intelligence agents operating behind enemy lines, countered guerrilla activities, and performed outpost duties, convoy escort, and whatever other mission was required of them.¹¹ Patrolling to eliminate sniper harassment, destroying roadblocks, and detecting enemy activity, the Raiders supported the 1st Marine Division moving from Wonsan to Hungnam. They worked closely with the 1st and 5th Marine Regiments. This independence lasted until the SAG headquarters landed at Wonsan on 25 November 1950.

LTC Hanes established a SAG base camp at the North Korean airbase at Yongduk. There he reorganized,



41st Royal Marine
Commando Shield




Major James H. Wear commanded the 1st Raider Company
from August 1950 to January 1951.



USS *General W. A. Mann*, (AP 112) took the Raiders
from Inch'on to Wonsan.

The Taebaek Mountain Range in North Korea runs north to south near the Sea of Japan and naturally separates the country in half.

GHQ Raiders 1950-1951



NOTES: *Message, CINCFE Tokyo, Japan to DA Wash GC-O, Pentagon dated 23 September 1950 approved by BG E. K. Wright, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. The GHQ Raider Company was first organized with three rifle platoons of three, ten-man squads each and a headquarters section. Every squad was assigned either a .30 caliber light machinegun or a 60 mm mortar. There was also a special weapons platoon of fifty-six men, trained with either 75 mm pack howitzers, 81 mm or 60 mm mortars. In December 1950, this organization changed and a weapons platoon was added to each Raider Company.

**Special Attack Battalion was also formed and trained at Camp McGill, Japan to conduct Raider and Guerrilla type operations. Message CINCFE to DA Wash, GC-O, Pentagon, 23 September 1950, augmented by transfer of ROK personnel from 1st Raider Company.

This diagram shows the changes that occurred in the GHQ Raider organization during its existence from 15 July 1950 to 31 March 1951.



Part of the Raiders' mission in North Korea was to keep the mountain passes open in eastern North Korea for the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division moving along the east side of the Chosin Reservoir.

re-equipped, and put the entire unit through extensive tactical training until 5 December 1950. In lieu of creating the 1st Anti-Guerrilla Company, Hanes organized a second Raider Company shortly before the end of training. This company was formed from internal SAG assets. Forty-eight enlisted men of the Headquarters and Service Company, thirty-two soldier replacements for the 1st Raider Company (GHQ Raiders), ninety-three ROK Army (ROKA) men from the Special Attack Battalion (SAB), two 1st Raider Company officers, and four officers from headquarters were assembled.¹² Then, in early December

1950, the SAG with its 1st and 2nd Raider Companies, was attached to the 32nd Regimental Combat Team (RCT), 7th Infantry Division (ID) and sent to Sinpung-ni, fifteen miles north of Hamhung.

Raider David L. Carter remembered that the 1st Raider Company established an Outpost Line of Resistance (OPLR) for the 32nd Infantry at Hungnam on 6 December 1950. John W. Connor stated that they were to keep the mountain passes open for the 1st Marine Division, the 7th Division, and Task Force DRYSDALE (41st Independent Commando) on the eastern side of the Chosin Reservoir.¹³

The two missions required the 1st Raiders to do extensive patrolling to locate enemy forces, intercept guerrillas and agents headed south toward Hamhung as well

as establish refugee control points to divert Korean civilians from the congested area between Hamhung and Hongwan. Instead of being evacuated from Hungnam by ship like the rest of X Corps, the Raiders were airlifted out of Yonp'o Airbase back to Pusan. They were trucked nine miles north of Kyongju to establish a base camp. By 16 December 1950, the SAG was housed in squad tents, doing range firing, and tactical training.¹⁴

In South Korea, the 1st and 2nd Raider Companies' mission was to protect the X Corps area from guerrillas. This meant destroying bypassed enemy forces in the Ulsan-Kyongju area, road and trail reconnaissance, and supporting a Special Attack Battalion (SAB) joint counter-guerrilla operation with the weapons platoons from each Raider Company.¹⁵ The SAB was to attack on 22 December 1950 to eliminate a 300-man guerrilla force dug-in on top of Sinbulsan Mountain. The SAB Liaison Officer, First Lieutenant (1LT) William L. Baker, Sr. remembered that the SAB operation started at 0300 hours, 22 December 1950. "Company B was positioned behind the enemy to block his withdrawal when driven off the hill. Company A led the attack with Company C to follow at one-hundred yards, prepared to continue the attack if necessary."¹⁶

Climbing the steep, ice-covered mountain in a sub-zero blizzard of snow and ice took longer than expected. Growing darkness prompted the attackers to halt short of capturing the final objective. Raider medic Daniel W. Bish still remembered the climb up Sinbulsan Mountain years later. "It was the most God-awful climb I ever made in my life. It was extremely wet, windy and mainly steep. As we went up a few feet we slipped back a few feet, then you

took another few feet and so on."¹⁷ Finally, the darkness and exhaustion took its toll. The SAB was ordered to disengage, but not before the guerrillas had suffered enough casualties to cause them to abandon the stronghold. The American Raiders learned two things that proved worthwhile at Chang-to: Only Korean officers controlled action in the SAB units; and none of the American advisors with the SAB worked at the company level.¹⁸

After a brief break on Christmas Day, SAG training resumed. In the midst of small-arms marksmanship, mortar gunnery exercises, and motorized patrols, some Raiders accompanied the SAB to Sinbulsan Mountain to recover the remains of the Koreans killed in action and to destroy the remaining guerrilla fortifications. While the SAG was protecting the X Corps operational zone, Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) launched their third offensive on New Year's Eve 1950. The size and violence of the CCF attacks caused Seoul to be abandoned on 4 January 1951 and forced the Eighth Army back to form a line from Pyongtaek to Wonju forty miles south of the Han River.¹⁹ These events had little impact on X Corps units who were still reassembling after the Hungnam evacuation, but that was about to change.

On 7 January 1951, the Raiders were ordered south to Andong to protect the X Corps forward command post and patrol and destroy any guerrillas in zone.²⁰ The Headquarters Intelligence Detachment (HID) Agents, the "Blue Boys," were controlled by the SAG S-2 Section. These South Koreans wore civilian clothes while gathering information on enemy dispositions before Raiders moved into certain areas or villages.²¹ On 9 January 1951, the "Blue Boys" reported that a North Korean division augmented by twelve to sixteen hundred North Korean guerrillas with approximately eighty prisoners had broken through friendly lines. The combined force was moving southwest towards Mungyong.²²


SAG alerted the SAB and the 1st Raider Company. Sergeant First Class (SFC) Patrick T. Gannon, the 3rd Platoon sergeant was sitting in a Korean "hooch" in Andong trying to stay warm when 1LT Albert T. Noreen, Jr., his platoon leader, came in to tell them to pack up. They were going after the captives.²³ Little did the Raiders know that they were about to enter their biggest fight of the war. The SAB and 1st Raider Company were headed to the village of Chang-to, or Jongsongli in Korean. Located southeast of Seoul in the County of Mungyong between

Wonju and Yonju, Chang-to was the regional rice center. It was located in a valley surrounded by wood-covered mountains over 3,000 feet high.

At 0915 hours on 10 January 1951, the SAB, commanded by ROK MAJ Bae Dong Girl and the SAB advisor, MAJ William G. "Mike" White and 3rd Platoon of the 1st Raider Company left Andong by truck with three days rations and orders "to secure Chang-to and patrol on foot to adjacent towns. Prepare for movement NE to engage guerrilla forces on orders."²⁴ As darkness was falling, the force arrived at the village of Tuin-dong where they remained overnight. The next morning (11 January), the SAB and Raiders conducted foot patrols as they moved towards Chang-to, closing on their objective on 12 January 1951. White decided to wait to attack the guerrillas until 0600 hours the next day.

The SAB and the Raider platoon set up defenses taking advantage of the village and its surroundings. A dry riverbed running east to west divided the village in half. On the north side of the riverbed a thirty-foot bluff dominated the terrain. Sitting on the bluff were two square medieval European-type castle forts built by ROK police. Each fort was fifty yards wide and surrounded by a twenty-foot high stone wall with watch towers on the four corners. Connecting the two forts was a narrow walkway protected by a parapet. White assigned a SAB platoon to each fort and positioned the rest of the battalion along the north side of the riverbed in the upper section of the village. The Raider platoon was left with the south side of the dry river bed. They moved into a

"It was the most God-awful climb I ever made in my life. It was extremely wet, windy and mainly steep. As we went up a few feet we slipped back a few feet, then you took another few feet and so on." — Raider medic Daniel W. Bish



Sketch of Chang-to showing the positions of the 1st Raider Company and the SAB on the evening of 13 January 1951.

Second Helicopter Detachment at Chang-to

The Second Helicopter Detachment was the result of a U. S. Army effort to field organic helicopters to perform aeromedical evacuation missions in Korea. Activated by Headquarters, V Corps General Order 79, the Detachment was formed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 1 October 1950. The four pilots and four enlisted mechanics spent the next month preparing their four Bell H-13B Sioux helicopters and equipment for transport to Korea. The Detachment arrived at Inch'on on 24 November and established operations at Ascom City, a former Japanese arsenal between Inch'on and Seoul. Improved H-13Ds replaced their H-13Bs and the unit relocated to Taegu to escape the CCF 2nd Phase Offensive.



Captain Albert C. Sebourn, Commander of the 2nd Helicopter Detachment earned a Distinguished Flying Cross for his actions at Chang-to.

View of the helicopter evacuation pod designed by CPT Sebourn using a U. S. Navy "Stokes" litter, aircraft fabric, and plexiglass. Heater ducts were later added to protect patients during Korean winters.

Aerial view of the 8063rd Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH).





CPT Sebourn's "Mechanized Angel" that he flew into Chang-to with Dr. (CPT) Burgess Smith.



CPT Hely's helicopter was called "Idiot's Delight."



Captain Joseph W. Hely flew into Chang-to on 14 January 1951 to bring in much-needed ammunition and to assist CPT Sebourn. He was also awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for his role in assisting the Raiders.

U. S. Navy wire basket "Stokes" litters to the skid struts. He also fabricated Plexiglas and aircraft fabric coverings and installed heaters to protect the wounded during air evacuation. While Sebourn and his pilots practiced flying with loaded litters, the Eighth U. S. Army (EUSA) Surgeon General, elected to retain operational control of the four assigned helicopter detachments, but assigned one to each MASH in the corps sectors.¹ On 13 January 1951, Sebourn and the Second Helicopter Detachment were supporting the 8063rd Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) at Suwon when it received a one-helicopter casualty evacuation mission for Chang-to.

In his hurry to launch, CPT Sebourn did not realize his crew chief, SGT Hubert L. Tompkins, had put a dead

battery back in the helicopter after starting it. Tompkins did not think that the pilot would shut down the "Mechanized Angel" hence it would recharge in flight. After several tries to restart the helicopter and with no radio contact with the 8063rd, CPT Sebourn and Dr. (CPT) Burgess Smith, his passenger, joined the Chang-to defense force. Back at the 8063rd, with no idea of Sebourn's situation, CPT Joseph W. Hely, started checking back through Eighth Army channels. It was night before Hely learned where Sebourn had gone. Hely volunteered to fly to Chang-to at first light in his helicopter, "Idiot's Delight", with much-needed ammunition and another battery

for the "Mechanized Angel". CPT Hely, accompanied by 1LT Joseph L. Bowler in "Nooks" and 1LT Willis G. Strawn in "China Clipper" flew into Chang-to bringing more ammunition. They back-hauled casualties. On the morning of 15 January 1951, Bowler and Strawn made the final helicopter evacuations from Chang-to just before the SAG withdrew.²

The Second Helicopter Detachment served in Korea from 22 November 1950 until 27 July 1953 and supported a variety of American and UN units. The 2nd was designated the 8191st Army Unit (AU) on 14 May 1951 and redesignated the 49th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance) (MDHA) on 2 December 1952. On 3 February 1953, HQ, EUSA activated the 1st Helicopter Ambulance Company (Provisional) and placed all four detachments under its control.³

The original members of the Second Helicopter Detachment at Fort Bragg, NC, were:

CPT Albert C. Sebourn
1LT Joseph W. Hely
1LT Joseph L. Bowler
1LT Willis G. Strawn
SGT Hubert L. Tompkins
SGT Warren L. Clark
CPL Joe Batten, Jr.
CPL Francis M. Martin

Endnotes

- 1 Joseph W. Hely manuscript to Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 9 July 2001, "Chapter II, The Korean War," USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 2 Hely manuscript, II-20 and Albert Sebourn as told to Howard Eisenberg, "Bloody Ambush at Eggbeater Bowl," *Photo*, Volume 1, Number 6, December 1952, 36.
- 3 Hely manuscript, II-39.1.



As shown by this map, Chang-to's position made it an ideal location for an occupying force to be able to influence both civilian and military activities in central South Korea.

schoolhouse complex surrounded on the north and east sides by stone walls and on the south and west sides by dirt walls. White explained, "I assigned this sector to Lou Donoho's company because it suited their machine guns, 60 mm and 81 mm mortars."²⁵

CPL Delmer E. "Dave" Davis, remembered that the village was deserted when they arrived. They were to spend the night in Chang-to and attack the guerrillas first thing in the morning. "The third platoon was strung out on the south side and we had a school and school yard immediately at our backs. I don't know who did the patrolling or who brought in the intelligence, but it was very quickly decided that perhaps we were outgunned. This resulted in a request back to SAG for the rest of the company which consisted of two more rifle platoons, a mortar platoon and Company Headquarters with the kitchen and supply to be sent forward."²⁶ The SAB commander decided to delay the attack until the rest of the Raiders arrived. Assigned a defensive position

on the southwest corner of the school yard, BAR man CPL Davis and his ammo bearer, PFC Robert Bach, dug in for the night.²⁷ Davis stated: "I still had all my ammo, grenades, .45 caliber pistol and machete. I prepared all that I had so they would be in easy reach so when the crunch came I could take as many with me as possible."²⁸

It was 1630 hours, 12 January, before CPT Louis W. Donoho and the rest of the 1st Raider Company arrived. With the third platoon already in place, Donoho assigned the first platoon to the northeast section of the stone wall and the second platoon to the southeast corner. The mortar platoon, headquarters, mess, and supply sections occupied the schoolyard around the schoolhouse. The school building had stoves in some of the classrooms. These rooms served as an aid station, a warming room, and a secure, comfortable place to eat. Raider medics, PFC George F. Pankow and Sergeant (SGT) Billy D. Oneyear, set up the aid station. Raiders rotated guard duty throughout the night as the temperature dipped below zero. For most Raiders, this was their only bit of comfort for the next three days.

On 13 January at 0300 hours, the Raiders went to 100% stand-to with all positions on the perimeter alert. Just before 0600 hours, a Raider heard movement to his front and challenged in English. The English reply, in a North Korean accent, caused .50 caliber machinegun bursts. This was answered with a burp gun blast from an NKPA probing patrol. Dave Davis remembers the probing incident as "our first encounter. Now, we didn't have to attack. We were on the defensive. I don't think anyone was hit in the initial exchange of fire as it was very dark. All was pretty quiet until daylight, then the shooting started. It seems that we were completely surrounded and they occupied the high ground all around and could literally



Captain Louis W. Donoho commanded the 1st Raider Company during the Battle at Chang-to, 13-15 January 1951.



Corporal Delmer E. "Dave" Davis was an original GHQ Raider and became a Browning Automatic Rifleman after CPT Donoho saw him shoot on the rifle range.

look down into our foxholes.”²⁹ Without realizing it, Davis had accurately assessed the Raider’s predicament.

The 27th and 29th Regiments, 10th NKPA had occupied the high ground in the darkness to completely surround the SAB and 1st Raider Company.³⁰ About 0605 hours the NKPA commenced firing en masse employing small arms, mortars, and a recoilless rifle. To counter the incoming fire, World War II veteran, Master Sergeant (MSG) Charlie Straughn, the Weapons Platoon Sergeant, got his two 81 mm and three 60 mm mortars into action. Besides his renown as a mortarman, Straughn was remembered after Chang-to for not letting his men dig in. They had to provide indirect fire support in the open rather than from protected firing pits. Throughout the battle the mortar men moved their weapons around the school yard as Straughn, disregarding bullets hitting all around him, kept track of the enemy preparing to attack. Then, when it was clear where the main attempt would be made, he moved the mortars and issued appropriate firing commands. Straughn had trained his men so well that they could have twenty-five mortar rounds in the air at once. Then, they exploded like a massive barrage.³¹ SFC Pat Gannon said, “MSG Straughn was a tower of strength that day. He saved our buns that morning.”³²

About 1300 hours, 13 January, MAJ White sent a report to SAG headquarters: “Estimated enemy strength three to four hundred. Beaten off by small arms and mortars. Still receiving harassing fire by small arms. Attacked from North and East and South, three sides. At present MSR main supply route cut to South. Total casualties one EM SAB, one EM 1st Raider Company wounded in action. Casualties yesterday were two agents and one civilian policeman MIA.”³³ By the time SAG received that message, CPL George L. Chambers and SGT Marvin L. Money had been wounded. CPL Dave Davis explained, “A group of Raiders went to the mess truck to get some breakfast pancakes. Some dummies bunched up in the chow line and they were shot by a sniper.”³⁴ The two wounded men needed better medical care than Oneyear or Pankow could provide. CPT Donoho asked SAG headquarters for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) of Chambers and Money.

LTC Hubert L. Binkley, the Medical Operations Officer at X Corps got the MEDEVAC request and called the 8063rd Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) at Suwon for a helicopter to evacuate two wounded Raiders at Chang-to. CPT Albert C. Sebourn, the Second Helicopter Detachment commander, got the mission and headed for his Bell H-13D Sioux helicopter.³⁵ Thinking this was just

a routine evacuation mission, Sebourn agreed to take CPT Burgess Smith, an 8063rd surgeon from Little Rock, Arkansas along. They took off at 1430 hours, and reached Chang-to about two hours later. After finding the village and spotting the orange marker panels, Sebourn turned to start his landing approach. He quickly realized that this mission was not going to be routine. The closer they approached the schoolhouse, the heavier the enemy fire directed at them became.

Running through a gauntlet of enemy machinegun and rifle fire, Sebourn managed to land his helicopter about fifty feet behind CPL Delmer Davis in the southwest corner of the school yard. Davis remembered: “The firing got very intense and we started getting incoming mortars

“... It seems that we were completely surrounded and they occupied the high ground all around and could literally look down into our foxholes.”

— BAR gunner CPL Delmer E. Davis

and 75 mm recoilless rifle fire trying to take out that helicopter. I counted twenty-six holes in the thing in short order. The pilot rolled out and hit the ground running. The doctor quickly followed

waving his pistol. The two headed straight for the school to help treat the wounded.”³⁶ After placing Money and Chambers in the helicopter’s side evacuation pods, Sebourn and Smith climbed back into the cockpit. That’s when they discovered that the battery was dead. Sebourn knew that they were not leaving Chang-to that night, so they unloaded Money and Chambers and carried them back inside the schoolhouse. Doctor (CPT) Smith stayed to help Oneyear and Pankow. In the meantime,

“But don’t do too much shooting. Before you ever got here, we fired all but our last two mortar shells. The boys are almost out of ammo, and a defective shell’s jammed so tight in the .50’s barrel only an atom bomb could blast it loose. So conserve, Captain, conserve!”

— related by CPT Albert C. Sebourn

Donoho stationed Sebourn, armed only with his .45 caliber pistol, in a battle-damaged shack next to the school, with the instructions: “But don’t do too much shooting. Before you ever got here, we fired all but our last two mortar shells. The boys are almost out of ammo, and a defective shell’s jammed so tight in the .50’s barrel only an atom bomb could blast it loose. So conserve, Captain, conserve!”³⁷ MSG John M. May stated that the Air Force C-119 cargo planes did not drop any ammunition or supplies because they could not distinguish between Raiders and the NKPA and did not want to risk airdropping any supplies to the enemy.³⁸

Ammunition was not the only issue plaguing the Raiders as darkness settled in again. By the time the MEDEVAC reached Chang-to, the Raiders had repelled several North Korean frontal assaults. Casualties were mounting and the radio broke down. CPT Sebourn recalled how the night began in Chang-to on 13 January. “Murky dark was the cue for the Banzai Symphony Orchestra. Whistles and weird horns screeched and honked. Wolf-howls pierced the air, and with savage shouts and wild shots, an attack on the southern flank opened up.”³⁹ The night of 13-14 January, the Raiders



M16 Halftrack mounted with four .50 caliber machineguns (Quad .50's). Two of these from the 15th AAA Battalion, 7th ID were provided to the Chang-to SAG and 2nd Raider relief force.

stopped five attacks, the last being another human wave charge that ended at daybreak. Raider Robert Bach remembered: "Every morning about 0230 hours they [North Koreans] would blow their bugles and horns and charge our position screaming and yelling. What we didn't know is that they sent their prisoners in front of them with the intention of expending our ammo and then overrunning our positions."⁴⁰ Lacking a radio to request airstrikes and aerial resupply and unable to get help from the SAB because of the enemy fire between the school and the forts, Raider ammunition reserves were "barely enough to fill a helmet-liner."⁴¹

Unbeknownst to the SAB or 1st Raider Company, the 2nd Raider Company, commanded by CPT James C. Olson, and LTC Hanes leading reinforcements from the Headquarters and Service Company, had begun preparing to move to Chang-to on 13 January with more men and ammo.⁴² The SAG relief force, reinforced with two 15th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion M16 halftracks (7th Infantry Division) left at 1515 hours that day. Each M16 had four .50 caliber turret-mounted machine guns ("Quad .50s"). One halftrack led the column while the other provided rear security. Enemy activity stopped the column twice. The first time, a minefield of wooden box mines had blocked the road. The second was to defend against an attack by elements of the 1st Battalion, 29th NKPA Regiment who were protecting a second minefield. When the lead halftrack had its front end blown off, the column halted and formed a defensive perimeter for the night in a dry river bed along the road.⁴³

The SAG relief element was not bothered any further. In the morning (14 January) LTC Hanes contacted MAJ White by radio to tell him they were nearing Chang-to. Enemy activity had reduced the SAG relief column to one operational two and one-half ton truck, armed with a .50 caliber machinegun mounted in a ring mount, towing the second "Quad .50" halftrack.⁴⁴ Pushing forward, the SAG force used its five .50 caliber machineguns in direct ground fire support, and broke through the North Korean southern roadblock about the time the other three helicopters of the 2nd Helicopter Detachment crested the mountains and four U. S. Navy Corsairs arrived overhead. The three Bell H-13s carried ammunition (and a spare battery for CPT Seaborn) in the helicopter pods. The Corsairs started dropping napalm on North Korean soldiers caught on the surrounding ridges and covered all four helicopters as they reloaded their pods with the wounded and headed back to the 8063rd MASH. Davis remembered: "that all four planes used up everything

Page 5 of 5 pages

HEADQUARTERS
X CORPS
Office of the Commanding General
APO 909

31 January 1951

SUBJECT: Commendation

TO: Commanding Officer
Special Activities Group
APO 4

1. The Special Activities Group is commended for the successful part it played in the X Corps operations to destroy the II North Korean Corps.
2. The Special Activities Group, although given a sector that would normally be assigned to a unit many times its size, was able, by virtue of its aggressive mobility and skillful leadership, to impose losses on the enemy for in excess of its own numbers. Its units frequently attacked enemy groups two and three times their own numerical strength and destroyed large numbers of enemy which sustaining relatively minor casualties itself. The area in which the Special Activities Group operated was mountainous and the period during which these operations took place imposed great hardships on the men, due to the cold and inclement weather.
3. I am proud of the success of the Special Activities Group in fulfilling its assigned missions.

/s/Edward N. Almond
EDWARD N. ALMOND
Major General, United States Army
Commanding

Commendation from
MG Almond to the
Special Activities Group.



PFC William E. Joyner (left) and PFC John W. Connor (right) in position at Chang-to 13-15 January 1951.

they carried, stayed about two hours at low level, totally broke the NKPA's back, and what enemy remained in the surrounding hills never contacted us again."⁴⁵

The two-day Battle of Chang-to officially ended on the afternoon of 14 January 1951. From daybreak on 13 January 1951 the SAB and 1st Raider Company (6 officers and 108 soldiers) repelled fourteen NKPA *banzai* attacks, killing 392 enemy, and capturing 11 more. The price was high: 10 KIA, 32 WIA with 1 "Blue Boy" agent MIA. The X Corps Commander commended the SAG not only for its conduct at Chang-to, but also its other missions. MSGs Robert B. Graves and Charlie Straughn were awarded Silver Stars, while PFC Wayne A. McNett received a Bronze Star for Valor, and MSGs Adell H. Jackson and Wilbert T. Maples received battlefield commissions to Second Lieutenant, U. S. Army Reserve.⁴⁶

The North Korean attack on 13 January 1951 prevented the Raiders from freeing the eighty prisoners. Raider Robert Bach remembered that none of the prisoners escaped or were freed and those not killed during the *banzai* assaults were buried up to their waists and then shot as target practice, bayoneted or decapitated.⁴⁷ Chang-to was denied to the North Koreans as a major rice center, thereby precluding the establishment of a large guerrilla base. After Chang-to, the remainder of the 10th North Korean Division fled north, only to encounter the 1st Marine Division conducting counter-guerrilla operations. The Raiders continued to patrol and perform counter-guerrilla operations until 1 April 1951 when Department of the Army disbanded all Special Operations and Ranger units in Korea. SFC David L. Carter best summarized the operational life of the Raiders: "We were really a bastard unit jumping from one place to another."⁴⁸ ▲

Eugene G. Piasecki, a retired Special Forces officer, is a government contractor who has been with the USASOC History Office since 2006. He earned his Master's Degree in military history from Norwich University. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, Army special operations in Somalia and the History of Camp Mackall.



"Obviously we didn't save the prisoners. If you look close you will see many have their hands tied." GHQ Raider Robert Bach

Endnotes

- Charles H. Briscoe, "Born of Desperation: Early Special Operations in the Korean War," *Veritas, Journal of Army Special Operations History*, PB 31-05-2 Vol. 5, No. 4, 2009, 30.
- General Douglas MacArthur, CINCFE Tokyo, Japan, personal message to General Collins, September 1950, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- Shelby L. Stanton, *Ten Corps in Korea, 1950* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1989), 125.
- Stanton, *Ten Corps in Korea*, 126.
- The 1st Provisional Raider Company was known at different times by different names. In X Corps it was called either the Special Operations Company or the X-Corps Raider Company, 8245th Army Unit. On 19 September 1950, at Inch'on, the Raiders were attached to the 1st Marine Division and further attached to the 5th Marines. On 21 September, they were moved to the 7th ID and by 25 September to Task Group Able of the 3rd Battalion, 187th ARCT. By 1 October 1950, the Special Operations Company detached from the 187th ARCT and reverted to X Corps Reserve. Effective 20 December 1950, the Far East Command General Headquarters Raider Company became the 1st Raider Company, 8245 Army Unit with an authorized strength increase from 106 to 173 with 37 spaces in the newly formed weapons platoon. ("Command Report, 8227 Army Unit, Special Activities Group, December 1950," Entry 429, Box 5011, Record Group 407 National Archives).
- Stanton, *Ten Corps in Korea*, 126. This was part of X Corps Operations Order #4 dated 4 October 1950.
- General Headquarters, United Nations Command, General Orders No. 13, ACTIVATION OF UNITS, 6 October 1950, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- Stanton, *Ten Corps in Korea*, 139. Almond's authority extended from the ROK I Corps to the 1st Marine Division, the 7th Infantry Division still on ships at Pusan and the 3rd Infantry Division in Japan being readied as a X Corps reinforcement.
- Stanton, *Ten Corps in Korea*, 145.
- Roy E. Appleman, *East of Chosin. Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 7.
- Jearl E. "Buck" Ballow, *Soft Cap Chronicles: Oral History of the GHQ 1st Raider Company (8245th Army Unit)* [photocopy], 141, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- Command Report, 8227th Army Unit Special Activities Group, December 1950.
- Ballow, *Soft Cap Chronicles*, 203. Stanton, *Ten Corps in Korea*, 251. *Marines Corps Gazette*, August 1953, 31. The Outpost Line of Resistance (OPLR) is normally a mile or more in front of the division's General Outpost Line to give early warning of attack and performed by the division's I & R platoon. TF DRYSDALE was no stranger to the SAG. Commanded by LTC Douglas B. Drysdale, it had been part of the SAG until the 6 October 1950 reorganization. Attached to the American 1st Marine Division at the Chosin Reservoir, the 255-man Royal Marine Commando; Company B, 31st Infantry Regiment (U.S. Army); Company G, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines; and Companies B and D, 1st Marine Tank Battalion led the break out of Koto-ri and then the break through to Hagaru-ri at the reservoir's southern tip.
- Command Report, 8227th Army Unit Special Activities Group, December 1950.
- Special Activities Group, *Command Report*, 6.
- Ballow, *Soft Cap Chronicles*, 225-226. The attack on Sinbulsan Mountain was planned using an old Japanese survey map that showed elevations in meters rather than feet. Sinbulsan Mountain (Hill 1076) was actually more than three times higher than expected.

MAJ White's Pancakes



Major William G. "Mike" White was the senior advisor to the SAG Special Attack Battalion (SAB).

MAJ William G. "Mike" White earned his tenth Purple Heart on the way to a long-awaited pancake breakfast with the 1st Raiders on 14 January. MAJ White, armed with his beloved pump shotgun and accompanied by another SAB advisor,

CPT Russell S. Moriarty, started across the dry river bed between the SAB and the Raiders. He was quickly shot in the chest by a sniper. MEDEVAC'd by helicopter with his shotgun, White's wound ended his combat tour in Korea and was his last in a long military career.⁴⁹



Captain Russell S. Moriarty was an advisor to the SAB and assisted loading MAJ White onto the MEDEVAC helicopter after he was wounded by a North Korean sniper.



Evacuation of a wounded soldier by H 13 helicopter. CPT Albert C. Sebourn is at far left holding a blanket.

17 Ballow, *Soft Cap Chronicles*, 226.

18 Command Report, 8227th Army Unit Special Activities Group, December 1950.

19 Richard W. Stewart, General Editor, *American Military History Volume II: The United States Army in the Global Era, 1917-2003* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2009), 235.

20 First Raider Company, *Journal*, January 1951.

21 J. Barry Dwyer, "Battle of Changto Summary," *Behind the Lines*, May/June 1966, 5. David Carter, Squad Leader SFC, First Squad, First Platoon, GHQ Raiders, e-mail to Eugene G. Piasecki, 22 February 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

22 John W. Connor, *Let Slip the Dogs of War. A memoir of the GHQ 1st Raider Company (8245th Army Unit) a. k. a. Special Operations Company Korea, 1950-51* (Vermont: Merriam Press, 2008), 167. Delmer E. "Dave" Davis in his article "The Fight at Chang-To, Marine Raiders in Korea," from *Special Operations.com* places the guerrilla force strength at 1200 with 80 prisoners, 12 of whom allegedly were Americans.

23 Patrick Gannon, e-mail to Delmer E. "Dave" Davis, 3 November 1999, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

24 Special Activities Group (8227th Army Unit), *Consolidated Daily Log Entries*, 10 January 1951.

25 Dwyer, "Battle of Changto Summary," 5.

26 Delmer E. "Dave" Davis, 3rd Platoon, 1st GHQ Raider Company, e-mail to Pat Gannon, 21 June 1999, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

27 Delmer E. "Dave" Davis, 3rd Platoon, 1st GHQ Raider Company, e-mail to Eugene G. Piasecki, 2 February 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. As Davis remembers, the Raiders were told they didn't have to dig in the night of 11 January because they were attacking at 0600 on 12 January 1951. Davis and Bach decided to dig in anyway, and noted that when the Raiders began receiving enemy fire the next morning, "there was a lot of dirt slinging going on."

28 Delmer E. "Dave" Davis, e-mail to Pat Gannon, 22 June 1999, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

29 Delmer E. "Dave" Davis, "The Fight at Chang-To. Marine Raiders in Korea," *Special Operations.com*, 23 April 2003, <http://www.specialoperations.com/Stories/Chang To.htm>.

30 First Raider Company, *Journal*, 13 January 1951.

31 Delmer E. "Dave" Davis, e-mail to Pat Gannon, 21 June 1999, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

32 Rick Zimmerman, e-mail to Delmer E. "Dave" Davis, 28 October 1999, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

33 Special Activities Group (8227th Army Unit), *Consolidated Daily Log Entries*, January 1951.

34 Davis e-mail to Gannon, 21 June 1999.

35 Albert Sebourn as told to Howard Eisenberg, "Bloody Ambush at Eggbeater Bowl," *Photo*, Volume 1, Number 6, December 1952, 31.

36 Delmer E. "Dave" Davis, e-mail to J. Barry Dwyer, 16 June 2001, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

37 Sebourn, "Bloody Ambush at Eggbeater Bowl," 34.

38 John M. May, MSG, 1st Raider Company, 8245 AU, January 1951, statement, date unknown, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

39 Sebourn, "Bloody Ambush at Eggbeater Bowl," 33.

40 Robert Bach photograph caption USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

41 Sebourn, "Bloody Ambush at Eggbeater Bowl," 36.

42 SAG Special Activities Group (8227th Army Unit), *Consolidated Daily Log Entries*, 10 January 1951, 13-14. Robert Burns, Special Activities Group, 22 October 2003, telephonic interview, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

43 Burns interview, 22 October 2003.

44 Davis e-mail to Pat Gannon, 22 June 1999.

45 Davis e-mail to Gannon, 22 June 1999.

46 John W. Connor, *Let Slip the Dogs of War. A Memoir of the GHQ 1st Raider Company (8245th Army Unit) A.K.A. Special Operations Company, Korea, 1950-1951* (Vermont: Merriam Press, 2008), 175.

47 Robert Bach photograph caption.

48 David L. Carter, e-mail to Eugene G. Piasecki, 5 March 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

49 Dwyer, "Battle of Changto Summary," 6.

IN THEATER

EIGHTH ARMY RANGERS: FIRST IN KOREA

by Eugene G. Piasecki

With assignment orders in hand and just waiting for transportation to the 24th Infantry Division, Second Lieutenant (2LT) Ralph Puckett, Jr. heard his name called out on the camp's Public Address system. LT Puckett was to report to a specific room in the Camp Drake headquarters building. He found Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) John H. McGee, who was interviewing and selecting volunteers "for an extremely dangerous mission behind enemy lines." Puckett's immediate response was: "Sir, I volunteer. I have wanted to be a Ranger all my life. If you will take me into that company I volunteer to be a squad leader or rifleman." Told to return the next day, Puckett learned that McGee had selected him not only just to be a member of the Ranger Company, but to be its commander.¹

On 25 June 1950, the aggressive invasion by the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) caught the Far East Command (FECOM) by surprise. The Communist juggernaut threatened to destroy American KMAC advisors and Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) forces as it drove to control the entire peninsula. General MacArthur, commander FECOM, alerted occupation units in Japan for immediate movement to Korea to stem the NKPA advances. LTG Walton H. Walker, Commander, Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA), realized the necessity to trade space for time in order to consolidate his units in a defensive perimeter around Pusan, initiating an aggressive mobile defense around the existing port facilities. Explaining his actions in a message to MacArthur, Walker stated that the 24th Infantry Division (24th ID) needed to be completely rebuilt and he had doubts about the operational capabilities of the newly arrived 25th Infantry Division. FECOM initiated Operation FLUSHOUT to send tons of supplies and equipment to replace those lost in the withdrawal. U. S. Army administrative and support troops were dispatched to Korea as combat replacements because qualified infantrymen were in short supply.² The creation and employment of the first American Army Ranger unit formed after World War II were initially tied to NKPA tactical changes, reduction of the North Korean guerrilla activities in the Pohang Pocket, and the need to begin some type of offensive operations.




Brigadier General John H. McGee was captured by the Japanese in 1942. McGee escaped from a POW ship in 1944 and finished WWII as the commander of the 169th Infantry, 43rd Infantry Division. In 1950 he was the Chief of the Miscellaneous Division, G-3 Section, Eighth U.S. Army, which created units to perform unconventional warfare missions during the early days of the Korean War.

Ralph Puckett, Jr., USMA 1949, was selected by McGee to become the Eighth Army Ranger Company Commander. Colonel Puckett was a charter member of the Ranger Hall of Fame in June 1992.




LTG Walton H. Walker and General of the Army Douglas A. MacArthur meet in P'yongyang, North Korea, 21 October 1950.



The Pohang Pocket was selected by the NKPA to base their guerrilla effort against UN and ROKA forces.


As the situation in Korea steadily deteriorated through July, the fate of United Nations, American, and ROKA forces hung in the balance. The NKPA breached the Eighth Army defenses between Taegu (Eighth Army Headquarters) and Pohang creating the "Pohang Pocket" behind the lines. NKPA patrols probed the Yonil Airfield perimeter and Communist agents in Taegu fired flares to illuminate targets for North Korean artillery. General MacArthur realized that any efforts to disrupt the NKPA attacks would have to come from FECOM assets since additional American Army units and draftees would be slow in coming. These conditions prompted FECOM to use existing personnel and equipment to create the Eighth Army Rangers and the GHQ Raiders to interdict enemy supply lines and reduce the NKPA war-fighting capability. The man tasked to accomplish MacArthur's intent was LTC John H. McGee, assigned to the Miscellaneous Division, G-3 Operations, Eighth U. S. Army.

Originally, LTC McGee focused on conducting guerrilla operations in North Korea, but the gravity of the situation in the south caused him to shift emphasis. EUSA needs soon turned his efforts into creating units to work behind enemy lines in the Pohang Pocket to destroy the NKPA guerrillas operating with impunity there.³ While McGee redirected his efforts, friendly forces defending the Pusan Perimeter began having some success. Despite NKPA pressure, the consolidated UN units repelled NKPA attacks, capitalized on the advantage of interior lines, and stabilized the perimeter to accept reinforcements and rebuild the land forces in Korea. In response, the NKPA resorted to guerrilla tactics. Dressed as Korean refugees, NKPA operatives joined the thousands of Korean civilians seeking safety in Pusan. As the refugees flooded the roads into Pusan and Taegu, civilian-clothed NKPA agents managed to disrupt traffic with raids and roadblocks, infiltrations, and rear-area sniping attacks.⁴



LTC McGee used the Ranger Table of Organization from World War II as the template to form the Eighth Army Ranger Company on 25 August 1950.

With just seven weeks to produce a special unit designed to counter the new NKPA threat, McGee knew time was a critical resource. Using a World War II Ranger Company Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) as his guide, he went to the replacement detachment at Camp Drake, Japan to begin screening enlisted soldiers.⁵ After selecting sixty-five enlisted volunteers, he still needed the requisite two platoon leaders and a commander for the Ranger Company. After



Sign indicating the location of the Far East Command (FECOM) Replacement Detachment at Camp Drake, Japan.

interviewing dozens of officers, he finally chose Second Lieutenants (2LT) Charles N. Bunn, Springfield, Illinois, and Barnard Cummings, Jr., Denver, Colorado, to be the Ranger's first and second platoon leaders. McGee still needed a company commander. That's where 2LT Puckett fit in. Despite individual differences, Bunn, Cummings, and Puckett were all classmates at the United States Military Academy (Class of 1949). They attended the Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC) and Airborne School before being shipped as replacements to Korea.

Having selected the initial group of Ranger volunteers, 2LTs Puckett, Bunn, and Cummings rounded out the unit by visiting service units in Japan and interviewing soldiers at the replacement detachment at Camp Drake. They needed seventy-four enlisted men. FECOM's one restriction on their recruiting was that trained infantrymen were "off-limits." They were already in short supply and now needed to defend the Pusan Perimeter. Every volunteer was informed of the potential danger of Ranger operations and given the choice to continue or leave. Puckett had final approval authority. He chose only those men he felt would be physically and mentally capable of finishing Ranger training and accomplishing Ranger missions.⁶

With the final roster of volunteers approved, the Eighth Army Ranger Company was activated on 25 August 1950 and training began.⁷ Puckett remembers: "The training that seemed to be the biggest challenge was the physical aspects during the first few weeks. They were part of the Army of Occupation in Japan that had not been focused on combat readiness."⁸ To correct this, the intensive regimen to improve physical fitness included road runs, forced marches, calisthenics, and grass drills. For the Rangers, the constant physical training day and night was not enough to distinguish them from the other soldiers at Camp Drake. Ranger Billy G. Walls and some of his "buddies" solved the identity problem. "One day while drinking with two others we saw an American boy with a Mohawk haircut. We went to the barber shop and all got Mohawks. Afterwards we went to the shower room for some serious drinking where we were seen by one of the officers who promptly made it mandatory for all Rangers to have Mohawks."⁹ While the physical preparation in Japan was productive, the Rangers' true



Charles N. Bunn, USMA 1949, and the First Platoon Leader. After the Eighth Army Rangers were disbanded, he was reassigned to the Ranger Training Center at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Barnard Cummings, Jr., USMA 1949, was selected as the Second Platoon Leader. Declared Missing In Action after the battle of Hill 205, his remains were never recovered.



test awaited them in Korea. On 1 September 1950, the company boarded the Japanese ferry *Koan Maru* at Sasebo headed for Pusan.

Arriving at the South Korean port a day later, the Rangers boarded a Korean train that took them north fifteen miles. U. S. Army 6x6 trucks carried them to their training base on a small hill overlooking the village of Kijang. On the edge of the Pusan Perimeter, LTC McGee had established the Eighth Army Ranger Training Center, which the volunteers called "Ranger Hill."¹⁰ Unlike Camp Drake, there were no permanent facilities and the center was in the combat zone. According to Ranger Jesse E. Anderson, "The Rangers lived in designated platoon areas in shelter-half tents with the company headquarters in a squad tent next to a boxing ring put up by LTC McGee."¹¹ Living and training in a combat zone were emphasized that night when the company established a 360-degree defensive perimeter around Ranger Hill to deter, or if necessary, defend against possible North Korean guerrilla attacks. Two-man foxholes were dug in front of each tent in assigned defensive sectors. Machine guns were mounted at strategic locations on the hill and trip flares for early warning were set out each night around the camp's perimeter.¹²

Before training started, Puckett had established four goals that applied to all the Rangers regardless of rank;

1. *Each Ranger would be in outstanding physical condition. Every Ranger would be a Tiger!*
2. *Each Ranger would be highly skilled in the tactics and techniques of the individual soldier (T&TIS). Every Ranger would know his stuff.*
3. *Each squad, each platoon, and the company as a whole would be a smoothly functioning, highly efficient killing machine.*
4. *Each Ranger would have the confidence and esprit that caused him to believe that he and his Ranger Company were the best that the United States Army could produce. This goal was as important as any of the rest.*

Puckett's philosophy was simple: "The officers set the example and either taught the class or participated as a trainee. We shared the same hardships and became hot, cold, wet, dusty, hungry, tired and dirty just like the


Infantry Division Reconnaissance Company (TO&E 17-57N)



IX Corps SSI



25th Infantry Division SSI



The Infantry Division Reconnaissance Company provided security and reconnaissance for the Division Headquarters. This diagram presents the unit as it was officially approved by the Department of Army, and does not reflect combat-related variations.

men. We worked together, became a team, and looked after each other. We learned to trust and depend on each other, developed confidence, and expanded our bonding. We stressed fundamentals in a progressive battle-focused program with high standards that everyone was expected to meet, and we listened to and incorporated training suggestions from the men into our program.”¹³

For LTC McGee and 2LT Puckett time was short because the Rangers had to be able to conduct: Raids, Reconnaissance Patrolling, Combat Patrolling, Motorized Reconnaissance and Movement, and Trail Block missions. Ranger training instructions came from three sources: LTC McGee’s experiences with the Philippine Scouts before World War II; training notes from McGee’s brother, George, a former World War II Merrill’s Marauders battalion commander; and the infantry doctrine in U. S. Army Field Manual 7-10 *The Rifle Company, Rifle Regiment*, dated October 1949.¹⁴ Puckett said, “There was nothing brilliant about anything we did, nothing particularly innovative. I studied FM 7-10, the basic field manual for the rifle company. Colonel McGee was completely supportive. He never overruled anything I recommended.”¹⁵ The result was a training program that built leadership skills around the basic infantry fundamentals of shoot, move, and communicate, and progressed from individual soldier skills to collective unit tactics culminating in field training exercises. Most of the Rangers had a common view of their training.

Ranger Richard D. Branham said: “Map reading, vehicle patrolling, weapons firing, night patrolling. . . hand-to-hand, bayonet drill, hill assault were all accomplished very well as were squad and platoon tactics. I remember above all and many times thinking that LT Puckett was half mountain goat.” Ranger Elmer H. Cassatt echoed Branham’s sentiments: “Training was extra hard work pushed into a short period of time. It was many long marches with some blisters, bayonet drill that would do some men in, night patrols, bad weather, being wet and cold for days in the field, rough hand-to-hand fighting, weapons training, firing on the range, overcoming insects, parades, inspections that seemed useless, personal health, leadership of instructors, good food most of the time, etc.”¹⁶ Though intense, Puckett’s training methodology was quite simple: “I established high standards and required all to meet those standards. . . by working together in a demanding, battle-focused training program the standards of which had to be met, we turned ourselves into Rangers and all that the word meant.”¹⁷ That was important because their training was about to be cut short.

The end of September 1950 marked the end of the fifth week of the seven-week Ranger training cycle. According to 1LT Puckett, “COL John A. Dabney, G-3, the Eighth Army, wanted the Rangers to become operational ASAP. Eighth Army wanted every available soldier, and our company was the only uncommitted company in Korea

while we trained.”¹⁸ COL Dabney’s driving concern was to use the Rangers’ unique capabilities to either support and exploit the 15 September X Corps landings at Inch’on or contribute to GEN Walker’s EUSA breakout from the Pusan Perimeter. Dabney wanted the status of the Rangers’ training, and McGee’s recommendation for their immediate combat employment. The original requirement to reduce the North Korean guerrilla threat in the Pohang Pocket would disappear when the Eighth Army attacked north from the Pusan Perimeter. EUSA was to destroy the enemy as it advanced north to meet X Corps in the vicinity of Seoul between 16 and 22 September 1950.¹⁹ McGee considered the Rangers ready for combat with the following qualifications:

- A. *Their missions did not exceed the capabilities of the three American officers, sixty-three enlisted soldiers and ten Korean Augmentations to the U. S. Army enlisted (KATUSAs) assigned.*
- B. *The company commander was allowed adequate time for reconnaissance and detailed planning.*
- C. *After evaluation of its performance in combat, the Company either be expanded into a Ranger Battalion or deactivated.*²⁰

The final Training Report for the Eighth Army Ranger Company provided to the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army Korea on 1 October 1950 formalized LTC McGee’s assessment. In it he emphasized the Rangers’ high level of physical conditioning and patrolling skills while reminding everyone that they had limited firepower, rapid foot mobility over difficult terrain, and their strong chain of command was made possible by the increased sense of duty possessed by unit sergeants.²¹ Considered operationally ready for combat, the Eighth Army Ranger Company became the Eighth Army Ranger Company, 8213th AU (Army Unit) on 8 October 1950.²² Two days later (on 14 October 1950), 1LT Puckett took his advanced echelon (ADVON) to the 25th “Tropic Lightning” Infantry Division (25th ID), IX Corps at Taejon. The EUSA Rangers were to work with the 25th ID Reconnaissance Company, commanded by Captain (CPT) Charles Matthews, against guerrillas in the Poun area, northeast of Taejon.²³

For the first time since their formation, the Ranger Company platoons were to operate independently. 1LT Puckett, the company headquarters, and 1LT Cummings and 2nd Platoon were based out of Poun while 1LT Bunn and the 1st Platoon were located at a village nearby. Operating in conjunction with the Recon Company, the Rangers rapidly acquired combat experience. Using Ranger patrolling skills, they located and eliminated enemy pockets of resistance bypassed by the UN drive north from Pusan.²⁴ As the EUSA approached the 38th Parallel, General MacArthur and President Harry S. Truman met on Wake Island on 15 October 1950 to discuss the situation in Korea. MacArthur told the President that he expected formal NKPA resistance in Korea to end

around Thanksgiving. He anticipated that EUSA would be back in Japan by Christmas. Moreover, he no longer feared Chinese or Soviet intervention. Unknown to both American leaders, the Red Chinese had already begun moving forces across the Yalu River into North Korea.²⁵

The size of the Chinese intervention was unknown. Actually, four Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) armies, the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42nd each comprised of three divisions, had crossed the Yalu between 14 and 20 October 1950. All four armies kept their original designation of the *Fourth Field Army* until they crossed into Korea. Then, they became subordinate units of Li T’ien-yu’s CCF *XIII Army Group*. Of the four CCF armies positioned in front of the Eighth Army, the 39th posed the greatest threat to the 25th Infantry Division.²⁶

As the 25th Infantry Division moved the 175 miles north to Kaesong, the Rangers conducted patrols and set up fire roadblocks to stop enemy vehicle movement. Being just two miles south of the 38th Parallel, the EUSA Rangers, the 25th ID Reconnaissance Company, and elements of the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment organized into Task Force (TF) JOHNSON swept and cleared a triangular area bounded by Uijong-bu in the south, Tongduchon-ni in the north, and Shiny-ri to the northeast.²⁷ After leaving TF JOHNSON on 18 November 1950, the Rangers returned to Kaesong, and came under operational control (OPCON) of the 89th Medium Tank Battalion (MTB) commanded by LTC Welborn G. “Tom” Dolvin.

On 20 November 1950 the 25th ID moved north to join the EUSA’s renewed offensive against a combined North Korean-Chinese force believed to be approximately 25,700 soldiers. Because the 25th ID’s sector of the IX Corps front was too wide for a two-regiment attack, but too narrow for a three-regiment front, the 89th MTB was reconfigured to form Task Force DOLVIN to “spearhead” the drive. The same day the 25th ID published the operations order, the Rangers began to motor march north. At 0100 hours on 22 November 1950, they reached Kunu-ri, North Korea, and by 1600 hours they had joined TF DOLVIN at Yongdungp’o.²⁸ The next day, 23 November 1950, while the rest of TF DOLVIN ate a full Thanksgiving dinner, the Rangers had turkey sandwiches in between briefings, equipment checks, and ammunition issue.²⁹ As an added



President Harry S. Truman and General Douglas A. MacArthur met at Wake Island on 15 October 1950 to discuss the situation in Korea.

Task Force DOLVIN



Eighth Army
DUI



25th Infantry
Division DUI



89th Medium Tank
Battalion DUI



27th Infantry
Regiment DUI



35th Infantry
Regiment DUI



LTC Welborn G. "Tom" Dolvin, USMA 1939. LTC Dolvin, a WWII veteran of the 191st Tank Battalion was already experienced against the North Koreans having led the 25th ID's breakout from the Pusan Perimeter in September 1950.

Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Welborn G. "Tom" Dolvin, a World War II European Theater combat veteran, was playing golf at Fort Benning, Georgia on 12 July 1950 when a messenger arrived with orders changing his assignment from Austria to Japan. He was to command the Eighth Army's 8072nd Army Unit (AU), Medium Tank Battalion in Japan. A week later, LTC Dolvin arrived in Japan and discovered that his battalion contained six officers and sixty-five enlisted men from Eighth Army and nine officers and one hundred and forty-six enlisted men from 2nd Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas. Its primary fighting strength was three medium tank companies; one company (seventeen tanks) was equipped with M26 Pershings (90 mm main gun); the other two (thirty-four tanks) with M4A3E8 Shermans (76 mm main gun). Supplementing the battalion's fire power was an assault gun platoon with three M45 105 mm howitzer tanks. A variety of other wheeled and tracked vehicles such as M39 Armored Utility Vehicles and M3 (Scout Car) and M4A1 (81 mm Mortar Carrier) halftracks supported all other combat elements.

On 31 July 1950, the battalion was not all together. One company was in Pusan. The remainder were spread from Camp Drake (Tokyo) to Masan, Korea. Only a portion of assigned personnel and equipment were ready for combat. By 4 August 1950, the 8072nd AU MTB reassembled in Pusan and three days later became the 89th Medium Tank Battalion. With redesignation came reorganization. Unlike tank battalions in the 1950s infantry divisions, the 89th would be organized like a World War II MTB with four tank companies instead of three.¹ This allowed Dolvin to train his one company of Pershings and three companies of Shermans in a secure area while rotating them in and out of the line for rest and maintenance.²

There were two TF DOLVINs. TF DOLVIN I spearheaded the 25th ID's breakout from the Pusan Perimeter to secure the southwest portion of Korea from Chinju to Hamyang and Namwon (26 to 30 September 1950).³ TF DOLVIN II led the 25th ID drive north to the Yalu River. TF DOLVIN II had these elements:

- A. B Company (-), 89th Medium Tank Battalion (MTB) (M4A3E8) with the 8213th (Eighth Army) Ranger Company attached
- B. E Company, 27th Infantry Regiment with the 89th MTB Assault Gun Platoon attached
- C. B Company, 35th Infantry Regiment with 1st Platoon, B Company, 89th MTB attached
- D. 25th Infantry Division Reconnaissance Company
- E. Reconnaissance Platoon, 89th MTB⁴

After supporting the Eighth Army Ranger Company's attacks on Hills 222 and 205, TF DOLVIN II remained intact until after the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) Second Phase Offensive on the night of 25-26 November 1950. Concerned that the CCF would initiate an attack directed at the 25th ID's center, the division commander, Major General (MG) William B. Kean, made two significant decisions. First, he cancelled plans to continue the advance northward on the morning of 26 November 1950 and second, he created Task Force WILSON under command of Brigadier General (BG) Vennard Wilson, the assistant division commander. TF WILSON merged the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry and all TF DOLVIN II elements except the Rangers (who became the 25th ID security force). LTC Dolvin later became Chief of Staff of the 25th ID until late 1951 when he was reassigned to the Office of the Chief of Research and Development, U.S. Army in Washington.

Endnotes

- 1 Arthur W. Connor, Jr., "The Armor Debacle in Korea, 1950: Implications for Today," *Parameters*, Summer 1992, 72. www.usamhi.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1992/1992%20Connor.pdf.
- 2 Connor, "The Armor Debacle in Korea, 1950," 73.
- 3 Roy E. Appleman, *The United States Army in the Korean War. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950)*, (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army, 1961), 579.
- 4 TF DOLVIN II was the result of 25th ID Operations Order 15 dated 21 November 1950. Robert W. Black, *Rangers in Korea* (New York: Ivy Books, 1989), 31.

89th Medium Tank Battalion



M26 Pershing Tank. Held over from WWII for service in Korea, the Pershing's age contributed to its numerous mechanical problems. It was eventually replaced by the M46 Patton Tank beginning in 1951.



M4A3E8. Nicknamed the "Easy Eight", this tank was the improved version of WWII's M4 Sherman. Armed with a 76 mm main gun, it was also replaced by the M46 Patton.



M45 Howitzer Tank. This was a 105 mm howitzer mounted in the turret and hull of an M26 Pershing chassis. It was found in the assault gun platoon of the Medium Tank Battalion.


25th Infantry Division Reconnaissance Company




Two M24 Chaffee Tanks were assigned to each armor section.



One M39 Armored Utility Vehicle transported the platoon's infantry squad.



M4A1 81 mm Mortar Carrier. There was one of these per platoon.



TF DOLVIN Map. Shows the route and objectives of TF DOLVIN in North Korea from 25-27 November 1950.

Crossing the LD on time, TF DOLVIN had B Company, 35th Infantry on the left flank, the Rangers, aboard the tanks of B Company, 89th MTB in the center, and E Company, 27th Infantry on the right flank. Shortly after crossing the LD, the Rangers encountered two 8th Cavalry Regiment soldiers who had escaped from the Chinese after being captured at Unsan in early November. The former prisoners reported that twenty-eight more wounded and frostbitten Americans had been abandoned by the Chinese approximately five kilometers ahead. The TF pushed on, found the other prisoners, and sent them to the rear.³¹



enemy mortar and automatic weapons fire. 1LT Cummings led the second Ranger platoon in an 800-yard assault to seize the hill. Without warning, the B Company, 89th MTB tanks opened fire on the advancing Rangers. Ranger Billy G. Walls, a second platoon machinegunner, recalls: "At this time our tanks opened up on the Rangers from the rear; I saw the tank shells hit into the Rangers. LT Puckett ran screaming to the tanks and stopped the shelling."³² Despite suffering casualties from friendly tank fire, the Rangers seized the objective and took up defensive positions for the night of 24-25 November 1950.³³

Better suited as the objective for a full-sized infantry company with more men and assets, 1LT Puckett and his fifty-one Rangers mounted the 89th MTB tanks to seize Hill 205, a thinly wooded crest about 5,000 meters further north.³⁵ When the tanks entered the frozen rice paddies below the hill, they stopped and once again buttoned up after the first shot was fired at them.³⁶ Hopping off the vehicle, Puckett tried to open his tank's phone box to talk to the commander. When that failed, he climbed back on the engine deck and started beating against the turret with his rifle. When the tank commander cracked the turret hatch open approximately four inches, Puckett, in no uncertain terms reminded the commander that unlike his three inches of armor, the Rangers only had a quarter inch of clothing to protect them. They needed tank fire support for the assault. Ranger 1LT Charles Bunn remembered that almost as soon as the Rangers hit the ground, enemy mortar fire bracketed them.³⁷ Instinctively, SFC Morrissey, 1LT Cummings, and 1LT Puckett started leading the Rangers toward the objective. TF artillery support, air strikes, and the tank gun fire enabled Hill

205 to be captured as the enemy fled. The EUSA Rangers reorganized and consolidated on the objective. Puckett established a 360-degree perimeter, sited automatic weapons on likely avenues of approach, and told the Rangers to dig in and prepare to spend the night. Then Puckett went to the TF command post to coordinate his artillery fire support plan with CPT Gordon Sumner, the artillery liaison officer, and to review the operations overlay. The Ranger CO saw that not only was his right flank exposed, but the closest friendly unit to the Rangers was several kilometers away. Returning to Hill 205, Puckett reflected: "I felt all alone, but totally focused on my direct responsibilities and prepared to hold the high ground on Task Force DOLVIN's right flank."³⁸

The Rangers dug in and improved their defensive positions during the afternoon and early evening hours unaware that the CCF intended to start its Second Phase Offensive that night. At approximately 2100 hours, Ranger First Sergeant (1SG) Charles L. Pitts, at the base of Hill 205, was arranging for hot chili to be carried up as part of the company's resupply when he heard machinegun fire coming from the left flank.³⁹ Unknown to Puckett and the other Rangers, this signaled the start of the CCF attack which overwhelmed 3rd platoon, E Company, 27th Infantry, in squad defensive formations on three separate small hills below Hill 207, E Company's main position. Alerted to an approaching enemy, the Rangers prepared for an attack. About 2200 hours, swarms of Chinese beating drums and blowing whistles and bugles, began a frontal assault. Heavy Ranger small arms fire and Puckett's pre-planned artillery concentrations halted this first attack around 2250 hours. Unfortunately, several Rangers were wounded including Puckett who was hit in the left thigh. He refused evacuation for what would be his first wound. Roughly ten minutes later the Chinese launched a second attack which was also beaten back, but was quickly followed by another, also repelled.

Each attack resulted in more Chinese being committed and the fighting closed to hand grenade range. After being wounded a second time (in the left shoulder) Puckett reported at 2350 hours that the Rangers still controlled the hill. After repulsing a fourth and then a fifth CCF attack, their ammunition was almost gone. According to Ranger Billy G. Walls, his platoon sergeant, Ranger Harland F. Morrissey, issued the order to "fix bayonets and prepare for counterattack." Then they waited. Finally, at 0245 hours following an intense mortar barrage, the Chinese launched their sixth and final attack on Hill 205 with the lead Chinese assaulters throwing hand grenades.⁴⁰ Unable to get artillery support, critically short of ammunition, and with most of the Rangers still alive being wounded, Puckett sent his last radio message: "It's too late. Tell Colonel Dolvin we're being overwhelmed."⁴¹

Then Chinese swarmed over Hill 205, bayoneting and shooting the Rangers who fought from their foxholes. Wounded Ranger Merrill S. Casner had a Chinese soldier put a rifle to his head and pull the trigger. It did not kill him, but Casner faked death



PFC William L. Judy was a mechanic in an engineer unit when he volunteered for the Rangers.

SFC Harland F. Morrissey gave the command to "fix bayonets" during the sixth and final CCF attack on Hill 205 on 26 November 1950. During WWII, he earned a Silver Star with the 1st Marine Parachute Battalion.



PFC David L. Pollock was Billy Walls' assistant machine gunner who helped Walls evacuate Puckett from Hill 205. Pollock and Walls were each awarded the Silver Star for their actions on Hill 205.

SGT Billy G. Walls volunteered for the Rangers because his platoon sergeant in basic training had been a Ranger and he wanted to "fight with the best." He and Morrissey introduced the Mohawk haircut.



until he could get off the hill.⁴² Amid the noise and confusion, Ranger William L. Judy found LT Puckett seriously wounded by either grenade or mortar fragments. Unable to move, Puckett told Judy to leave him behind. Judy had other ideas and went to find Morrissey to help him evacuate his company commander. Not finding Morrissey, he located Rangers Billy G. Walls and David L. Pollock to help him. Walls and Pollock found LT Puckett on his hands and knees, wounded in his left shoulder, both feet, thighs and buttocks, and surrounded by Chinese. The Rangers fired into the Chinese soldiers driving them away. Walls charged forward, picked Puckett up, slung him over his shoulder, and ran off the hill while Pollock provided covering fire. They hid in a small draw filled with brush



The Turkish Brigade was commanded by BG Tahsin Yazici and arrived in Korea on 19 October 1950 with 5,000 men in three infantry battalions, artillery and engineer units. Attached to the 25th ID, it remained in Korea until mid-summer 1954.

CPT Charles G. Ross was originally assigned as CPT Vann's Executive Officer. He had the distinction of being the last commander of both the Eighth Army Ranger Company and the 1st Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne).



and trees. Judy finally found Morrissey and a few more Rangers, and rejoined the company at the collection point at the base of Hill 205.

Exhausted after carrying Puckett about fifty yards, SGT Walls dumped Puckett on the ground as he and Pollock tried to catch their breath. After a short rest, Walls said to Puckett, "Sir, you're too heavy," and the two men grabbed Puckett by his wrists and dragged him the rest of the way down the hill.⁴³ Eventually, they reached the base of Hill 205 where 1SG Pitts had established a collecting point. LT Puckett was carried to a tank and loaded onto the back deck. He was evacuated to the aid station about one and a half miles away. The CCF occupation of Hill 205 prevented attempts by 1SG Pitts or the other Rangers to search for dead or missing Rangers on the hill. The next morning (26 November 1950) 1SG Pitts, as one of the few leaders not wounded, took charge of the Eighth Army Ranger Company and prepared the morning report. Among the fifty-one Rangers who attacked, captured, and then defended Hill 205 only ten remained unharmed. Four casualties were sustained in the attack up the hill. An additional twenty-seven more were wounded, and ten were missing after the sixth CCF assault drove them off Objective 10. Among the missing Rangers was 1LT Cummings whose remains were never recovered.

The action at Hill 205 rendered the Eighth Army Ranger Company combat ineffective. After 26 November 1950, the Company was only capable of conducting routine patrols in front of the 25th ID front-line trace, acting as a security force for regimental or divisional headquarters, or assisting the Turkish Brigade in securing Kangwha Island at the mouth of the Han River. 1LT Ralph Puckett, Jr. was evacuated to the United States to recover from his wounds.⁴⁴ He was replaced first by CPT John Paul Vann and then CPT Charles G. Ross.⁴⁵ The original Ranger screening and selection criteria went by the wayside and special training programs were eventually discontinued. New personnel were assigned directly from mainstream replacement detachments. Replacement training was done between company missions, but it lacked the focus and intensity of that given to the original EUSA Rangers by LT Puckett and LTC McGee. While the EUSA Ranger Company did participate with the 25th ID in Operations KILLER and



CPT John Paul Vann assumed command of the Rangers on 5 December 1950 after Puckett was evacuated for his wounds. Vann returned to the Ranger Training Command at Fort Benning on 5 March 1951. He was killed in Vietnam in a helicopter crash in 1972.

RIPPER, no amount of operational experience would save them from being disbanded and replaced by the 5th Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne) on 31 March 1951.

EPILOGUE:

During its short life, the Eighth Army Ranger Company fought in four major campaigns, spent 164 days on continuous front-line duty, and was awarded the Korean Presidential Unit Citation. The Eighth Army Ranger Company has never been officially acknowledged as a separate unit by the Department of the Army. Although organized under two recognized U.S. Army Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) documents by General Headquarters (GHQ), Far East Command message CX50251, 2 December 1950, the company was never officially "activated" under either of these documents. They remained a FECOM TDA Army Unit (AU). Years later, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) told Puckett that Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) units could not be awarded combat campaign streamers. Only TO&E units were authorized them. This meant that the only Ranger unit in Korea during the Pusan Perimeter defense and the only Ranger unit that could have earned a battle streamer for that period was not entitled to one by Army policy.⁴⁶ Despite the lack of formal honors, Retired Colonel Ralph Puckett best explained the spirit of the Eighth Army Rangers: "We had the confidence that came from believing that we were the best that the United States of America could produce."⁴⁷ ▲

Eugene G. Piasecki, a retired Special Forces officer, is a government contractor who has been with the USASOC History Office since 2006. He earned his Master's Degree in military history from Norwich University. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, Army special operations in Somalia and the History of Camp Mackall.

Endnotes

- 1 COL (Ret) Ralph Puckett, Jr., Eighth Army Ranger Company, e-mail to Eugene G. Piasecki, 14 February 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. Puckett volunteered for the Rangers as a result of the stories he had heard about the Rangers and his personal desire to be with the best. After his interview with McGee, Puckett learned that his boxing experience, recent graduation from Jump School, and excellent physical condition worked to his advantage since McGee had also been on West Point's boxing team. Impressed with his attitude and aggressiveness Puckett stated McGee selected him to command the Ranger Company because he believed an officer with no combat experience would be more aggressive than an experienced officer who had fought in World War II.
- 2 T. R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War. The Classic Korean War History* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1963), 108.

- 3 Robert W. Black, *Rangers in Korea* (New York: Ivy Books, 1989), 12-13. The defensive line between Taegu and Pohang was originally called the Nakdong Perimeter and only became known as the Pohang Pocket after the NKPA had broken through its defenses.
- 4 Black, *Rangers in Korea*, 10-11.
- 5 Black, *Rangers in Korea*, 13. Puckett used the TO&E McGee gave him to form the company into a five-man headquarters element and two thirty-six man platoons for a total company strength of three officers and seventy-four enlisted men. The company headquarters consisted of the commander, first sergeant, supply corporal, company clerk and messenger. Each platoon had a headquarters element of one officer and three enlisted men; two assault sections of eleven men each; and a special weapons section of ten men. Each assault section was armed with a mix of M-1 Garand rifles, carbines, and supplemented by a light machine gun. The special weapons section included a 60 mm mortar, two 3.5 inch bazookas, and a Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR); each platoon headquarters also had a sniper rifle as part of its armament (Gray, 'The First Rangers in Korea,' 24-26).
- 6 While preferring single men under the age of 26, Puckett did make exceptions. He generally selected average soldiers who had demonstrated solid duty performances and motivation. This included a few World War II veterans such as Corporal Earl Cronin who had fought in Europe and Corporal Harland F. Morrissey who had won a Silver Star as a member of the 1st Marine Parachute Battalion.
- 7 Records of Events Section, Initial Morning Report, 26 August 1950 from the Eighth Army Ranger Company Association Newsletter, 25 August 1987. General Order 237, Headquarters Eighth Army APO 343 dated 24 August 1950 published on 25 August 1950 activated the Eighth Army Ranger Company.
- 8 COL (Ret) Ralph Puckett, Jr., e-mail to Eugene G. Piasecki, 11 March 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 9 Rangers Billy G. Walls and Merle W. Simpson, Eighth Army Ranger Company, interviews by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 7 July 2005, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. The Eighth Army Ranger Company Association, *The Eighth Army Ranger Company from August 1950-March 1951*. A Narrative Compilation as of July 1992, 12. Ralph Puckett was the officer Walls saw and recalls: "I saw Walls in the hall with a Mohawk. He recommended that all of us get a Mohawk. I agreed immediately. Told him to pass out the word while I published a written order. Then I went for my Mohawk. We kept the Mohawks until the weather turned very cold in November. 1SG Pitts did "the honors" with his barber kit, important equipment for every First Sergeant.
- 10 Black, *Rangers in Korea*, 15.
- 11 Ranger Jesse E. Anderson, Eighth Army Ranger Company, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 6 July 2005, Eighth Army Ranger Company Reunion, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 12 The Eighth Army Ranger Company Association, *The Eighth Army Ranger Company*, 15.
- 13 Puckett e-mail, 14 February 2010.
- 14 The Eighth Army Ranger Company Association, *The Eighth Army Ranger Company*, 15. Colonel (retired) Ralph Puckett, Eighth Army Ranger Company, letter to Dr. Richard L. Kiper, 30 April 2004, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 15 Puckett letter to Kiper, 30 April 2004, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 16 The Eighth Army Ranger Company Association, *The Eighth Army Ranger Company*, 18-19.
- 17 Puckett letter to Kiper, 30 April 2004, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 18 Puckett e-mail, 11 March 2010.
- 19 Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War*, 171.
- 20 The Eighth Army Ranger Company Association, *The Eighth Army Ranger Company*, 18; Gray, 'The First Rangers in Korea,' 36-37. The Korean enlisted men were part of the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA) Program. The KATUSA Program was conceived in July 1950 by an informal agreement between South Korean President Syngman Rhee and General Douglas MacArthur and implemented by 15 August 1950. On that date, GEN MacArthur ordered LTG Walker to increase the strength of each company and battery of United States troops by 100 Koreans. The Koreans would legally be part of the ROK Army and would be paid and administered by the South Korean government, but receive U.S. rations and special service items.
- 21 The Eighth Army Ranger Company Association, *The Eighth Army Ranger Company*, 24. Puckett e-mail 14 February 2010. McGee assessed the company as prepared to undertake the missions of: Raids, Reconnaissance Patrolling, Combat Patrolling, Motorized Detachment, and Trail Blocks. He also stressed the importance of achieving tactical surprise and the necessity for having sufficient time to plan and rehearse missions.
- 22 Black, *Rangers in Korea*, 23. Also on 8 October 1950, Puckett, Bunn and Cummings were all promoted to First Lieutenant. A Table of Distribution Allowance (TDA) unit is considered a temporary unit organized from in-theater assets and has no lineage. This meant that the campaigns and honors of the Eighth Army Ranger Company could not accrue to the Ranger heritage. This has caused much resentment over the years. (Black, *Rangers in Korea*, 23). EUSA issued General Order 106 with an authorized American strength of three officers and seventy-four enlisted men under Table of Distribution 301-1498, dated 19 September 1950.
- 23 Roy E. Appleman, *The United States Army in the Korean War. South to the Nakdong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950)*, (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army, 1961), 721; Shelby L. Stanton, *Rangers at War: Combat Recon in Vietnam* (New York: Orion Books, 1992), 349. Puckett relates in his 14 February 2010 e-mail that the Rangers had to be attached to some unit because they had no mess, no medics, no transportation, ---nothing. The TO&E under which the Rangers was formed called for all of that support to be at Ranger Battalion Headquarters level and since there was no Ranger Battalion, Puckett stated: " We had a great relationship with the Recon Company."
- 24 Black, *Rangers in Korea*, 28-29. The Company also received a ten-man squad of KATUSAs to supplement their numbers and act as interpreters with friendly civilians. Puckett placed one KATUSA in each headquarters element and split the remaining number into each assault section.
- 25 Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War*, 185-186.
- 26 Appleman, *South to the Nakdong, North to the Yalu*, 766.
- 27 The Eighth Army Ranger Company Association, *The Eighth Army Ranger Company*, 34.
- 28 Black, *Rangers in Korea*, 31. The Eighth Army Ranger Company Association, *The Eighth Army Ranger Company*, 36-38. The 89th Medium Tank Battalion was attached by authority of 25th ID Operations Order #15 on 21 November 1950.
- 29 Puckett e-mail 14 February 2010.
- 30 Black, *Rangers in Korea*, 31. This was 25th ID Operations Order #6 dated 1000 hours, 23 November 1950.
- 31 The 8th Army Ranger Company Association, *The Eighth Army Ranger Company*, 40-41.
- 32 The 8th Army Ranger Company Association, *The Eighth Army Ranger Company*, 41-42.
- 33 Black, *Rangers in Korea*, 32.
- 34 Black, *Rangers in Korea*, 32.
- 35 Colonel (ret) Ralph Puckett, Jr., Commander, Eighth Army Ranger Company, interview by Colonel (ret) Harry J. Maihafer, 1 December 2000, *Military History Magazine*, <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/ARMY+RANGERS+BAPTISM+OF+FIRE-a066419967> accessed 12 January 2010. COL Maihafer and COL Puckett were classmates and graduates of USMA, Class of 1949. Maihafer has also written the book *From the Hudson to the Yalu* which contains stories about several of his classmates who fought in Korea.
- 36 Puckett e-mail, 14 February 2010.
- 37 The Eighth Army Ranger Company Association, *The Eighth Army Ranger Company*, 46.
- 38 The Eighth Army Ranger Company Association, *The Eighth Army Ranger Company*, 45-47. Puckett e-mail, 11 March 2010.
- 39 The Eighth Army Ranger Company Association, *The Eighth Army Ranger Company*, 50.
- 40 Walls interview with Briscoe, 7 July 2005. Puckett e-mail, 14 February 2010.
- 41 Puckett interview with Maihafer, 1 December 2000. Prior to the sixth attack, two Chinese mortar shells landed a fraction of a second apart and exploded almost on top of Puckett's command foxhole. Barnard Cummings, Puckett's classmate and one of the three original officer volunteers in the Eighth Army Ranger Company was killed instantly. Puckett now had wounds to both feet, left shoulder and left arm, thighs and buttocks. In fact his right foot was so badly mangled he had to persuade treating medical personnel not to amputate it.
- 42 The Eighth Army Ranger Company Association, *The Eighth Army Ranger Company*, 56.
- 43 COL (ret) Ralph Puckett, Jr., e-mail to Eugene G. Piasecki, 4 April 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 44 Puckett e-mail, 4 April 2010. Puckett remembered: "The right foot was in such bad shape that the doctors considered amputation the first five months I was in the hospital. I have had 20+ operations on the feet and still have a miniscule amount of drainage but all is well."
- 45 CPT John Paul Vann began his career as a B-29 Superfortress Bomber navigator during WWII. After the war he remained in the Army and received a commission in the Infantry. Assigned to the 25th Infantry Division in Korea, he commanded the Eighth Army Rangers, between December 1950 and February 1951 until he was reassigned to the Ranger Training Command at Fort Benning, GA. In 1962 in Vietnam he was an advisor to the South Vietnamese Army, but resigned his commission in 1963 and returned as a Deputy for CORDS in the III Corps Tactical Zone. He was killed in a helicopter crash in Vietnam in the early 1970s.
- 46 Puckett e-mail, 11 March 2010.
- 47 COL Ralph Puckett, Jr., Personal notes for: Chapter III: The Korean War—Formation and Training of the Eighth Army Ranger Company, e-mail to Eugene G. Piasecki, 11 March 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

PSYOP

"VOLUNTEERING" FOR COMBAT: LOUDSPEAKER PSYWAR IN KOREA

by Charles H. Briscoe

As an early psychological operations unit, the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (1st L&L) fulfilled a unique role in the Korean War. Gerald "Jerry" Allen Rose played a part in this interesting mission as he participated in tactical loudspeaker operations from the fall of 1951 through the summer of 1952. In the course of his ten-month tour with the 1st L&L, Rose rotated from line division to line division across the front every thirty to forty-five days, participated in 253 combat loudspeaker missions, and was awarded the Bronze Star and two Purple Hearts. While Rose was only one member of the 1st L&L, his story allows us to gain insight into the unit's activities and its place in history.¹

Jerry Rose, an Oakland High School graduate with a Bachelor of Arts from the California College of Arts & Crafts, had been drafted in 1951 and sent to Fort Ord, California, for basic infantry training. A college degree and Expert marksmanship ratings with the M1 rifle, the M2 carbine, the .45 pistol, and Browning Automatic Rifle opened Officer Candidate School to the amateur lightweight boxer. However, marching a squad of fellow candidates into the side of a building ended that venture. Rose was quickly back at Fort Ord chasing stockade work detail escapees, before being shipped off to Japan.

Bored with company clerking at a replacement center in Japan, Private (PVT) Rose, infantryman, volunteered for Korea. Arriving at the embarkation point in early fall, Rose found that the ferry docks in southern Japan were piled high with stocks of winter clothing from wounded and dead Americans. Not having been issued cold weather gear, Rose outfitted himself before getting aboard the ferry to Pusan, Korea.

The crossing to Pusan was uneventful, but "ten miles offshore, I got the first whiff of burning feces and trash. It was unforgettable," remembered Rose, "because that smell was a constant in Korea."² At Pusan, Rose found himself in a holding company with other replacements awaiting transportation at the railroad terminus. Several nights later, PVT Rose was aboard a train traveling north when it stopped "in the middle of nowhere at 3 a.m." The stop proved to be the start of a tactical Psychological

Warfare (Psywar) assignment for Jerry Rose.

While the train was at a halt, a soldier entered the darkened railroad car and asked if anyone had training in psychology. Rose, who had taken a basic psychology course in college, said, "I have," violating for a second time (Officer Candidate School being the first) the old Army adage, "Never volunteer for anything." After spending a night at "Fort Apache," a training and logistics site south of Taegu, the shanghaied Rose was put on a train to Seoul.

Arriving in Seoul, Rose was met by another soldier in a quarter-ton four-by-four truck (Jeep), and taken to the 1st L&L headquarters in an old high school on the north side of Seoul. The company clerk of the 1st L&L had his replacement—Rose.⁴ Later, Rose discovered that this technique was used by the 1st L&L to get choice replacements, and was why more than half of the enlisted men were drafted college graduates in spite of the company not having priority fill for school-trained Psywar soldiers.⁵

Private Rose was soon introduced to the company commander, Major (MAJ) Donald W. Osgood; the executive officer (XO), Captain (CPT) Jay V. Russell; and the First Sergeant, Master Sergeant Frank L. Reppen. Reppen was a Finn captured in the Russo-Finnish War (1937–38) who had been repatriated by the Germans for service in an ethnic SS (*Schutzstaffel*) battalion. After surrendering to American forces, Reppen elected to join the U.S. Army as a way to get U.S. citizenship.⁶ Major Osgood was a WWII veteran of the European theater. Russell, the unit XO and former loudspeaker platoon leader, had commanded ammunition and labor, infantry,



Far East Command SSI



Eighth U.S. Army SSI



The 1st L&L used an old high school on the north side of Seoul for its headquarters.

and cavalry reconnaissance platoons in the 25th Infantry Division from Guadalcanal to the Philippines, and had graduated from the Alamo Scout school. First Lieutenant (1LT) Richard L. Keator, the 1st L&L's Loudspeaker Platoon leader, commanded a rifle platoon in Europe toward the end of WWII.⁷ Such disparate military backgrounds for personnel assigned to Psywar was typical in the post-WWII period. Few officers and enlisted men had experience or schooling in psychological operations.

The 1st L&L evolved from a Technical Information Detachment (TID) of four officers and twenty enlisted men stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas. The TID was the Psywar detachment of Aggressor Force for Army maneuvers countrywide.⁸ Shortly after the North Koreans invaded the South, the detachment was alerted for Korea and notified that it would become an Army Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company under Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) 20-77 dated 1 September 1950. The TID packed its equipment and left Fort Riley on 9 September. They shipped from Seattle on 15 September aboard a U.S. Navy troopship carrying military families to Japan. Told that their equipment would meet them in Korea, the 1st L&L cadre of twenty boarded the Pusan ferry in Yokohama, Japan, on 15 October, bound for Eighth U.S. Army in Taegu, Korea (EUSA).⁹

On 4 November 1950, the 1st L&L was activated with an authorized complement of eight officers, ninety-nine enlisted men, three printing presses, twelve loudspeakers, and twenty-seven vehicles. The unit was placed under the administrative control of Eighth Army Special Troops Command and the operational control of the G-2 EUSA. No special arrangements were made by EUSA, nor priorities given, for language-qualified personnel or other Psywar specialties and unique equipment.

First L&L cadre spent the next several months locating TID equipment and getting it shipped from Japan to Korea, requisitioning—legally and illegally—TO&E equipment: printing presses, Jeeps, trailers, generators, loudspeakers,

and tents. They also spent their time recruiting personnel, writing tactical Psywar operating procedures, hiring interpreters from Korean universities, and selling tactical Psywar concepts to the corps and divisions of EUSA. It was April 1951 before the company was combat effective, and nine loudspeaker teams were dispatched to the divisions on line. By the end of June 1951, the company had eleven loudspeaker teams in action.¹⁰

The 1st L&L's general TO&E mission was to conduct tactical propaganda operations for a field army, and to provide qualified psychological warfare specialists as advisors to the army and subordinate staffs. The company's primary tools for tactical propaganda dissemination against the enemy were leaflets, news sheets, and loudspeakers. The 1st L&L was also capable of using propaganda to influence friendly elements (civilians) in enemy-held territory contiguous to the army front.¹¹

Psywar operations and requirements during the initial months of 1951 far exceeded the capabilities of the original 1950 TO&E. Change 1 to the TO&E, dated 24 April 1951, authorized a twenty-five percent enlisted over-strength. By the time Rose joined 1st L&L, the company headquarters supported three operational platoons: Propaganda, Publications, and Loudspeaker.¹²

The Loudspeaker (L/S) Platoon consisted of four officers and twenty-nine enlisted personnel, although the usual officer complement was three. The platoon officers spent most of their time getting support—administrative, logistics, and maintenance—for the eleven L/S teams spread across the East-West front. Each of the L/S platoon's three sections had three to four L/S teams assigned based on tactical employment in the corps sectors. L/S teams were supposed to be "tightly knit three-man units" consisting of a Team Chief, Assistant Team Chief, and a local civilian employee (Korean or Chinese, depending on the audience) who served as the translator-announcer-linguist. The L/S team mission was to:

1. Persuade isolated groups of enemy personnel in tactically untenable positions to surrender by means of live or recorded, semi-fixed ground, patrol and/or mobile tank-mounted loudspeaker broadcasts;

2. Beam broadcasts, musical, and feature programs by means of platoon's primary psychological warfare medium to enemy front line troops in static tactical situations;

3. Beam warnings and make loudspeaker announcements to civilians in enemy-held territory, in coordination with friendly elements;

4. Broadcast news, make announcements, and participate in other consolidation psychological warfare operations under the direction of Psychological Warfare and/or Civil Affairs/Military Government agencies, as directed.¹³

Clerking at the 1st L&L headquarters, supplemented by occasional Korean culture classes, soon bored Rose the



"The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company was the first unit of its kind to serve in combat. For almost three years, the 1st L&L provided psychological warfare support to the U.S. Army, Marines, and United Nations forces in Korea."²

infantryman. The only threat was an occasional small harassment bomb or leaflets dropped after midnight by "Bed Check Charlie", also known as "Piss Call Pete," a slow (70 to 90 knots) propeller-driven aircraft that flew low-level missions out of Sariwon Airfield. Rose quickly realized that the L/S teams were the only teams seeing combat.¹⁴ With the knowledge that L/S team members needed no special training, PVT Rose once again formulated a plan to escape clerking.

After being repeatedly badgered by Rose for a field assignment, CPT Russell finally sent now-Private Second Class (PV2) Rose to join Corporal (CPL) William E. Johnson's L/S team in early December 1951. Johnson's team was supporting the 24th Infantry Division (24th ID) dug in along the East-West railroad line. PV2 Rose quickly advanced in the three-man unit and became the Jeep driver, generator operator/mechanic, and assistant team leader in a matter of days.¹⁵



The civilian interpreter on each L/S team read the typewritten English scripts and broadcast in Korean and/or Chinese.¹⁶ A 1953 story in *The Stars and Stripes* provided an excellent account of how one Korean interpreter performed his mission:

The strenuous nightly climb to work was made a little easier for Mr. Kim on this rainy night as three searchlights on the next



A Chinese or Korean interpreter was part of every loudspeaker team and was responsible for reading prepared scripts addressed to enemy troops or nearby civilians. The American (or two) on each team acted as Team Chief, and was responsible for everything from security to generator repair. In this photo, PFC Wilson, SGT Lawrence O'Brien, and Yang Yunn (left to right) broadcast to the Chinese near Munye-ri. This L/S team sergeant will later be awarded a Silver Star.

Loudspeaker Equipment



Loudspeaker teams were equipped with a Public Address Set AN/UIQ-1 or a Beachmaster loudspeaker, a Recorder-Reproducer RD74/U (in lieu of a RD 31C/U), a Multimeter TS-352/U, a spool dispenser for a reel of WD-1 wire, a quarter-ton four-by-four truck (Jeep), a quarter-ton trailer, a Generator PE-75, a small wall or Arctic "hexagon" tent and stove (tent or Coleman), and whatever else they could scrounge. Air mattresses were commonly used to cushion the fragile broadcasting equipment.




Bed Check Charlie

Bed Check Charlies operated throughout the war, but low-level flights increased during the last six months, when the front lines were static. North Koreans used the Polikarpov U-2/Po-2, a Soviet biplane dating from 1927; the Yakovlev Yak-18A, a low-wing aircraft; the ancient Blochavidan Mbe-2, a pusher-type seaplane; as well as Lavochkin La-9 and La-11 low-wing aircraft. The Soviets had used them all during World War II as liaison, ambulance, and night raider aircraft. Powered by large exposed radial engines and constructed mostly of wood, they were difficult to track on radar, too slow to intercept with jet aircraft, and noisy enough to harass ground troops. After the Bed Check Charlie flights destroyed an F-86 Sabrejet and several F-51 Mustangs on crowded forward air bases, and some fifteen million gallons of aviation fuel and huge amounts of munitions stored at Inch'on, the intruders became a priority for the F4U-5N all-weather night fighter Corsairs of the 7th U.S. Navy Fleet. Several night fighter Corsairs from VC-3 aboard the USS *Princeton* (CVA-37) were detached ashore to K-6 at Pyongt'aek, Korea, to intercept the Bed Check Charlies, or "Washing Machine Charlies" as the Navy referred to them. Lieutenant Guy "Lucky Pierre" Bordelon, "Detachment Dog," was awarded the Silver Star and Navy Cross for destroying five Bed Check Charlies. He became "the Navy's first prop ace in Korea."¹

Endnotes

- ¹ http://www.acepilots.com/korea_bordelon.html; LT Guy Bordelon Interview in Donald Knox and Alfred Koppel, *The Korean War: The Concluding Volume of an Oral History: Uncertain Victory* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), 246-50.



Navy Lieutenant Guy Bordelon flew an F4U-5N Corsair when shooting down five Bed Check Charlie aircraft, making him the first "prop ace" in the Korean War.



Yakovlev Yak-18A



Polikarpov Po-2



Lavochkin La-9



As the Main Line of Resistance stabilized, the frontline divisions dug in and established prepared positions. This relative permanency allowed loudspeaker teams to broadcast from one location for several days at a time, a heretofore unknown luxury. *Photo courtesy of Jay V. Russell*

ridge cast an eerie light. Mr. Kim could barely distinguish the last few steps, but as he gained the top of the mountain, he could see more clearly. He started to set up for the night's work. First, the generator. Good, he thought, as it started without difficulty. He checked the dial to insure that there was enough power, then connected the "mike," placed a harmonica to his lips and began the first broadcast of the evening. From a loudspeaker unit, some 300 yards in front of the MLR (main line of resistance), came the strains of a soulful harmonica solo, followed with a resume of the current news in flawless Chinese for the news starved Communists. Thus, an obscure bunker on an isolated mountain once again became the final link in the Psywar chain.¹⁷

Security during the broadcasts was provided by the L/S team leader and assistant. They were usually armed with an M2 carbine or M3A1 sub-machinegun, because access to pistols—.45 caliber automatics—was limited.¹⁸ In his security role, expert sharpshooter PV2 Rose proved himself in combat on his first mission with the 24th ID.

After watching WWII hero Audie Murphy in *The Red Badge of Courage* at an open air theater, CPL Johnson, PV2 Rose, and their interpreter moved to the Combat Outpost Line (COPL) on Hill 1062 to broadcast into the Chorwon Valley. The combat outpost position had already been overrun several times, and they were to broadcast well in front of it. Wires ran back to the generator in the Jeep trailer near the outpost bunker. To enhance their security, CPL Johnson and Rose set up "early warning devices" (wire-suspended C-Ration cans containing small rocks) well in front of their foxhole. With such precautions in place, the interpreter began the broadcast.

The Chinese attack came early in the morning. Alerted by the noise of a rattling can, Rose fired his M3A1 "Grease




Loudspeaker Team 9 consisted of CPL Jack Dudley (L), PV2 Jerry Rose (R), and their interpreter. CPL Dudley was known for his enthusiastic and creative ideas for loudspeaker missions, including one that scared both sides into retreating.

Gun" at a looming figure charging toward him. As the enemy soldier fell backward, the hand grenade he was carrying exploded. This episode marked the beginning of a major firefight. Artillery and mortar illumination enabled the defenders to drive off the determined Communist attackers. While serving as a Psywar soldier, PV2 Rose had finally attained the status of a "blooded" combat infantryman.¹⁹

Unbeknownst to the novice Rose, special efforts were being made by the Chinese and North Koreans to capture broadcasting loudspeaker teams. "When they do that [send Hunter Teams to stop the Psywar broadcasting]," one EUSA official in Seoul observed, "we know we are hurting them."²⁰ That rear area assessment provided little consolation to the L/S teams on the front lines.

Loudspeaker broadcasts increased significantly in January and February 1952, "largely due to the more widespread use of prepared positions" by the Main Line of Resistance (MLR) divisions. As the MLR stabilized across the Korean front, L/S equipment could be used for several days at one location.²¹ Because only nine to ten of the eleven loudspeaker teams in the 1st L&L were available, L/S teams shifted every three to four weeks from division to division as the infantry moved forward to the MLR. To support this practice, L/S personnel served on thirty-day temporary duty orders with each division.²²

When CPL William Johnson rotated home to the States, PV2 Jerry Rose was reassigned to CPL John "Jack" H.



Chinese prisoners of war were recruited to broadcast propaganda messages and surrender appeals to their comrades still at arms. The broadcasts reinforced the promises printed on leaflets and safe conduct passes, and increased the enemy desertion rate.

Dudley's L/S Team 9 supporting 25th Infantry Division (25th ID). Promoting Psywar and tactical loudspeaker employment were constants for all L/S personnel because few staff officers and commanders in Korea had used loudspeakers in combat.²³ Dudley was a top salesman and sold the 25th ID on an interesting way to utilize the L/S team's unique capabilities.²⁴ The G-2's top priority was capturing enemy soldiers from the 223rd and 224th Chinese Infantry Regiments, and the L/S broadcast team was to be the bait.²⁵

"Dudley was a real crazy guy, but very ingenious. He had gone to the rail yard in Seoul and recorded tanks being unloaded from the flatcars and all kinds of locomotive noise," remembered Rose. "With infantry patrols lying in ambush to 'snatch' prisoners, Jack wanted realistic sounds that would prompt enemy scouts to investigate. That Jack Dudley idea—'The Phantom Army'—worked out real well for a couple of weeks. A good number of enemy soldiers were taken."²⁶ Even CPT Russell had supported using L/S teams to draw enemy fire when he served as the L/S platoon leader.²⁷

Prisoner of war interviews provided "grist" for the L/S teams on line. Broadcasting names of those recently captured was helpful, but better still was the recorded plea of a prisoner entreating his former comrades to surrender. When it was discovered that a newly captured Chinese artillery officer spoke Japanese, Sergeant Nagano, a Hawaiian Nisei, was brought to interrogate him. Nagano learned that the Chinese artilleryman had served with General Chiang Kai-shek during WWII. After being captured by the Red Army during the civil war, he "volunteered" to join the Communists.²⁸ Many of the Chinese prisoners who agreed to broadcast for the United Nations (UN) were former Nationalist Army soldiers that had been pressed into service by the Communists.

In their broadcasts, the prisoners of war emphasized the good treatment provided by UN troops, reinforcing the promise that had been printed on the airdropped and artillery-delivered surrender leaflets and safe conduct passes.²⁹ The safe conduct passes were effective, and most enemy deserters carried these paper tickets to freedom. Desertions multiplied when L/S broadcasts preceded artillery fire and air strikes, and several L/S teams even had groups of enemy soldiers surrender to them.³⁰

In an effort to further increase the L/S teams' effectiveness, the division G-2 suggested that the loudspeaker be mounted on an M24 Chaffee light tank. This idea had several advantages: the engine could power the loudspeaker; the tank could travel farther into no-man's-land forward of the combat outpost line because its three machineguns provided more protection; and the noise made by the M24 tank moving into position would considerably heighten enemy curiosity. Corporal Dudley, PV2 Rose, and the interpreter Lee conducted five of these very dangerous missions before the tank crew of the M24 finally balked at being such a vulnerable target of enemy fire.³¹

In reality, the negatives outweighed the positive points used by the division staff to sell the idea. The



Safe conduct passes, airdropped and delivered inside artillery shells, promised good treatment by UN troops. As a sign of their effectiveness, safe conduct passes were found in the possession of most enemy deserters.



The North Koreans were known to use safe conduct passes against UN troops, as well. In this pairing, one side has altered and copied the other side's pass to distribute as counterpropaganda. The question is, which came first? Color "Safe Conduct Pass" photo courtesy of Jay V. Russell



M24 engine had to be constantly running to power the mounted loudspeakers. As a result, the highest broadcast volume had to be used to drown out the tank engine noise. Because the tank crew could not hear approaching danger, they “buttoned up” inside their tank for self-protection, which meant that the L/S team was forced to communicate with the crew using the outside telephone. “But, really that didn’t matter anyway, because we couldn’t hear a thing over the running tank engine and broadcast noise. Pinpointed by the noise, instead of being bait we became magnets—just sitting ducks, to tell the truth,” said Rose. “But, I got promoted to PFC [Private First Class] and was awarded a Bronze Star.”³²

These tactical risks did not preclude a Far East Command observer team from emphasizing the success of M4 and M24 tank-mounted loudspeakers, nor 3rd Infantry Division from using a loudspeaker on an M39 armored utility vehicle (AUV). The AUV enabled the team to stay up with 15th Infantry commander leading Task Force BURRESS in a tank. Along the same lines, Sergeant (SGT) Lawrence O’Brien’s L/S team with the 7th ID was given an M20 light reconnaissance vehicle. Fortunately for Major General Claude B. Ferenbaugh, 7th ID commander, SGT O’Brien came upon his ambushed command vehicles, treated the wounded, and effected a rescue of the general, his aide-de-camp, and driver.³³

As a first lieutenant, Jay V. Russell had researched the mounting of loudspeakers on a variety of armored vehicles, after the 1st Marine Division on the Wonju-Hongch’on axis had attached an M4A3E2 “Super” Sherman tank to an L/S team in March 1951. Russell, like 1LT Fred Wilmot from EUSA G-3 Psywar Division, also evaluated the M39, the M29C Weasel Cargo Carrier, and the British Universal (Bren Gun) Carrier.³⁴ One of Russell’s recommendations regarding mounted loudspeakers was that close coordination was needed to keep UN troops from being “shocked” by innovative Psywar techniques.³⁵

Despite the risks associated with innovative loudspeaker employment, the enthusiasm of the resourceful CPL Jack Dudley was not dampened. Noting the effects achieved by the Chinese in using

bugles, drums, and war calls during attacks, and remembering the chills he got watching WWII films of screaming Nazi Stuka divebombers, CPL Dudley went back to Seoul.³⁶ This time he went to the zoo, where he recorded hungry, growling lions and tigers just before feeding time. “Especially proud of himself, Jack kept this recorded broadcast ‘close hold.’ Youn Myong Chong’s broadcast was totally forgotten the night when Dudley turned on the growling lions and tigers. Everybody—the troops in the outpost behind us and the Communist scouts in front of us—started running away. It caused one hell of a commotion. Attacking wild animals were the excuse for abandoning positions. Knowing that the next thing coming our way would be artillery, we got out of there as fast as we could, too,” recalled Rose, laughing. “Fortunately, we were rotating to the 45th Infantry Division [Oklahoma Army National Guard], because Dudley’s dramatic production of ‘Lions on the Loose’ didn’t go over too well with the 25th ID.”³⁷

Broadcast scripts and recorded messages provided by the Propaganda Platoon in Seoul were not much better. When L/S teams supporting the Republic of Korea Army units broadcast nostalgic themes in Korean to the enemy, the intended effects sometimes backfired. South Korean troops began weeping, and their officers were visibly affected. Thereafter, the substance and purpose of the latest campaign was passed down through the chains of command before broadcasting.³⁸ Scripts and tapes were approved by Projects Branch Chief of the G-3 Psywar Division, EUSA before distribution to L/S teams by the Publications Platoon.

Scripts followed an indirect path to the L/S teams. Normally translated into Chinese and Korean, mimeographed copies in English with Chinese and Korean characters alongside, were distributed to the teams.



Loudspeaker teams experimented with mounting public address systems on a variety of armored and unarmored vehicles—including the M39 AUV shown here—with mixed results. While mounted loudspeakers could generally approach closer to enemy lines, the proximity to enemy artillery was not always worth the risk to personnel and equipment.



This M4A3 Sherman tank was modified for loudspeaker use.

Produced by college-educated writers in the comfort of Seoul, most scripts were too sophisticated for the vast majority of the target audience—illiterate conscripted Chinese and North Korean peasants. Practical solutions to the communication problems were needed.³⁹

After visiting several prisoner of war compounds before assuming command in April 1952, CPT Herbert Avedon instructed that each sentence in the broadcast be spoken slowly and repeated several times in order to improve understanding among illiterate soldiers. To correct printed products, he directed the use of ideographs or pictographs instead of advanced characters, because many Chinese children were taught to read and write (through second grade) using phonetic symbols or ideographs. Avedon managed to convince EUSA G-3 Psywar to use Chinese phonetics on all leaflets aimed at Communist Chinese Forces. This practice was eventually adopted by Far East Command Psywar in Tokyo.⁴⁰ Still, interpreter Youn thought Psywar products produced in Seoul were “Numba 10.”⁴¹

According to Rose, “most of the time we wrote our own broadcasts based on what we found on the bodies and got from regimental S-2s. These were very basic messages identifying enemy KIA [killed in action], using Chinese and Korean vulgarities. After all, we weren’t talking to white collar people.”⁴² This direct approach met 1st L&L guidance to focus on the lowest possible unit personalities by name, physical characteristics and appearance, and habits. The “contingency” broadcast scripts prepared by “insufficiently trained and untalented” L/S team chiefs were criticized by CPT Avedon, but seemed to be effective nonetheless.⁴³

The written job description of an L/S team chief was nowhere close to the realities of his responsibilities. CPT Avedon’s ideal candidate would fit the following description:

Writes loudspeaker scripts and programs and broadcasts to tactical audiences [in accordance with] the principles of Psywar. Has some knowledge of history, politics, sociology, psychology, customs, traditions or culture of enemy against whom he operates, and knows something of the language and dialects of principal enemy population groups and of the media of mass communications. Has knowledge of enemy leaders, military and civilian.

To this was later added a requirement for previous combat experience.⁴⁴ Though L/S team chiefs—usually corporals or PFCs—rarely possessed the above skills and

knowledge, they functioned well in the circumstances they actually found themselves in. By the time an L/S team chief completed his combat tour, he knew combustion engines well enough to repair a motor generator, and could fix an amplifier or tape recorder-reproducer in the field. He had also earned a CIB (Combat Infantryman Badge), for the enemy regularly shot back during his broadcasts.⁴⁵ It was practical knowledge, common sense, and combat savvy that kept L/S teams operational, rather than the academic qualifications Avedon desired.

During Rose’s attachment to the 45th ID, where tank-mounted loudspeakers were used again, the “dirtiest” aspect of Psywar—searching the enemy dead for any items of intelligence value—inspired a lucrative, money-making enterprise for L/S Team 10. Since they routinely worked in no-man’s-land, the newly-arrived Oklahoma National Guard soldiers who watched them at work constantly badgered the team for war souvenirs. This inspired interpreter Youn. “We be rich selling war trophies,” said the enterprising North Korean refugee. After making some arrangements with a nearby orphanage, Youn established a cottage industry creating enemy “battle flags.” Bed sheet remnants were spattered with chicken blood, shot full of holes, and emblazoned in paint with Chinese characters. Because few Americans read Chinese, “Mao Tse-Tung is a Fat F...t” was Youn’s favorite battle flag slogan.⁴⁶ The enterprise was flourishing when L/S Team 10 moved to the 1st Marine Division, after broadcasting from the notorious Old Baldy (Hill 266), Porkchop (Hill 255), and White Horse hills (Hill 395).⁴⁷

L/S Team 10’s souvenir business prospered until the sandbagged team bunker received several mortar hits. Fortunately, the 60 mm rounds did not penetrate the mounded earth, sandbags, and timber that covered the dugout, but the concussions collapsed the bunker. No one was killed, but the “battle flag” stocks were buried. PFC Rose crawled from the debris with blood coming out of his ears, nose, and eyes, and was evacuated—earning the first of two Purple Hearts.⁴⁸ The 14 April 1952 edition of *Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk* provided this account of the incident:

*A bunker enclosing PFC Gerald Rose was partially destroyed by four rounds of enemy 60 mm mortar fire. Rose was broadcasting when the enemy began firing. He ducked into the bunker just before it was hit. The subject of his broadcast was “The Futility of War.”*⁴⁹



The 24th Infantry Division provided the first U.S. Army ground forces in the Korean War. The division’s first mission was to slow the North Korean advance southward.



The 25th Infantry Division entered the Korean War in July 1950. The division built on its WWII reputation as “Tropic Lightning” and successfully executed a number of important offensive actions in Korea.



The 45th Infantry Division, Oklahoma Army National Guard, deployed to Korea in December 1951. During its 429 days in combat, the division fought in and around such infamous locations as Pork Chop Hill, Old Baldy, and Heartbreak Ridge.



The famed 1st Marine Division entered the Korean War on 15 September 1950, when it made a surprise amphibious assault on Inch’on and went on to recapture Seoul.

SGT Lawrence O'Brien

Sergeant Lawrence O'Brien's story is prime evidence that the heroes of Psywar in Korea were found on the ground and in the air, executing psychological operations missions in the face of enemy fire.

Sergeant O'Brien, the loudspeaker team chief with the 7th ID, received the Silver Star for gallantry in action near Ch'ung Ch'on, Korea, in May 1950. Moving forward in his M20 reconnaissance vehicle (restored example shown below) to join a tank task force, he came under heavy enemy fire but continued forward nonetheless. Coming upon the overturned guard Jeep of the 7th ID commander, Major General Claude Ferenbaugh, he found beneath it the bodies of two military policemen who had been killed by enemy fire, and a third who was seriously wounded. Sergeant O'Brien sent his driver back with the vehicle for assistance and remained to aid and protect the wounded man against the concentrated fire of the enemy. When a rescuing tank force arrived two hours later, they were taken aboard, and Sergeant O'Brien guided the tanks in a further search for Major General Ferenbaugh, his aide and his driver, whom they found and rescued from enemy ambush.¹



Notes

- 1 Colonel Kenneth K. Hansen, *Psywar in Korea* (Washington, DC: Joint Subsidiary Activities Group, OJCS, 1960), 194–95.



The broadcaster was actually Youn, and Rose, providing security, was far enough away from the generator and public address system set to hear the telltale “plump” sound made by mortar rounds leaving the tube. After spending Easter 1952 in the hospital, Rose returned to the 1st L&L in Seoul to receive his next assignment, and there encountered a completely new chain of command.

Normal overseas rotations had brought in a whole new group of officers and senior noncommissioned officers. In April 1952, MAJ Osgood was reassigned to the Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. CPT Herbert Avedon, Signal Corps, replaced Osgood as the commander of 1st L&L. He had been a WWII Ranger signal officer from Sicily to Anzio, as well as an Office of Strategic Services Psywar veteran of Burma. 1LT Joe Roberts, the former Propaganda Platoon Leader, had succeeded CPT Russell as XO. Only CPT Avedon had attended the officers Psychological Warfare course at Fort Riley, Kansas, where military occupational specialties (MOSs) 9305, Psywar Officer, and 9306, Psywar Staff Officer, were awarded to graduates. The 1st L&L did not receive enlisted Psywar school graduates from the States either.⁵⁰

To correct Psywar training shortfalls, CPT Avedon intended to start formal training for the L/S teams, and to change the L/S team MOS 0320, Interrogator/Linguist—an intelligence specialty that the Army had difficulty filling—to one more satisfactory based on 1st L&L experience in Korea. Avedon submitted a TO&E change to reduce the L/S team from three to two personnel, and to change the Team Chief MOS to 1636, Intelligence Analyst, and the Assistant Team Chief MOS to 3174, Public Address System Mechanic. The changes were finally effected in 1954.⁵¹

In an effort to overcome the dearth of school-trained L/S personnel, Avedon instituted a seven-day course on Psywar principles and training on loudspeaker equipment. However, increased field requirements for L/S teams across Korea, personnel rotations, combat casualties, and inexperienced enlisted instructors minimized the effectiveness of this solution.⁵²

Operational training detractors prompted the Propaganda Platoon to print (mimeograph) a ten to twelve page handout entitled *Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk*. According to CPT Avedon, “a lack of adequate specialized training by L/S personnel” made a continuing instruction program mandatory for the teams in combat. *Team Talk* contained “instructional material, tactical information (such as lists of enemy vulnerabilities), leaflet drop schedules (coded K for North Korean and C for Chinese units) and programming lessons, as well as a sprinkling of entertainment features.”⁵³ Intramural sports stories and a “Horning-In” section explained what L/S teams were doing in the field and who they were supporting—with names and team numbers provided.⁵⁴

The *Team Talks*, though labeled “Restricted Security Information,” were not classified. Operational security, as it is known today, for Psywar activities was not taken seriously. Because the Propaganda Platoon



As depicted in this painting by 1st L&L artist PFC Richard "Dick" Zayac, loudspeaker teams often worked forward of the front lines, risking harm or capture by the enemy. True to life, this painting shows Communist troops demolishing loudspeaker equipment abandoned by a loudspeaker team fleeing to safety.

prepared the EUSA Psywar leaflets, as well as air and ground loudspeaker broadcasts in order to exploit enemy psychological vulnerabilities, *Team Talk* quickly became the primary means to get broadcast scripts to L/S teams in the field.⁵⁵ With hardly any security measures protecting 1st L&L products, the Communists knew exactly where the major UN tactical Psywar was emanating from, and did not hesitate to demonstrate their intelligence. When a six-by-six truckload of leaflets was captured by the enemy, a "Bed Check Charlie" pilot returned them a few nights later—showering them over the 1st L&L compound in Seoul.⁵⁶

In spite of Avedon's detailed standard operating procedures, among the men of the 1st L&L, the unspoken rules were: log as many missions as possible (front line time accrued the most points for overseas rotation), don't report contacts with the enemy—especially with the Psywar Hunter Squads, don't get captured, and don't report friendly fires.⁵⁷

Friendly fire was a constant threat because the L/S broadcasts routinely drew enemy fire. The nervous infantrymen behind them also wanted "combat points" to shorten their overseas tours, but did not want to get killed in the process. Sandbagged log bunkers and deep trenches provided protection against small arms and machinegun fire, but enemy artillery and mortar attacks were risky.⁵⁸ The last thing the infantry wanted was to have the enemy direct fire against the L/S teams, because that would obligate the infantry to respond and lead to an escalating fire fight. "Friendly" fire from the rear, loudspeakers stuffed with snow, and cut wires were strong warnings from the American troops on line that the L/S teams were being too effective.⁵⁹ When caught in crossfire Rose's team played its "Ace in the Hole"—Doris Day:

For some reason, the Americans and Chinese loved listening to Doris Day. So, when our efforts had really stirred them up, resulting in artillery and mortar barrages and machinegun fire being directed at us, and in turn from the American lines, we quickly switched to Doris to quiet things down. We once tried the chaplain's church music, but "Onward Christian Soldiers" didn't have much impact on the Chinese nor the American GIs. Only Doris Day worked.⁶⁰

The situation was different for L/S teams supporting artillery forward observers trying to pinpoint enemy firing positions. The forward observers wanted the L/S teams to draw fire to direct counterbattery fire against the enemy artillery and mortars. Since 1st L&L officers rarely accompanied the L/S teams on night combat missions,



In a line stretching across the peninsula, UN troops battled fiercely for a series of hills and ridges whose nicknames still resonate with the tragedies that played out in their midst.⁶⁵

Popular singer and actress Doris Day was a favorite among frontline troops—on both sides.




the enlisted Psywar soldiers developed practical mission parameters of their own: get as close as possible; talk as long as possible; when you receive fire, get yourselves and the equipment out as quickly as possible.⁶¹ Getting as close as possible was important because the range of the AN/UIQ-1 public address (PA) set was “a mile, if the wind was blowing right.” Psywar doctrine said, “Statements read over a PA set sound more ‘authoritative’ than those coming from a radio or printed in a newspaper or leaflet. The announcer’s voice has a super-human volume; it commands attention as no radio broadcast can ever do.”⁶² Ignored was the reality that broadcasts from the front line “drew fire like a magnet” and served as homing beacons for enemy Psywar Hunter Squads and searchlights, as shown by this *Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk* story:⁶³

*Team 12, consisting of Team Chief Preslesnik and interpreters, visited the Company this past week. Preslesnik played the part of “Bring ‘em Back (but not Alive) Buck” when he toted in a badly damaged generator that the Chinese used as a target for their guns. He also brought back three small pieces of what originally was a speaker that once belonged to PVT Joseph (Combat Story) McSheffrey. If the Chinese keep hitting our equipment the way they have been, we’ll have to start indoctrinating them about supply economy.*⁶⁴

Once under enemy fire, recovering equipment was not that easy—especially the communications wire connecting the generator in the Jeep trailer to the forward location of the loudspeaker site in the steep mountainous terrain of Korea. Rose had to devise a simple “deadman” winching system to get the Jeep and trailer in place on a steep ridgeline. To further add to the difficulty, infantry units commonly laid minefields beyond the outpost line. As a result of geography and war, abandoning equipment was not uncommon for the L/S teams. SGT Nick Soter from Team 9 lost his Jeep after driving up Hill 854 for a night broadcast. Before the L/S team could start broadcasting, Hill 854 was attacked from three sides. The team barely got away, and had to leave its Jeep, trailer, generator, and public address system set behind.⁶⁶ A common sense


refusal to retrieve their WD-1 wire at night led to the rapid transfer of CPL Dudley, PFC Rose, and Youn from the 40th ID (California Army National Guard) to the British 1st Commonwealth Division.⁶⁷

By May 1952, the Chinese were conducting effective counterpropaganda against UN forces. It was quite easy to accomplish, since operational security was nonexistent; Koreans were everywhere doing everything. Few Americans questioned where the locals went or what they did. The majority of classified destruction was done by Koreans using fifty-five-gallon burn barrels. Even loudspeaker teams had Korean houseboys who arranged laundry, cooked meals, scrounged rare commodities on the black market, and worked on the Jeeps. In Seoul, it was not uncommon for members of the 1st L&L and the Psywar Division of EUSA to keep female consorts, many of whom were North Korean intelligence agents. The majority of the secretaries at EUSA headquarters were also Korean, and security checks were cursory at best.



The U.S. Army General School at Fort Riley, Kansas, offered the Army’s Psychological Warfare course, which produced Psywar Officers and Psywar Staff Officers (MOSs 9305 and 9306).

Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk provided 1st L&L personnel in the field with training materials and news from the rest of the company. *Team Talk* also quickly became the primary means of distributing tactical information to the loudspeaker teams, including broadcast scripts and leaflet drop schedules.




"These people were our allies, after all," was the common response.⁶⁸ There was little wonder that the Communists were well informed.

Nevertheless, enemy knowledge about the 1st L&L and L/S team identities and assignments was disconcerting. Chinese counter-Psywar broadcasts "welcomed" L/S teams by number and the members by name when they arrived at their frontline divisions. "The Chinese portable loudspeakers were as good as ours," said Rose. "We had those used by the U.S. Navy beach masters in WWII."⁶⁹ Chinese patrols left personally addressed "skull and crossbones" notes tied to bushes in no-man's-land for the L/S teams. The leaflets threatened to hang L/S team members if captured, and advertised the \$10,000 gold bounty to Psywar Hunter Squads for capturing any of them.⁷⁰ "For this reason, we had contact with Hunter Squads about every three missions by mid-summer," remembered Rose.⁷¹

During his second assignment with the 1st Marine Division, the division's Psywar staff officer concocted a scheme much riskier than being captured in no-man's-land. As a result of this misguided plan, PFC Rose's second tour with the 1st Marine Division in June 1952 proved to be short-lived. Having done tank reconnaissance probes into the Chinese lines around the Punch Bowl, the Marines were anxious to repeat the practice at Panmunjom. To enhance these probes, the 1st Marine Division Psywar officer "promised to make the broadcast team famous." He proposed the construction of a simple raft that would hold the 10th L/S team Jeep and trailer. PFC Rose, the team chief, and Youn would simply broadcast to the Chinese Soldiers as they floated down the Injim River. This was notwithstanding enemy fire being concentrated on them.⁷²

Some very accurate artillery fire eliminated that 'harebrained Huckleberry Finn' scheme. My team consisted of Youn and me. I didn't have another American. We were in a foxhole setting up to broadcast when a Marine full colonel in starched utilities brought a Red Cross volunteer up to the COPL for a battlefield 'tour.' The two 'tourists' silhouetted themselves on the ridgeline, taking turns with the colonel's binoculars. You could see the sun glinting off his silver eagles. When we tried to warn them away because they would attract artillery fire, they waved back, ignoring our shouts to go away. Less than a minute after they drove off in their Jeep, we were hit by artillery. The impact was so close that Youn and I were blown out of the foxhole by

Korea's steep ridgelines presented the loudspeaker teams with some logistical challenges. Rose's winching system, as illustrated by his own hand, was simple, but got the job done—repeatedly.



*concussive impact. The first thing that I saw was my mangled bloody hand. A large piece of shrapnel had ripped it apart. Our Jeep sitting behind the COPL was our only means of escape. Just as I drove away, a second round hit the COPL. It was just like a war movie—a series of artillery rounds exploding in orchestrated sequence behind us as we raced down the road. Luck was with us. I made it to the MASH at X-Ray Bridge. A helicopter carried me to the USHS Hope," said Rose. "That second Purple Heart was a real doozy. I never saw Youn again."*⁷³

It was several surgeries and considerable physical therapy later before lately-promoted CPL Jerry Rose was shipped to the United States and discharged in the summer of 1953. Thus, in less than a year, Rose completed 253 tactical loudspeaker missions, the majority at night, while supporting 24th ID, 25th ID, 45th ID, 40th ID, 1st Marine Division, the Commonwealth Division, Turkish Brigade, and the Republic of Korea 9th Division (White Horse). In the course of his tour, he was awarded the Bronze Star, two Purple Hearts, and the Combat Infantryman Badge.⁷⁴ "No other sergeant in the Eighth Army shoulders greater responsibility than the chief of a loudspeaker team," was the fitting tribute accorded the tactical field arm of the 1st L&L by Lieutenant Dale Story in a 1952 *Combat Forces Journal* article on Psywar in Korea.⁷⁵

During CPL Rose's tour with the company, no 1st L&L personnel were killed in action, but numerous L/S soldiers were wounded.⁷⁶ In May 1952, CPT Avedon accepted the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation for the 1st L&L at a ceremony in Taegu. The unit was also awarded two U.S. Army Meritorious Unit Citations for Korean service. The citation awarded by EUSA General Order #245 dated 28 February 1953 read:



The British 1st Commonwealth Division was comprised of troops from Australia, Canada, Great Britain, India, and New Zealand.



The 40th Infantry Division, California Army National Guard, arrived in Korea in February 1952 to replace the 24th ID on the battle line.



Loudspeaker teams were responsible for carrying and positioning their equipment in the most strategic location possible—often on top of a steep, craggy hill that could only be accessed by foot.

(Painting by 1st L&L artist PFC Richard “Dick” Zayac.)

... The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, the only unit of its kind in the combat zone, performed their duties with determination and aggressiveness. Equipped with bulky public address systems best adapted to vehicular use, the loudspeaker teams hand carried their equipment to isolated peaks on the front in order to render close psychological warfare support to infantry line units.⁷⁷

Psychological warfare was still a fairly untested tool when Rose joined the 1st L&L in Korea. Though frontline combat is not in the Psywar soldier’s job description, life on a loudspeaker team was everything Rose the infantryman could have hoped for in terms of excitement. In spite of the trials and dangers of L/S duty, Rose reflected that:

Life in Korea wasn’t all bad. We hunted golden pheasant in the Chorwon Valley. And I acquired a nice collection of Chinese and North Korean weapons. I got to see a Bob Hope USO show with Jerry Colona, some pretty girls, and listened to the Marine Band. Tins of Fosters ale were the highlight of supporting the Aussies in the Commonwealth Division. We got to see the latest movies—albeit in pretty cold and austere theaters. I managed to get copies of the Oakland Tribune occasionally. Selling enemy “battle flags” was a real hoot. And then . . . there was R&R in Tokyo.⁷⁸ ♣

Special notes of appreciation are due to retired LTCs Jay Russell, former 1st L&L Loudspeaker Platoon Leader and Executive Officer, and Fred W. Wilmot, G-3 Psywar EUSA, and to former CPL Gerald Rose, Loudspeaker Team Leader, 1st L&L Company, Korea, for sharing memories, old photographs and memorabilia, documents, and providing the words to explain tactical Psywar loudspeaker operations during the Korean War.

Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and the Lodge Act.

Endnotes

- 1 Gerald A. Rose, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 13 October 2003, tape recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Rose interview, 13 October 2003.
- 2 “PSYWAR Hits Korean Enemy Right Where It Hurts the Most,” *The Stars and Stripes*, 20 May 1953; Herbert A. Friedman, “The American PSYOP Organizations During the Korean War,” <http://www.Psywarrior.com/KoreaPSYOPHist.html>, accessed 15 April 2010.
- 3 Rose interview, 13 October 2003.
- 4 Rose interview, 13 October 2003.
- 5 Gerald A. Rose, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 29 October 2004, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Rose interview, 29 October 2004. **Getting school-trained Psywar soldiers to the 1st L&L in Korea was not an Army priority judging by the Psywar NCO Class No. 1 (24 October 1951–21 November 1951) graduation roster. All forty-five graduates were assigned to either the 2nd L&L Company or Psy War Det 5021 ASU stationed at Fort Riley, KS, site of the Army General School. The Psywar Division was in the department of Resident Instruction. Psywar NCO Class No. 1 Graduation Roster, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.**

- 6 In 1950, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., the Republican senator from Massachusetts, authored Public Law 597 as a means of incorporating select members of Europe's displaced persons population into the U.S. Army. Popularly called the "Lodge Act," PL 597 offered the opportunity to apply for U.S. citizenship in return for five years of enlisted service in the U.S. Army. Passed by the 81st Congress in June 1950, the "alien enlistment program" received its first recruits at the 7720th Replacement Depot, Sontheim, Germany, in 1951. Kenneth Finlayson, "The Lodge Act and the Early Days of Special Forces," *Special Forces: The First Fifty Years* (Tampa, FL: Faircount LLC, 2002), 92–93.
- 7 1st L&L Company Thanksgiving Dinner Menu, Korea, 1951, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Rose interview, 13 October 2003; Jay V. Russell, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 16 November 2004, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Russell interview, 16 November 2004.
- 8 Colonel Kenneth K. Hansen, *Psywar in Korea* (Washington, DC: Joint Subsidiary Activities Group, OJCS, 1960), 26. Major Homer Caskey took the Technical Information Detachment overseas. After the TID was expanded to become the 1st L&L Company, it was subsequently commanded by Majors John T. Dabinett and Donald W. Osgood, and Captains Herbert Avedon and Oliver W. Rodman.
- 9 Department of the Army, Operational Research Office, Technical Memorandum ORO-T-3 (FEC); George S. Pettee, *US Psywar Operations in the Korean War* (n.p.: 23 January 1951), 29; "PSYWAR Hits Korean Enemy Right Where It Hurts the Most," *The Stars and Stripes*, 20 May 1953; 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, EUSA, APO 301, Seoul, Korea, *Standing Operating Procedure (SOP)* dated 10 August 1952, hereafter cited as 1st L&L SOP.
- 10 Pettee, *US Psywar Operations in the Korean War*, 29; Russell interview, 16 November 2004. When war broke out in Korea, Major (MAJ) Alfred L. DiBella from the G-2 Psywar Branch ("Special Projects Division") of the Supreme Command Allied Powers (General Douglas MacArthur's headquarters) in Tokyo was dispatched to Seoul. In January 1951, General Mathew Ridgway transferred responsibility for Psywar from G-2 to G-3 in EUSA, where it became a division of the G-3 Operations section rather than a special staff section. He increased the manning to eight officers and nine enlisted men, and named MAJ DiBella acting chief. MAJ DiBella, MAJ Edwin Rios, First Lieutenant Fred W. Wilmot, and a master sergeant conducted the tactical Psywar campaign for EUSA until the 1st L&L Company was combat effective in April 1951. Airborne and ground loudspeaker efforts were experimental. Only two trailer-mounted loudspeakers and two airborne loudspeakers had been in service. The 1st Cavalry Division occasionally lent its loudspeaker trailer to the 25th Infantry Division in the summer and fall of 1950. The Marines used loudspeakers throughout the fall. Attempts to use them at the Chosin Reservoir in winter were unsuccessful. With the temperatures from -10° to -20° F, the generator would not start. Fred W. Wilmot, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 10 November 2004, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Wilmot interview, 10 November 2004; Fred W. Wilmot, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 29 November 2004, digital recordings, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Wilmot interview, 29 November 2004; Pettee, *US Psywar Operations in the Korean War*, 2, 7, 23–24; Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 26, 194, 196.
- 11 TO&E 20-77, Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, Army, 1 September 1950, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter TO&E 20-77.
- 12 TO&E 20-77.
- 13 Russell interview, 16 November 2004; 1st L&L SOP, First Lieutenant Russell escorted five Chinese interpreters from Pusan to Seoul. They were former professors from the Pusan University. HQ, 2D Logistical Command, APO 59, AG 300.4, "SUBJECT: Letter Order No. 2-40," dated 7 February 1951, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. The L/S Platoon was definitely combat effective by 1 May 1951. When a L/S team with the 27th Infantry Regiment, northeast of Seoul, encountered three Chinese prisoners of war being escorted to the rear, the team sergeant and interpreter obtained their names, units, and names of officers and friends. The interpreter then made surrender appeals with this current information. Twenty-four Chinese soldiers surrendered that day. The next day another fifteen surrendered. "Some Psywar Operations Highlights," RG 319, Section 338, Box 4, 1951–52, National Archives, Washington, DC.
- 14 Stephen E. Pease, *Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950–1953* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992), 131–32; Rose interview, 13 October 2003; Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 313–14, 316.
- 15 Rose interview, 13 October 2003. Private First Class John Squicciarini's Loudspeaker team supported a Republic of Korea Army division in Operation RATKILLER from December 1951 through January 1952. Large bands of guerrillas and bandits had taken refuge in the mountains northwest of Chinju after the Communist retreat from the south. General James A. Van Fleet assigned Lieutenant General Paik Sun Yup two Republic of Korea Army divisions to eliminate this potentially dangerous threat. 1st L&L loudspeaker teams broadcast surrender appeals to surrounded groups. By the end of January 1952, nearly twenty thousand bandits and guerrillas had been killed or captured. John A. Squicciarini, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 30 November 2004, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Squicciarini interview, 30 November 2004; Matthew D. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 191.
- 16 "PSYWAR Hits Korean Enemy Right Where It Hurts the Most," *The Stars and Stripes*, 20 May 1953.
- 17 "PSYWAR Hits Korean Enemy Right Where It Hurts the Most," *The Stars and Stripes*, 20 May 1953.
- 18 TO&E 20-77; Rose interview, 13 October 2003.
- 19 Rose interview, 13 October 2003.
- 20 "War Without Weapons," *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, 17 March 1951, 3.
- 21 Major Donald W. Osgood, Commander, 1st L&L Company, Korea, letter to Captain Jay V. Russell, Fort Benning, GA, dated 14 March 1952, Russell Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 22 TO&E 20-77; 1st L&L SOP; Captain Herbert L. Avedon, "Command Report No. 18," June 1952, Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 300; Rose interview, 13 October 2003; EUSA, Office of the Commanding General (CG), APO 301, AG 300.4 KAGM, Letter Order No. 11-221 dated 30 November 1951 had Captain Jay V. Russell; First Lieutenant Hillard J. Trubitt, 062034, Armor; Second Lieutenant Quillian D. Clements, 02263454, Artillery; and twenty-four enlisted men (including Corporal William E. Johnson, RA16249927; Corporal John H. Dudley, US56050526; and Private-2 Gerald A. Rose, US56141578) temporary duty from 1 Dec 51 to 31 Dec 51 in connection with Psywar activities. They were authorized travel by train, but no per diem. Loudspeaker platoon officers and team members had thirty-day temporary duty orders issued monthly. EUSA, Office of the CG, APO 301, AG 300.4 KAGM, Letter Order No. 12-197 dated 28 December 1951, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; EUSA, AG 300.4 KAGM, Letter Order No. 11-221 dated 30 November 1951, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 23 Captain Jay V. Russell, "Psychological Warfare Operations During the Attack," U.S. Army Advanced Infantry Officers Course, Class #2, 1952–53, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Russell interview, 16 November 2004.
- 24 "Corporal Jack Dudley was a 'legendary character' among the loudspeaker men in the 1st L&L. But, he got things done. Dudley was an eccentric who wore an Australian Army bush hat, a heavy Chinese padded cotton overcoat with his British battle jacket, and Korean overboots. His team Jeep sported a UN flag and UN markings, so no one hassled him," related a bemused John Squicciarini, another original loudspeaker team leader in the 1st L&L. Squicciarini interview, 30 November 2004.
- 25 Rose interview, 13 October 2003; Gerald A. Rose, letter to Dr. Stanley Sandler, 25 May 1994, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Gerald A. Rose, undated letter to parents, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. The 1st L&L Company Propaganda Platoon had little access to the enemy Order of Battle in Seoul. This severely handicapped the scope and focus of the loudspeaker broadcast scripts and leaflets. Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 26 Rose interview, 13 October 2003; Rose letter to Sandler, 25 May 1994; Rose letter to parents, undated.
- 27 First Lieutenant Jay V. Russell, 1st L&L Company Report, "SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Report Resulting from Personal Visit to I Corps," dated 16 January 1951, Russell Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 28 Gerald A. Rose, letter to parents, May 1952, Korea, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 29 "War Without Weapons," Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 59.
- 30 "Far East Command AFF Observer Team 5 Report," July 1951, Entry 1, Box 91, RG 337, National Archives.
- 31 Gerald A. Rose, letter to Dr. Stanley Sandler, 12 July 1994, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Rose interview, 13 October 2003.
- 32 Rose interview, 13 October 2003.
- 33 Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 194–95.
- 34 Wilmot interview, 10 November 2004; Far East Command AFF Observer Team 5 Report; Russell, "Psychological Warfare Operations During the Attack," 10–11, 13; First Lieutenant Jay V. Russell, "SUBJECT: Operation of Loudspeaker Teams with Attached Tank," n.d., USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 194. On 15 February 1951, Task Force BURGESS flanked the 150th North Korean Division on Hill 191 and raked its positions with the combined firepower of numerous twin 40 mm antiaircraft guns, quad .50 caliber antiaircraft machineguns, and 76 mm tank guns. Then, the Loudspeaker (L/S) team broadcast a surrender appeal three times with positive results. However, the best use of the L/S team was against a village south of the Han River. The L/S team sergeant

- convinced the task force commander that the L/S could reduce the risk of assaulting the village and minimize collateral damage to the civilians. When the villagers began running toward the L/S, they were halted until the headman came forward. The villagers were told to come out of their homes to help move wounded North Koreans out to the road. The task force commander held his fire to give the enemy an opportunity to respond to the surrender appeals. "As a result of the broadcasts, thirty North Korean soldiers surrendered and no villagers were injured. Thus, a North Korean division was effectively destroyed by combining all direct action weapons available to the 15th Infantry."
- 35 Russell, "SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Report Resulting from Personal Visit to I Corps."
 - 36 "War Without Weapons," 3.
 - 37 Rose interview, 13 October 2003.
 - 38 Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 205. In June 1952, seven of the eleven loudspeaker teams were supporting Republic of Korea Divisions. Avedon, "Command Report No. 18."
 - 39 1st L&L SOP.
 - 40 Herbert Avedon, interview by Dr. Stanley Sandler, 14 September 1994, Rockville, Maryland, transcript in Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Avedon interview, 14 September 1994.
 - 41 Rose letter to Sandler, 25 May 1994.
 - 42 Rose letter to Sandler, 25 May 1994.
 - 43 1st L&L Co. SOP; Captain Herbert Avedon, O&T Branch, Propaganda Division, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, "Memorandum For Record, SUBJECT: Psywar Operational Deficiencies Noted in Korea—A Study," 28 August 1953, 23, Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
 - 44 Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 187–88. This was a considerably summarized job description based on the one prepared by Captain Avedon during his four-month period of 1st L&L Company command. Though his was only a single sheet of paper, it was single-spaced. His inflated description of duties and idealistic requirements far exceeded the qualifications of a corporal or sergeant. It is doubtful that any serving Psywar officer, including Avedon, possessed the requisite leadership, tactical skills, and capabilities. He wanted Assistant Loudspeaker Team Chiefs (corporals and privates first class by TO&E) to be highly intelligent, have platoon sergeant experience, academic education in psychology, sociology, anthropology and/or oriental history or culture, and possess the ability to write. Ironically, the majority of enlisted personnel in 1st L&L were drafted college graduates, though not with the specializations Avedon sought. Avedon, "Command Report No. 18;" Rose interview, 29 October 2004.
 - 45 Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 187–88.
 - 46 Rose interview, 13 October 2003; Gerald A. Rose letter to Dr. Stanley Sandler, 8 October 1994, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Avedon interview, 14 September 1994. The 40th and 45th were National Guard divisions that were sent to relieve the 24th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division in the winter of 1951–1952. The two active divisions returned to their prewar occupation duties in Japan. D.M. Giangreco, *War in Korea 1950–1953* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990), 205.
 - 47 Rose interview, 13 October 2003; Rose letter to Sandler, 8 October 1994.
 - 48 Rose interview, 13 October 2003; Rose letter to Sandler, 8 October 1994; Avedon interview, 14 September 1994.
 - 49 Eighth U.S. Army, G-3, Psywar Division, Seoul, Korea, *Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk*, 14 April 1952, Major Alan J. Dover Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
 - 50 1st L&L SOP; 226th Signal Service Company photo, Seoul, Korea, 1-3126-3/FEC-52-11116, dated 18 April 1952; Avedon interview, 14 September 1994; U.S. Army General School, Psywar NCO Class No. 1 (24 October 1951–21 November 1951) Roster, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. All forty-five graduates were assigned to either the 2nd L&L Company or Psy War Det 5021 ASU stationed at Fort Riley, KS.
 - 51 TO&E No. 33-77, Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, Army, dated 13 September 1954. This TO&E superseded TO&E 20-77A, 30 October 1952, including Change 1, 30 December 1952, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
 - 52 1st L&L SOP; Captain Avedon's seven-day Psywar and loudspeaker operation course in reality was "four days crammed into seven days." Ten personnel completed the course in June 1952. The number assigned to operational loudspeaker teams was not specified. Avedon, "Command Report No. 18."
 - 53 1st L&L SOP.
 - 54 *Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk*, 14 April 1952; Eighth U.S. Army, G-3, Psywar Division, Seoul, Korea, *Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk*, 24 November 1952, Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
 - 55 At least 143 copies of the *Loudspeaker Team Talk* were distributed weekly: two per loudspeaker (L/S) Team for twenty; two per L/S Section Leader for six; four to L/S Platoon headquarters; four to 1st L&L Company headquarters; two to the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) L&L Company; three to the 1st Radio Broadcast & Leaflet Company; two to Psywar Projects, G-3 EUSA; one copy to Psywar Operations, G-3 EUSA; one copy to Psywar School; eight copies to the eight Division Psywar officers (one each); four copies to the Corps Psywar officers (one each); seven copies to the ROKA Division Psywar officers (one each); one copy to the airfield; fifteen file copies; and sixty-five copies minus the news items and translations to 1st L&L Company personnel. 1st L&L SOP dated 10 August 1952.
 - 56 Paul A. Wolfgeher, "Psychological Warfare: The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company in the Korean War," http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/topics/support_units/psyc_war/index.htm, accessed 15 April 2010.
 - 57 Gerald A. Rose letters to Dr. Stanley Sandler, 10 April 1994 and 7 June 1994, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
 - 58 Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 205; Squicciarini interview, 30 November 2004; Lieutenant Beverly Scott, "One Man's War," in Rudy Tomedi, *No Bugles, No Drums* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1993), 188; 1st L&L loudspeaker team personnel were granted Class "A" time for rotation, four points per month, which meant nine months on the line or a total of thirty-six points made them eligible for rotation to Japan or the U.S.
 - 59 Squicciarini interview, 30 November 2004.
 - 60 Rose interview, 13 October 2003; Rose letter to Sandler, 8 October 1994.
 - 61 Rose letters to Sandler, 10 April 1994, 25 May 1994, and 7 June 1994; Rose interview, 13 October 2003.
 - 62 *Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk*, 14 April 1952.
 - 63 "War Without Weapons"; Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 206.
 - 64 *Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk*, 24 November 1952.
 - 65 Robert J. Dvorchak, *Battle for Korea: A History of the Korean Conflict* (New York, NY: Da Capo, 2000), 237.
 - 66 *Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk*, 24 November 1952; Squicciarini interview, 30 November 2004; Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 205. Full equipment of three U.S. and three Republic of Korea Army teams had been overrun by the enemy, and in November 1952, another team reported the loss of all its equipment to an Allied unit that felt its need was greater.
 - 67 Rose interview, 13 October 2003; Rose letter to parents, 11 April 1952, Chorwon, Korea, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
 - 68 Colonel John Sadler (attached to the Central Intelligence Agency during the Korean War), interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 15 October 2003, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Rose letter to parents, 30 May 1952, Panmunjom, Korea, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Rose letter to Sandler, 12 July 1994. Captain Avedon took command of the 1st L&L in April 1952. Avedon interview, 14 September 1994.
 - 69 Rose letter to Sandler, 12 July 1994; Avedon, "Command Report No. 18."
 - 70 Rose letter to parents, 30 May 1952; Rose letter to Sandler, 12 July 1994; Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 313–14, 316.
 - 71 Rose letter to Sandler, 12 July 1994.
 - 72 Rose interview, 13 October 2003. Bearing out Rose's criticism of the 1st Marine Division Psywar officer's ideas, the next loudspeaker team assigned to the 1st Marine Division suffered one man killed in action, and one wounded. Captain Herbert L. Avedon, "Command Report No. 19," July 1952, Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
 - 73 Rose interview, 13 October 2003; Avedon, "Command Report No. 18."
 - 74 Rose interview, 29 October 2004.
 - 75 Lieutenant Dale Story, "Psychological Warfare in Korea," *Combat Forces Journal*, July 1952, 15.
 - 76 Rose interview, 29 October 2004.
 - 77 226th Signal Service Company, photo of Captain Herbert Avedon accepting Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation for the 1st L&L Company on 18 May 1952 in Taegu, Korea, U.S. Army Photo 11/869-4/FEC-52, Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Wolfgeher, "Psychological Warfare," http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/topics/support_units/psyc_war/index.htm; Friedman, "The American PSYOP Organizations During the Korean War," <http://www.Psywarrior.com/KoreaPSYOPHist.html>.
 - 78 Rose letter to parents, 30 May 1952; Rose letter to Sandler, 12 July 1994; Rose interview, 29 October 2004.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

A CIVIL AFFAIRS PIONEER: BRIGADIER GENERAL CRAWFORD F. SAMS, U.S. ARMY MEDICAL CORPS

by Troy J. Sacquety

A career U.S. Army officer, Brigadier General Crawford F. Sams gained prominence by helping to rebuild the Japanese health system after WWII and leading a secret mission during the Korean War. These events, however, occurred towards the end of his career. After graduating from East Saint Louis High School in St. Louis, MO, he enlisted and served briefly during World War I. After the war, he worked as a laboratory assistant and junior research chemist before enlisting in the California National Guard in 1922 as a Private. In 1925, he graduated from the University of California with a Bachelor of Arts in Psychology and received a commission as a Captain in the Field Artillery. Resigning after three years of service, he entered the Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis, MO. He graduated in 1929 as a Doctor of Medicine, and accepted a commission as a First Lieutenant in the U.S. Army Medical Corps. He served in the Medical Corps for the remainder of his U.S. Army career.¹

During WWII, Sams served in North Africa, Europe,




Before the Korean War, Brigadier General Crawford F. Sams was the Chief of the Public Health and Welfare Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan. He fulfilled a similar role in the military government of South Korea.

medical revolutions ever undertaken in a country. The military doctor expanded these practices to South Korea and was promoted to Brigadier General (BG) in 1948. When war broke out in Korea, General (GEN) Douglas A. MacArthur made BG Sams the Chief, Health and

and the Philippines, attaining the rank of Colonel (COL). In 1945, he transferred to Japan to serve as the Chief of the Public Health and Welfare Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in the military government of occupied Japan.² There, COL Sams immediately focused on preventing epidemics that threatened a malnourished Japanese population. He completely reformed the Japanese medical profession, established a country vaccine program, and greatly improved the calorie-poor diet. By professionalizing the Japanese medical system to modern standards while freeing the population from persistent endemic diseases and malnutrition, Sams engineered one of the most transformative

The surprise North Korean invasion of the south created a refugee problem of huge proportions. BG Sams was tasked to prevent outbreaks of disease among the stressed and malnourished refugee population.





Refugees fleeing the North Korean advance in 1950 flooded into South Korean harbors. The sheer density of the population meant that an outbreak of virulent disease had the potential of creating an epidemic medical disaster.



BG Sams felt that if he could keep South Korean civilians healthy and the North Koreans could not, it would be evident to all that democracy was the better of the two governmental systems.

BG Sams received the Distinguished Service Cross for his clandestine mission into North Korea.



Welfare, United Nations Command, Korea as well. In this capacity, BG Sams drew upon his experiences in Japan to prevent smallpox, cholera, diphtheria, and typhus from raging through the refugee population. This success had propaganda value because the ability to control epidemics was a “test of Communist versus democratic abilities . . . if we could control these diseases . . . and the Communists could not, it would be a direct and telling blow to the Communist propaganda . . . because we could show that literally the chances of dying under the Communist banner were far greater,” recalled BG Sams.³ Then, because of Sams’ acute familiarity with epidemics, GEN MacArthur selected him to lead a secret mission into North Korea.


Rumors surfaced that the North Koreans were overcome with bubonic plague, the “black death.” This was potentially dangerous for the South. The fluidity of the battle lines meant that North Korean refugees could easily slip south and spread the illness among the military and civilian populations. Since it was a “very unstable vaccine” the prophylaxis was not routinely stored.⁴ The Allies needed confirmation to create sufficient vaccine. After several unsuccessful attempts, BG Sams and his two teammates managed to infiltrate North Korea by rubber raft. After meeting with friendly agents BG Sams determined that the epidemic wreaking havoc on North Korea was not bubonic plague, but hemorrhagic smallpox.⁵ With this vital medical intelligence, the Allies did not have to implement a new vaccination program. Better still, they discovered that the Communist forces ravaged by smallpox were more understrength



Refugees arriving from North Korea had little to their name and the South was in ruins.

than originally believed. After conducting this secret mission, General MacArthur awarded BG Sams with the Distinguished Service Cross for “extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces in the Republic of Korea on 13 and 14 March 1951.” Although BG Sams knew that other infiltrating agents had previously been captured and had possibly disclosed the mission to the North Koreans, he persevered despite the potential trap. “General Sams nevertheless continued on his mission . . . General Sams’ party returned to the off-shore rendezvous with conclusive information of such significance as to effect the immediate conduct of the United Nations armed effort in Korea.”⁶ Following GEN MacArthur’s April 1951 relief in Korea, BG Sams, a close associate, returned to the United States after nearly ten years overseas.

BG Sams retired in July 1955 after thirty-three years in the U.S. Army. “To me the highlight of such a career has been . . . helping to rebuild a destroyed nation and to establish health and welfare programs which, on a nation-



In the immediate post-WWII years BG Sams helped to establish The Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission under the Chief, Public Health and Welfare. The Commission researched the long-term effects of radiation on human populations and continued as a joint US/Japanese effort long after the occupation ceased.

wide basis, are among the most modern in the world today. In the course of doing so, I hope to have influenced the thinking of many peoples in the underdeveloped countries so that they can know that, literally their lives are worth saving and that this very essence of our concept of democracy is more desirable than the promises of the dictatorships of the welfare or socialist state, where the individual is nothing and the welfare of the state is of primary importance.”⁷ Sams then embarked on a civilian career as a research physician with the University of California, San Francisco Medical Center studying the general effects of radiation on societies, and specifically on the human nervous system. After retiring in 1968, he pursued amateur genealogy.⁸ BG Crawford F. Sams died in 1994 and is buried at Arlington National Cemetery. ♣

Bubonic plague, also known as “Black Death,” killed between thirty and sixty percent of Europe’s population in the late 1300’s. In order to provide time to develop vaccines if necessary, BG Sams was sent on a mission inside North Korea in 1951 to determine if a disease affecting enemy forces was possibly bubonic plague.

Troy J. Sacquety earned an MA from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln and his PhD in Military History from Texas A&M University. Prior to joining the USASOC History Office staff he worked several years for the Central Intelligence Agency. Current research interests include Army and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) special operations during World War II, and Special Operations units in Vietnam.

Endnotes

- 1 Crawford F. Sams, “Medic” *The Mission of an American Military Doctor in Occupied Japan and Wartorn Korea* (Armonk, NY: East Gate, 1998), xvii-xxi.
- 2 Sams, “Medic,” xvii-xxi.
- 3 Sams, “Medic,” 217.
- 4 Washington University School of Medicine Oral History Project, “Transcript: Crawford F. Sams, 1979,” found on-line at <http://beckerehibits.wusl.edu/oral/transcripts/sams.html>, accessed 29 December 2009.
- 5 Sams, “Medic,” 252.
- 6 “Crawford Sams,” found online at <http://www.militarytimes.com/citations-medals-awards/recipient.php?recipientid=7146>, accessed 17 December 2009.
- 7 Sams, “Medic,” 264.
- 8 “Crawford Sams,” found online at <http://www.militarytimes.com/citations-medals-awards/recipient.php?recipientid=7146>, accessed 17 December 2009.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

THE UN OCCUPATION OF P'YONGYANG

by Charles H. Briscoe

P'yongyang, the capital of North Korea, fell to Republic of Korea (ROK) and U.S. forces on 19 October 1950. Five weeks after the Inch'on landing, United Nations (UN) forces had broken out of the Pusan Perimeter and Seoul had been recaptured. With ROK forces already across the 38th Parallel in pursuit of the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA), General Douglas MacArthur received permission to conduct UN offensive operations to destroy the NKPA threat. That launched the race to the Yalu River. P'yongyang became an intermediate tactical objective along the way and logical site for the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) advanced command post. As expected, tactical UN and ROK commanders were focused on the continuing fight. Neither the strategic commander nor tactical commanders anticipated controlling large parts of North Korea, let alone two of its largest cities, including the capital.

Why is this relevant today? U.S. and coalition leaders had much the same priorities for Afghanistan and Iraq. President George Bush chose the capture of Baghdad to mark the end of hostilities in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In 1950, the newly created UN did not want military government established in North Korea and the phrase "Civil Assistance" was coined to cover the P'yongyang mission. Fifty years later, U.S. Army Civil Affairs teams are conducting civil military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq just as Military Government teams did in North Korea in 1950. And, similar to recent events in Afghanistan and Iraq, the North Korea civil assistance campaign plan and the organization to carry out Phase



General Douglas A. MacArthur,
commander of UN Forces in
Korea, 1950-1951



Kim Il Sung, Premier of
Democratic People's Republic
of Korea (North Korea)



Dr. Syngman Rhee,
President of Republic of
Korea (South Korea)

Four activities (as they are now called) were approved after the perceived end of combat hostilities. In the midst of the ensuing chaos, North Korean citizens were denounced by neighbors as Communists in order to steal their property. Is that any different than people reporting somebody as a *Taliban* or *Fedayeen* in order to take possession of a truck, car, or house in Afghanistan or Iraq?

Not until after the capture of P'yongyang did General MacArthur approve the creation of a UN Civil Assistance Command Korea (UNCACK) for all of Korea. It was a State Department-driven action that resulted in a "paper" organization containing more than one hundred personnel. UNCACK was initiated in Tokyo to help rehabilitate Seoul, provide humanitarian and civil assistance to refugees in the south, and to reestablish government, law, and order throughout North Korea. UNCACK stood up in Seoul just in time to organize its own evacuation to Taegu.

Despite the lack of attention by the strategic command, the small Civil Assistance (CA) Team accomplished great things in P'yongyang, Chinnamp'o, and in Pyongan-Namdo Province during its short thirty-seven day tenure from 29 October to 6 December 1950. The successes must be attributed to Colonel (COL) Charles R. Munske, Field Artillery—probably the most experienced Military Government officer in the Far East Command at the time. A veteran of both world wars, COL Munske had organized and run military governments in the Philippines, and had served as Military Governor of Kyushu, Japan, for two years. Having just returned to the Pacific theater in mid-October 1950,



Colonel Charles R. Munske led UN Civil Assistance Command Korea efforts in P'yongyang, and played a key role in UNCACK activities in Seoul. Photo courtesy of Judy Munske.

Munske was rushed to Seoul to organize civil assistance in South Korea. That mission was short-lived—his experience was critically needed in P'yongyang.

What follows are the experiences of COL Charles Munske and his team in P'yongyang and the surrounding towns and villages, told primarily in his own words. The information and excerpts are from Munske's letters, notes, papers, and documents. As "the Civil Assistance man in P'yongyang," who better to tell the story? [Direct quotes from COL Munske are indicated by *italics*.]

Early in the morning of 24 October 1950, COL Charles Munske received a terse order from the EUSA G-3: "Organize a small military government team and proceed at once with the advancing troops to P'yongyang. Set up the local governments, prevent sickness, starvation, and unrest among the inhabitants and do what you can in the line of quick rehabilitation. Remember this is a United Nations effort and you will not actually set up military government. You will be known as a Civil Assistance Team and will act as such. The legal currency north of the 38th Parallel will be North Korean *won* and no South Korean political activities will be allowed until further instruction." The G-3 concluded with: "Remember this is a United Nations occupation."²

Munske's proposed military government team table of organization and equipment reflected *what was required to perform the mission competently, but per usual it was cut by two-thirds*. Weapons and ammunition were readily available, but everything else was in short supply. Military government equipment and supplies, DDT, drugs, and medicines were virtually nonexistent. From available personnel, Munske organized a team of four officers, two UN civilians, one enlisted clerk, four enlisted

Shortly after the Pyongan-Namdo Civil Assistance Team arrived in P'yongyang, ROK President Syngman Rhee visited the North Korean capital. His strident reunification speech in downtown P'yongyang reverberated all the way back to Washington and the United Nations in New York.



Major Policy Decisions Affecting Civil Affairs in Korea¹

- **27 June 1950:** U.S. military forces committed to action in Korea.
- **6 July 1950:** Commander in Chief, UN Command (CINCUNC) advised of pending civil affairs directive.
- **31 July 1950:** UN Security Council asks U.S. to provide machinery for relief and support of civilian population in Korea.
- **7 September 1950:** Interim civil affairs directive issued to CINCUNC.
- **29 September 1950:** President defines responsibilities of Army and Economic Cooperation Agency for economic aid to Korea.
- **1 December 1950:** UN Assembly creates UN Korea Relief Agency.


Munske's Proposed Military Government Team:

- | | | |
|---------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| 1•Team Commander | Colonel, Artillery | COL C.R. Munske |
| 1•Public Health Officer | U.S. Civilian, WHO* | Dr. F.K. Cassel |
| 1•Sanitarian | English Civilian, WHO* | Mr. S.A.C. Lord |
| 1•Public Welfare Officer | Captain, Infantry | CPTT.C. Vangen |
| 1•Public Safety Officer | Captain, Infantry | CPTW.F. Gerard |
| 1•Civilian Supply Officer | Captain, Infantry | LT W. Stack |

*World Health Organization

drivers, an enlisted cook, and two Korean interpreters:

Mr. S.A.C. Lord, Major (MAJ) E.H. Davies, Captain (CPT) Davidson, CPT E. Ellingson, and First Lieutenant (1LT) Bruce Fisher joined the team on 10 November and were followed by Dr. A.K. Lee, preventive medicine physician, Lieutenant Colonel J.J. Livingston, and MAJ T.J. Cook.



Map depicts UN assault on P'yongyang by the ROK 1st and 7th Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division, 19-20 October 1950.

First Lieutenant John Golden, 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (ARCT) Finance Officer, was also detailed to assist COL Munske in P'yongyang.³

Only two officers in North Korea had any military government experience: CPT Terrance Vangen had served in the post-WWII Korea occupation, and the Chinnamp'o Sub-team chief, CPT Loren E. Davis, had held a military government assignment in Okinawa, Japan.⁴ A few of the enlisted men had also served in military government companies. Munske's team was composed of *real good men, who were "Jacks of All Trades," excellent connivers, and experienced midnight requisitioners—without which a lot of the work accomplished could never have been contemplated.* Three ROK legal officers with their sergeants were also attached. *The ROKs got plenty of training, but in addition they were very helpful.*⁵

The CA team scrounged three Jeeps, a 1¼-ton truck, and a 2½-ton truck with ½-ton trailer. Then, they sat and waited for orders—which came nearly two days later. As the convoy rolled out of the Seoul University gate, the acting first sergeant surprised Munske with a dilapidated civilian truck pulling two ½-ton trailers loaded with equipment. The extra trailer was hooked to the 1¼-ton truck. Then, the trip—which turned out to be full of work, happiness, despair, and pathos—began.⁶

The day was beautiful, sunny, and warm, with a cold twang in the air. The road north was crowded with vehicles. The

*ground was dry and the road had about six inches of powdered dust on it. Every wheel that turned would raise the dust up into a cloud that settled on the vehicles and the occupants until everything was grayish. Everyone wore a scarf or a handkerchief tied around his face, trying to cover the nose and mouth, making it almost possible to breathe. It was out of the question to stop, and because our group was small and light, we weaved in and out of the long lines of slow moving vehicles headed north. The other side of the road, going south, also had considerable traffic—empty trucks and loaded ambulances, and occasionally a truckload of prisoners.*⁷

People were in the streets and South Korean flags were everywhere in Kaesong. Every house seemed to have a flag. One officer said, "Either the 1st Cavalry Division or 2nd Infantry Division must have a flag vendor with them. How else could North Koreans get ROK flags so quickly?" As they crossed the 38th Parallel, signs were everywhere—courtesy of various units. Munske added a UNCACK sign. In Jonghyon-ni, Munske's group saw bodies in the streets, houses burned down, and civilians being held prisoner by vigilantes. They witnessed a runaway detainee killed. Anyone could denounce another as a Red and have him arrested and his property confiscated.⁸

Early the next morning, 29 October, the CA team resumed its movement north at maximum speed. As the group wound through mountain passes, knocked out tanks stared at them from vantage points. Sariwon,

a large city on the edge of the mountains, had been severely damaged in the fighting. Beyond the city was a large flat plain. Battle-damaged vehicles and artillery pieces littered the flanks of the road and stood skeleton-like in the cotton fields and rice paddies. Empty artillery shell casings, small arms debris, and ammo boxes and crates were everywhere. Large sections of rail track had been ripped up. Bomb craters pocked the ground. Trains were lying on their sides with the locomotives and cars riddled by thousands of bullets. Others stood burned on the tracks. Only the blackened walls of stations remained. Few bodies were seen despite heavy fighting just a few days previously. That changed in P'yongyang.⁹

Divided by the Taedong River, the west side of P'yongyang contained most of the population, government and municipal buildings, cultural centers, churches, numerous schools, and hotels. The east side of the city was mainly industrial, but a large housing project was nearing completion. Entering the eastern outskirts of the capital, the CA team drove by badly damaged factories. One was the American Corn Products Refinery Company. An American mobile army surgical hospital had already been erected nearby. Near the airfield (designated K-23) on the northeast side of the capital were signs pointing to Division and Corps command posts.¹⁰

The impressive, dual-span railroad bridge crossing the Taedong had suffered extensive damage in the fighting. Lone pilings stood bolt upright in the river where bridge sections had collapsed. The highway bridge had suffered a similar fate. The viaduct running from an island in the river to the mainland had been broken, and a large water pipe hung precariously over the water. By the time Munske's team arrived, Army engineers had constructed a sizeable pontoon bridge to handle the heavy traffic. Troops and military police were everywhere. After crossing the bridge the CA group turned left along the river toward the city center. The journey took them past neatly stacked ammunition left behind at NKPA defensive positions, and streets filled with people wandering aimlessly. The drivers had to navigate through the numerous bodies of dead NKPA soldiers that lined the roads.¹¹

While the CA team set up in the courtyard of an abandoned Japanese house for the night, COL Munske visited the city proper. He saw little damage from bombing or shellfire, but signs of heavy looting were everywhere—doors broken in, windows smashed, and household effects lying out in the streets. In the center of the city, he encountered more troops milling around, mostly American GI stragglers.¹² *Dead bodies were lying in side*

United Nations Command units took great pleasure in marking their journey north across the 38th Parallel, many leaving signs such as this one created by the ROK 3rd Division.



UN troops encountered similar scenes to this friendly welcome in Chinnamp'o in each village and city they liberated during their drive into North Korea.

*streets and in the parks, and nightly shootings, rapes, and robbery were common.*¹³

At the City Hall, COL Munske encountered some I Corps officers that he knew, one of whom was the military government officer, COL Melchoir. He briefed Munske on the situation, showed him on a map where the command posts of EUSA (Advance), I Corps, and IX Corps were located. The North Korean government formerly occupied the Presbyterian Missionary compound, the largest in Asia, and this is where Eighth Army set up its headquarters. Melchoir also informed Munske that his CA team would be attached to the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (ARCT) for logistical support. A tactical CA team from the 2nd Infantry Division had just taken over from the 1st Cavalry Division.

COL Melchoir ended by providing a list of *supposedly*





Task Force (TF) INDIANHEAD, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ralph L. Foster, 2nd Infantry Division G-2, was given the mission to capture Russian and Chinese military advisors, collect documents of intelligence value left behind in the government offices of Kim Il Sung, and to rescue American POWs reportedly being held in P'yongyang. Comprised of two halftracks, seven 2½-ton trucks, five medium tanks, two light tanks, a reinforced demolition squad, a doctor and two medics, two antiaircraft artillery halftracks, military policemen, Counter-Intelligence Corps agents, and a team of interpreters, TF INDIANHEAD convoyed north from Chuoc-Myon toward P'yongyang on 17 October 1950.¹

When Lieutenant Colonel Foster pulled his TF INDIANHEAD convoy serial into a P'yongyang school yard on 19 October, he found more than one thousand NKPA prisoners being tried by a ROK Army military tribunal. Ignoring the ROK forces, the TF members began searching the school yard. In one of the classrooms they discovered that the names of sixty-five Americans had been written on a blackboard. "I remember the last name was Galvin. The school, I assumed, had served as a holding area for American POWs . . . but, I do not remember any barbed wire nor bars on windows or doors," stated Corporal Mario Sorrentino, demolition specialist.² The task force encountered no opposition in its searches. After failing to find any American POWs or Russian and Chinese advisors, they focused on collecting documents in the abandoned military and government offices of the North Korean capital. On 25 October, TF INDIANHEAD was disbanded, and the POW search and rescue mission handed over to the 187th ARCT.

Endnotes

- 1 Lieutenant Clark C. Munroe, *The Second United States Infantry Division in Korea 1950-1951* (Tokyo: Toppan Printing Co., 1952), 51.
- 2 Donald Knox, *The Korean War: Pusan to Chosin: An Oral History* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), 400, 413.


good dependable citizens that could be counted as non-Communists. One of them had already been appointed city mayor. Munske could only muse: *This was really rushing it, for there certainly had not been enough time to investigate the background of any of these people. However, it was now our problem.*¹⁴ He quickly discovered that the city government set up by I Corps was simply going through the motions. Lacking money, it could only hire people on the promise of future payment, and without vehicles, the various departments—i.e., sanitation, public works, health and welfare, etc.—were inoperative.¹⁵

Unaware of the Louis Heren article in *The Times* (London)¹⁶ lambasting him and his colleagues, COL Munske entered City Hall and established UNCACK headquarters on the second floor. He reported to UNCACK in Seoul that the constant shifting of responsibilities was not conducive to good civil assistance management, especially since the tactical teams had ideas of their own.¹⁷ Later, he conceded that in spite of the changing unit boundaries and

command responsibilities, the final outcome of the combined efforts of all CA activities could be considered satisfactory.¹⁸

During the team's first night in P'yongyang, an NKPA soldier was killed by ROK MPs. Afterwards, they threw his body into the CA team yard—a warning from ROK Provost Marshal "Tiger" Kim, who wanted to be the military governor and did not want the Americans interfering with him.¹⁹ However, Munske's orders were explicit that the Koreans would have no military government functions in North Korea nor were they to have any control over the civilian populace. They were not authorized to try civilians in courts; appoint town, city, or provincial leaders and officials; seize homes, property or businesses; nor interfere in any way with normal civilian activities. This was the function of the Civil Assistance Team or Military Government, by whatever name you called it.²⁰


COL "Tiger" Kim had a reputation as a tough gangster, but being a close associate of President Syngman Rhee,



Members of TF INDIANHEAD set up their kitchen in front of the North Korean capitol building in P'yongyang, shown here in defensive camouflage. This building became Eighth Army Headquarters.



LTC Ralph Foster, seated at Kim Il Sung's desk, and members of TF INDIANHEAD searched government offices in P'yongyang for documents and information regarding American POWs.



Map of P'yongyang in late November 1950. The Missionary Compound served as the Palace of Premier Kim Il Sung and then EUSA Forward Headquarters. The UN Civil Assistance Team for Pyongan-Namdo Province & P'yongyang established themselves in the City Hall. The American Corn Products Refinery complex became the last residence of the UN CA Team in December 1950.

he was immune from arrest. *I had my troubles with him but they were minor*, recalled Munske.²¹ He had much bigger problems: public utilities in poor shape; no water, lighting, or electricity; and no public transportation.²²

Planning and operations had to be done simultaneously since there was no time for long range planning. Based on his available officers, COL Munske established four sections: Public Health, Public Welfare, Public Safety, and Civilian Supply. The team leaders were responsible for organizing local and provincial governments assisted by the three ROK legal officers. Public Works, Finance, Transportation, Warehousing, Labor, and Billeting functions were also parceled out to the CA officers and enlisted men as the need arose. The situation was continually updated by team visits, conversations with any and all native Koreans willing to talk, and information from local Counter-Intelligence personnel, which included Major Moffat, who was from an old American missionary family that had served in Korea.²³

Anyone not in complete sympathy with the Communist regime had disappeared in the last days before the North Korean government and troops evacuated. Some had been executed and others had been taken north. Some

simply disappeared on their own. These were the ones Munske wanted to contact. Of the estimated 625,000 people living in P'yongyang in early 1950, only 300,000 remained.²⁴ One positive aspect of the Communists' flight was the predominantly anti-Red feeling among the populace.²⁵

Based on problems he encountered in the initial days of his administration, Munske soon established his objectives: set up a city government; start provincial governments, appoint mayors and governors, repair power plants because water was needed for sanitation and firefighting, simultaneously rebuild the water works, get the trolleys and trains operating, gather food, find North Korean *won* money plates, set up hospitals and welfare agencies, move ROK military squatters out of private homes, eliminate the thousands of ROK deserters, prevent the nightly looting and burning of buildings, and post proclamations effecting all of the above.²⁶

Some of the other major issues Munske faced included: land reform, the looting of banks (ROK soldiers carrying off large rice bags of five-*won* notes made it difficult to obtain operating currency), and a prison fire.²⁷ In a 1 November 1950 letter home, he described the bank situation: *Every vault was dynamited and blown up. Money was scattered all over the floors. In a Russian bank the manager had started a fire in the vault before locking it and it was still burning. I have to gather up all of this money as it is the only available. Trying to pick the money out of the rubble is a job, but we are getting to it.*²⁸

While Brigadier General Frank S. Bowen Jr., 187th ARCT commander, assumed responsibility for Civil Assistance in P'yongyang on 2 November, COL Munske was there to *make it happen*. Bowen attended the first police school graduation and ordered that the five Japanese sake factories be dynamited.²⁹ Those were Bowen's major contributions to the CA effort in P'yongyang. Munske, writing to his wife by flashlight in his house (no lights, heat, water, or toilet facilities) in the missionary compound, and wearing multiple layers of clothing, revealed his frustrations: *Everybody lives like pigs. No progress has been made. This is the worst situation that I have ever faced, and it is very depressing. We are trying to organize governments, get electric power and water back into the city, set up police and fire departments and do a million other things. Ironically, he concluded on a positive note: It doesn't seem that we will ever get anywhere with this setup. One of these days all the pieces of this puzzle will fall into its proper place and we shall lick it.*³⁰

After working at City Hall all day, Munske and his small team routinely traveled to EUSA headquarters to eat and attend updates. The only safe nighttime activity was to chase fires. On 6 November, the NKPA prisoners

The Sunch'on/Myongucham Massacre

Captured by North Koreans along the Nakdong River in early August 1950, Private First Class Lloyd Kreider, a 34th Infantry Regiment medic, was marched to Taejon and then taken by train into Seoul. About the time of the Inch'on landing, approximately three thousand prisoners of war were being held at a school house in Seoul. Shortly after the landing, about seven hundred of those still capable of walking were marched north. Prisoners unable to keep up were taken off to the side of the road and shot. "The road to P'yongyang was the real death march. As soon as a man fell out, he was shot or bayoneted. We were never given any food or water. Very few of us had any clothes, just some rags around the waist. I think about three hundred and fifty of us finally reached P'yongyang," recalled Krieder.¹

The POWs had been housed in a P'yongyang school for about a week when they saw flares at night over the city. They knew that meant the UN forces were close by. The North Koreans quickly herded the prisoners out of the school house. At least a third of the prisoners were killed—the invalids. The rest were marched to a train bound north via Sunch'on. The train traveled only at night, hiding from UN aircraft in tunnels during the day.

On the morning of 20 October, the steam engine was stoked to the maximum in an effort to asphyxiate the prisoners in the tunnel with smoke. When that effort proved too slow, the guards began taking groups of forty off the train to execute them with their machine guns. Private Kreider survived by falling down just

as the shooting started and then playing dead. After the prisoners were shot, another group bayoneted the bodies. Kreider was stabbed in the knee, but managed not to scream. At nightfall, once convinced that the guards had left, he crawled away from the dead. While searching for a good hiding place Kreider discovered another POW still alive—a master sergeant. The two hid in some bushes. In the morning, Kreider hailed a passing young North Korean boy for help. He returned with an old man who took the two escaped prisoners to his home and fed them. Then he loaded the two men on a cart and carried them to Sunch'on, where he turned them over to an ROK unit, which in turn transferred them to the 187th ARCT.²

"We'd heard rumors about a death march, where the NKPA herded this big group of American prisoners along, trying to get them into China, and shooting and killing them all along the way. Then, we discovered evidence that it was true. We were sent up to help gather evidence for war crimes trials later on. We dug up the American POWs who were shot in the Sunch'on tunnel massacre," related Sergeant William Chambers of EUSA Graves Registration. Fortunately, Lloyd Krieder was not among them.³

Endnotes

- 1 Lloyd Kreider, "Into the Tunnel," in Rudy Tomedi, *No Bugles, No Drums: An Oral History of the Korean War* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1993), 57–59.
- 2 Kreider, "Into the Tunnel," 57–59.
- 3 William Chambers, "Death All Day," in Tomedi, *No Bugles, No Drums: An Oral History of the Korean War*, 48–49.




The North Koreans force-marched American POWs north, ahead of the UN advance in October 1950. Hundreds died along the way and in temporary prisons, but the remaining POWs taken from Seoul were killed in a tunnel near Sunch'on, north of P'yongyang. War crimes investigators later found mass graves and unburied bodies at the site of the massacre.

of war set their prison on fire. Hundreds among the several thousand prisoners there died. While surveying the damage afterwards, the CA team discovered more than two thousand bodies buried in the prison yard.³¹ An estimated three thousand partisans and stay-behind NKPA being hunted by UN troops (primarily the 187th ARCT) during the day were responsible for most night fires and sabotage.³²

These are very hectic days trying to establish law and order here. The whole sky is red with fire. A really big one is burning in the pouring rain. We have no way to stop fires here since we have no fire engines. The Commies took them all north. Even if we had some we have no water in the city since they destroyed the entire water system. The CA team stopped the spread of that fire by using their trucks and cables to pull adjacent wooden buildings down. A few days afterwards, the team found three fire trucks twenty miles north of the city, where they had been strafed and bombed by UN fighters. Though all were in very bad condition, they were towed back to the city in hopes that one usable truck could be built from the three wrecks. That was accomplished and a Fire Department was established at the end of November 1950.³³

On 9 November, Munske's toughest problem was handling the ROK troops and South Korean youth groups who were causing a lot of trouble. They were *out and out 'carpetbaggers,' taking what they wanted and shipping it South. The 'kangaroo courts' held by these South Korean patriotic youth groups made the local populace resentful.³⁴ They are treating the people here as though they are still Commies and are robbing and shooting them. If I could get them moved out of here, at least half of our troubles would be over.³⁵ The five thousand ROK military personnel (including ROK Air Force personnel without airplanes and Navy sailors without boats) scrounging food and supplies, caretaking houses for their commanders, and stragglers and deserters, were causing mayhem. They took rice, millet, vegetables, machinery, clothing, and medicine, and shipped it south on trucks confiscated from the villages. Two rice mills were operated by the 8th Regiment, 7th ROK Division. When a ROK Air Force officer demanded the first one thousand bags of rice harvested in Mirim-ni, seven miles east of P'yongyang, Munske figured that they would have to look for a new mayor shortly.³⁶ With the ROK military having a three week headstart on foodstuffs, Munske's team struggled to collect rice and millet to put in central storage for emergencies.³⁷*

As the central UN supply agency for North Korean *won*, the UNCACK team was stringently doling out money to American units, while ROK Army units were discarding what they had stolen earlier because they could buy nothing with it. To keep repairs and reconstruction going, COL Munske was spending between one and two million *won* per day.³⁸ All the factories had either been systematically sabotaged by the Reds or looted by the ROK military. Money was essential to rehabilitation. The coal miners would not work without pay or rice and they



While the Highway Bridge (right) across the Taedong River had been destroyed, U.S. Army engineers quickly erected a pontoon bridge (left) to reconnect East and West P'yongyang until the Highway Bridge could be repaired.

Reported in the Media...


Correspondent Louis Heren of *The Times* (London) reported on conditions in the North Korean capital in mid-October. Effective politics of the Southern occupation of North Korea consisted mostly of the National Police and the rightist youths who trundled along with it. Cho Pyong-ok, Home Minister, announced that National Police controlled nine towns north of the 38th Parallel and that a special force of thirty thousand Koreans was being recruited for occupation duty. Heren called the U.S.-South Korean occupation a disgrace. American Civil Affairs officers were "pathetically few" and inexperienced.

"The recruitment of a provisional city council for P'yongyang would have been farcical, if the implications were not so obviously tragic. It was rather like watching an Army sergeant selecting men for fatigue duty. As a result, weeks after the fall of the city there were no public utilities, law and order was evident only on the main streets during the hours of daylight, and the food shortage due to indifferent transport and distribution had assumed serious proportions."

were critical to restoring electrical power for lighting and to operate the water pump system for the city.³⁹ The CA team recovered forty-six million *won* in five- and ten-*won* notes. Payments to contractors were usually stuffed in large rice sacks and carried away in oxcarts. Despite its illegality, South Korean *won* brought north by the ROK military, Seoul officials, and railway personnel complicated the situation.⁴⁰



Mounted South Korean soldiers “ride herd” on a prisoner as he is marched through a P’yongyang street to a prisoner-collection point. A bicycling North Korean citizen, wearing an armband that identifies him as an anti-Communist, joined the parade.



The 2nd Infantry Division was responsible for hundreds of POWs after the fall of P’yongyang. Makeshift holding areas were established in streets and in open areas, such as the basin in front of Eighth Army Headquarters in northern P’yongyang.



The UN Civil Assistance Command was the primary agency for managing and administering aid to refugees. In P’yongyang, it also served as a the military government and helped establish a new civilian government in the city.

Photo courtesy of Judy Munske.

NKPA forces still controlled the northern half of Pyongan-Namdo Province and the ROK I Corps divisions were still fighting. Munske revised his initial estimate that the war was practically over. He now saw that it could drag out for a long time.⁴¹ On 11 November 1950, IX Corps troops passed through the North Korean capital on their way to the front to prepare to continue the EUSA offensive.⁴²

On the positive side, Dr. Kassel found no signs of serious illness, malnutrition, or other health problems in P’yongyang, Chinnamp’o, and the surrounding villages. But, as Mr. Lord noted, sanitation was always deplorable everywhere. Six hospitals were made operational in the CA team’s short tenure in P’yongyang.⁴³


The city police department was also functioning, and a police school, organized by MAJ Jack Young, 2nd Infantry Division, was conducting accelerated training classes. A cadre of South Korean national police had been requested to officer the several hundred policemen.⁴⁴ On 15 December 1950, the city police force was to be increased to three thousand effectives.⁴⁵

P’yongyang was being governed as a “special city,” separate from the provincial government. The CA team later consolidated bureaus in the city government to eliminate redundancy.⁴⁶ *Our first plans are to follow the governmental system in use since the occupation of North Korea.* Colonel Munske made it clear to the *Stars and Stripes* that the system was not a military government. *We allow the newly-appointed local officials as much of the burden of administration as they possibly can handle, with our officers serving only as advisers.*⁴⁷

While Korean custom normally dictated that an elder male scholar be used in the higher echelons of government, it was felt that if such a man was not available to handle the demands of forming a new government, a younger man ought to be selected. Records of numerous persons were carefully scrutinized for capable leaders. Underground sources helped them find personnel acceptable to the majority. Then, a public meeting was set in the city auditorium to discuss the gubernatorial candidates in a democratic forum. Public Notices of decisions, authenticated by COL Munske’s chop (seal), were posted afterwards.⁴⁸

Munske and his team were making good progress by mid-November. Pyongan-Namdo Province officials were installed on 13 November. An interim governor, Kim Sung Chu, nominated by President Syngman Rhee, had actually served for a week. Non-potable water was now being pumped into the systems on both sides of the Taedong River, and limited lighting was available on the east side. One nearby coal mine was operating, but it only furnished enough coal to run one power plant. Several local citizens requested permission to print newspapers. In an interim report to Seoul dated 12 November 1950, COL Munske stated that *generally, things have been in a chaotic condition, but slowly we are beginning to see slight changes for the better.*⁴⁹

By mid-November, COL Munske thought that they were beginning to get control of the crime wave in the city, though



Vital to restoring order to P'yongyang was a competent police force. The first class from the Police Training Camp graduated on 12 November 1950, with speeches given by BG Bowen of the 187th ARCT, the mayor of P'yongyang, and COL Munske. *Courtesy of Judy Munske.*

nightly rapes persisted. Conditions outside the city were still tough. Guerrillas operated at will, daily attacking military convoys and running rampant in the small villages. To the south of P'yongyang, strong enemy attacks were being made against the UN forces, which included Turks and Filipinos.⁵⁰

In the north, the Americans and British were preparing for the final push to the Yalu. Still, *increasing contact with Chinese soldiers is still unresolved. Everyone is holding his breath. However we are not greatly worried. We are just damned sore. We had expected the fighting to be over by now.*⁵¹ Despite growing tactical evidence in the form of several hundred Chinese POWs, denial of a Chinese threat by Tokyo sufficed, especially since extremely cold weather reduced active patrolling by troops lacking winter clothing.

In the meantime, the senior UN Civil Assistance advisor was plagued by law and order challenges. After meeting with the ROK Commander in Chief MAJ Ly, the Counterintelligence Division commander, and MPs the night before, COL Munske joined a 20 November raid on a gang of racketeers.


Rakkasan Assault on Sukch'on and Sunch'on



The 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team made a parachute assault on Sukch'on and Sunch'on the morning of 20 October 1950. Although the jump was a success, faulty intelligence caused the Rakkasans to miss both cutting off the North Korean divisions north of P'yongyang and rescuing American POWs.



The Sukch'on/Sunch'on parachute assault was the first time that C-119s were used for a combat parachute operation. They dropped a total of four thousand troops and six hundred tons of supplies that day.



Delayed by heavy rain at Taegu, South Korea, the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (ARCT—"Rakkasans"), did not conduct parachute assaults on Sukch'on and Sunch'on until late morning 20 October 1950. The drop zones were adjacent to the railway lines going north from P'yongyang, the North Korean capital. The primary mission of the 187th was to cut off and then contain two North Korean divisions as part of the Eighth U.S. Army and ROK offensive into North Korea following the successful UN landing at Inch'on and the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter. A secondary mission was to rescue approximately two thousand American prisoners of war that were being shipped north to serve as future "bargaining chips" in UN negotiations.

The Sukch'on/Sunch'on airborne assault was the first time that heavy equipment was para-dropped in combat, and the first use of C-119 Flying Boxcar transports for a combat parachute operation. On 20 October and the days afterward, about four thousand troops and six hundred tons of equipment and supplies were dropped at Sukch'on and Sunch'on. This included twelve 105 mm howitzers, thirty-nine Jeeps and trailers, four 40 mm antiaircraft artillery guns, four ¾-ton trucks, and 584 tons of ammunition, gasoline, water, rations, and other supplies.¹

The Rakkasans arrived too late to contain the North Korean divisions and rescue the American POWs. The trail elements of the enemy units were a full day ahead on the north side of the Chongchon River. Communist Premier Kim Il Sung and his government had fled P'yongyang on 12 October for Manpojin on the Yalu River. Far East Command intelligence was seven to ten days old. When the Rakkasans were ordered to P'yongyang on 23 October, they had accumulated thirty-eight hundred prisoners, killed between two and three thousand North Korean soldiers, and suffered a hundred casualties. Unfortunately, the remaining UN prisoners had been taken from their train and machine gunned by their guards before dawn on 20 October—at the same time the 187th was preparing for the parachute assault.²

Notes

- 1 Roy E. Appleman, *US Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (June–November 1950) (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1961), 656–57.
- 2 Edwin P. Hoyt, *On to the Yalu* (New York: Stein & Day, 1984), 242–43.



A single working fire “truck” (actually a motorcycle) was available to fight fires in P'yongyang in late 1950. This demonstration of the pumper's power took place in front of the damaged City Hall, which can be seen in the center background. *Photo courtesy of Judy Munske.*

Headquarters (EUSAK) Civil Assistance Command.
 Pyong an-Nam do, Province
 Apo. 301
Off Limits

This building, and the contents therein is now under control of the Civil Assistance Team, UN Force.

All persons are prohibited from entering, and removing, or destroying any part of the building, grounds, equipment, and furniture, or any food located therein.

Trespassers will be apprehended, and prosecuted by the proper authority.

By Command of General Bowen:
 C. R. MUNSKE
 Colonel, Arty
 Chief, Civil Assistance Team

Youth groups became black marketeers under the guise of South Korean patriotic organizations. They had been robbing everything they could. After their raid on the gangsters, Munske investigated a cave twelve miles outside the city where a big guerrilla arsenal had been found. The UNCACK team got an unexpected bonus from the counter guerrilla operations: two captured Russian trucks and a Russian Jeep.⁵²

In mid-November, UN soldiers enjoyed an unexpected treat: “The greater portion of the day was spent patrolling, attending [winter] clothing classes, and enjoying the Bob Hope Show. The two-hour comedy show was thoroughly enjoyed by everyone.” “No one who saw the show could forget Marilyn Maxwell’s sweater, the acrobatics of the Taylor Maids, the wit of Jerry Colona, the music of Les Brown, and, most of all, the great man himself. It was hard to imagine that Bob Hope was actually in P’yongyang,” said Private First Class Jimmy Marks, A Battery, 61st Field Artillery Battalion.⁵³

COL Munske was too busy to attend the show. He was escorting official visitors throughout the city, explaining and showing what the CA team had accomplished. After dinner with Senator Claude Pepper of Florida, Munske was called back to Seoul to talk with U.S. Ambassador John J. Muccio about conditions in the North Korean capital. This was prompted by a *Christian Science Monitor* article noted by Secretary of State Dean Acheson. In Seoul, COL Munske found the UN Civil Assistance Command Korea well ensconced in the Bonto Hotel. The UNCACK was concerned about guerrilla activities affecting work throughout Korea. Perhaps to make up for a busy Thanksgiving, in Munske’s absence, CA team sergeants found the Russian ambassador’s old desk and some nice leather chairs, which they set up in their chief’s room in P’yongyang.⁵⁵

When Munske returned from Seoul on 27 November, he was accompanied by Brigadier General Crawford F. Sams, MacArthur’s Chief of Public Health and Welfare. General Sams wanted to visit city hospitals and clinics

無斷出入 및 財産撤去 嚴禁

이 건물 및 이 건물 내의施設 設備 品等 一切 財産은
 本民事務處에서 管理한다
 軍警民間 如何한 者를 莫論하고 許可없이 이 건물
 內 및 地域內에 出入하거나 其內에 있는 施設 設備
 品 또는 食料品等 一切 財産을 除去 搬出 또는 破壞
 함을 嚴禁한다
 前記에 違反하여 不法侵入 또는 侵害하는 者는 逮捕하
 여 嚴罰에 處한다

平壤駐屯軍司令官 本軍將命에 依하여
 國際聯合軍 平壤民事務處 處長 陸軍大校 이만스키



UNCACK issued various notices and proclamations as it reestablished law and order in P'yongyang. Posted instructions were often authenticated by COL Munske’s “chop,” or seal, with his name in both English and phonetic Korean.



Bob Hope's USO Tour was always a raving success, and the show in P'yongyang was no different. Shown here with President and Mrs. Syngman Rhee in Seoul, Bob Hope and Marilyn Maxwell headlined the wildly popular show.

before going up to the front where fighting was heavy. The night before, "Bed Check Charlie" had bombed K-23 airfield and everyone had been put on alert to defend the city.⁵⁶ Although Lieutenant General Walton Walker had formally told everyone that extremely large numbers of Chinese were breaking through Eighth Army lines, Munske calmly reassured his wife, *Don't worry about the Reds shoving us out of P'yongyang. We have British, Filipino, ROK, and American troops here. I'm not worried. UN troops are moving north now. The 7th Infantry Division has reached the Manchurian border and is sitting there.*⁵⁷

The uncertainty of the situation enabled COL Munske to survive an assassination attempt by guerrillas. *It happened about the time of the big UN push to the Yalu River in the northwest. The mayor, police chief, and I were supposed to discuss contingencies in the event a withdrawal became necessary. A group of Communist guerrillas figured to kill all of us. Fortunately, the ROK Counter Intelligence Corps discovered the plot and arrested the ringleaders. The group was 'loaded for bear;' the eleven were packing rifles, pistols, and grenades. One was a trusted police lieutenant.*⁵⁹

Despite most of the heavy fighting taking place in the northern part of Pyongan-Namdo Province, COL Munske and his CA team tried to conduct *business as usual* in order to dispel any thoughts of panic. But, local officials and medical personnel were getting very jittery because when they accepted

"Around Thanksgiving, word came up that the Eighth Army was going to launch a general attack all along the front. We were told that theater intelligence believed the Chinese in the area would fall back into Manchuria . . . It looked like this would be the final stage of the war, and that we'd all be home by Christmas. That same night, the night the UN offensive was supposed to be in full swing, all hell broke loose. All that night we were engaged almost continuously in firefights." — CPT Sherman Pratt, B Company, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division.⁶⁵

positions in the government established by us, they automatically signed their death warrants with the Communists. Witness to the long line of troops coming back through P'yongyang, beaten, haggard, and dirty they knew that the Chinese Army had hit U.S. hard and practically destroyed the ROK army. Evacuation was only a matter of time.⁶⁰

On 1 December, during his visit to 8th Army headquarters, COL Munske was told that the 2nd Infantry Division had been "cut to pieces;" only forty percent of the division survived. The 9th Infantry Regiment that had been in P'yongyang had lost sixteen hundred of its assigned two thousand men. General Sams discovered that his son-in-law, a battalion surgeon in the 9th Infantry, had been killed when his aid station had been overrun. Shortly afterwards, the 1st Cavalry Division was hit hard and the U.S. units began to fall back. Munske was told that the EUSA advance headquarters was reestablishing itself east of the Taedong, effectively cutting P'yongyang in half. He was instructed to handle the refugees ("Keep the people out of the Army's way"), to insure that repaired facilities were destroyed, and to use his judgment as to when to leave.⁶¹

COL Munske gathered the city and province government officials and told them to assemble everyone who worked for the UN governments and UN forces and tell them to prepare to move.⁶² Medical and public health

COL (Ret.) Walton H. "Buck" Walker II



COL (Ret.) Walton H. "Buck" Walker II, now Acting Deputy, G-7, U.S. Army Special Forces Command, is the grandson of General Walton H. Walker, Commander, Eighth U.S. Army in Japan and Korea. His father, General (Retired) Samuel Sims Walker, a company commander in the 24th Infantry Division in Korea, served under his dad and secured the Taedong Highway Bridge during the withdrawal. As a third generation West Pointer, Buck retired after thirty years of service having commanded airborne infantry, Special Forces, and a joint force in Haiti.

Costly Withdrawal...

On 27 November, UN forces began a costly withdrawal across the Ch'ong-ch'on River. While covering this retreat, the 2nd Infantry Division of IX Corps suffered roughly five thousand casualties and lost most of its artillery as it fought its way through large numbers of Chinese to reach the river and then through the mountain passes south of Kunu-ri.⁵⁸

personnel, the few remaining Christian missionaries, and the police force were included. The next day, 2 December, American unit after unit was rushing “pell-mell” through the capital to cross the pontoon bridges while CA was told to stand by. *Military government is a peculiar thing*, observed Munske.⁶³


"Bed Check Charlie" bombed the airfield again that night. On Sunday, 3 December, COL Munske assembled the "official" group of more than two thousand North Korean refugees and personally escorted them across the

pontoon bridge to the east side of the river Taedong, and installed them in the old American Corn Products factory near the railway station. Another one hundred thousand people gathered along the river were warned that the Filipinos guarding the crossing site would shoot them if they attempted to use the pontoon bridge. The CA team delivered several tons of rice to the factory to feed the “official” group while it waited for its train to safety.⁶⁴

Back at City Hall, COL Munske issued destruction and distribution orders to his team. The two newly built power plants, water system and machinery, printing presses, and Radio P'yongyang, were to be destroyed. Ninety-six crates of South Korean currency plates seized by the Communists in Seoul were loaded aboard trains heading south. The underground weapons factory found hidden in an abandoned lead mine between the towns of Sinchon and Yonam-Ni on the Pallyu River (BV 6346) was destroyed by combat engineers from the 187th ARCT. All freight cars on the west side of the river were rigged for demolition. Rice and millet in the UNCACK warehouse were distributed freely to the city's residents; two tons were placed on the steps of City Hall for people to help themselves.⁶⁶



Map reveals the extent of the UN advances in the east and west after five CCF (Communist Chinese Forces) Armies launch massive counterattacks to halt the Allied offensive and cause withdrawals south of the 38th Parallel.



Detailed limits of advance by UN regimental forces when they are countered by CCF Armies.

Shortly after lunch, COL Munske was surprised by an unexpected visitor. Captain Loren E. Davis, chief of the CA Sub-Team at Chinnamp'o, reported to him for instructions. He had just driven forty miles through guerrilla-controlled territory to collect medical supplies and planned to spend the night in P'yongyang. Munske quickly explained how precarious things were in the city and ordered him to return immediately with his medicines. He was not to await any further orders from him—leave when the U.S. troops (3rd Logistical Command) left the port. Captain Davis remembered, "I jumped back into my Jeep and we set a speed record getting back. Burning up the engines was the least of my concerns."⁶⁸

After making another tour of the deserted city in his Jeep, COL Munske had his team pack up in the missionary compound and moved across the river to safety.⁶⁹ That night, 3 December, the CA team occupied a hospital building with intact windows, sheltering from the below-freezing conditions. About 2130 hours, the sentry reported a large fire nearby. *Within an hour, they heard small arms begin to pop and explosions became progressively louder until the team realized that mortar and artillery shells were exploding. The nearby ammo dump was on fire. Fragments*

Dreams of Garrison Life...

The 1st Cavalry Division troops charged with the security of P'yongyang had begun to dream of the joys of garrison life in Japan and were more concerned with the proper arrangements for the "Homecoming Parade" in Tokyo than with the persistent stories of Chinese intervention.⁵⁴

This North Korean *hundred-won* note was legal currency during UNCACK's administration of P'yongyang, though five- and ten-won notes were much more common denominations.



Radio P'yongyang

While COL Munske worked civil assistance in P'yongyang, and CA officers with the divisions and corps dealt with tactical issues, the Psychological Warfare (Psywar) Division of G-2, EUSA in Seoul wanted to counter daily Russian and Chinese radio broadcasts into North Korea. Major Tom O. Matthews (pictured) and Captain Max W. Dolcater of G-2 Psywar, UN Command, Tokyo, were dispatched to North Korea. These officers would single-handedly get Radio P'yongyang operational. Intelligence reported that Radio P'yongyang had one Japanese and one Russian transmitter. Both had water-cooled tubes. When Matthews and Dolcater arrived in early November they discovered that key parts of the Japanese transmitter had been wrecked and little remained of the Russian machine. With some inquiries, they were shown where elements of the Russian transmitter were buried and told that the other parts had been shipped north by rail. Major Matthews flew to Tokyo to scrounge essential parts. While he was gone, Captain Dolcater found the necessary Russian radio parts on some abandoned railway cars near Sunch'on.¹

A bigger problem was electrical power. A nearby coal mine had supplied fuel for the main P'yongyang power plant, but the miners refused to work without rice. Matthews and Dolcater got themselves appointed official rice officers by COL Munske, and worked with his team to get coal delivered to the city power plant. To their surprise, these efforts to get Radio P'yongyang on the air also restored electricity to the waterworks and a hospital.² A few days before Thanksgiving 1950, Radio P'yongyang began broadcasting on 855 kilocycles (kc), but its signal varied from 830 to 880. By then Radio Seoul had also resumed broadcasting on 860 kc.³

The UN Command broadcast themes for Radio P'yongyang in November 1950—"Relief, rehabilitation, unification for Korea," "Democracy, how it works, and ROK Constitution," "Soviet Obstruction," and "Stragglers"—fell off after the Chinese attacks. By the end of November, they had been replaced by themes that emphasized "Chinese Intervention," "Soviet tyranny, lies, and oppression," "Refugees," and "UN determination and ultimate victory." Limited electricity reduced the North Korean broadcasts to nightly thirty and sixty-minute periods: 2200-2230 hours, 2300-2400 hours. Essentially, the second period was a rebroadcast of "North Korean News and Commentary."⁴

Notes

1 Colonel Kenneth K. Hansen, *Psywar in Korea* (Washington, DC: Joint Subsidiary Activities Group, OJCS, 1960): 91.

2 Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 83-84.

3 Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 91.

4 Captain Max W. Dolcater, "Evaluation of Enemy and Friendly Broadcasts with Respect to UN Military Operations and Pertinent Recommendations," Undated Report to Chief, Psychological Warfare Branch, G-2 Section, GHQ, Far East Command in Murray Dyer, *Strategic Radi Psywar in FEC, ORO-T-4 (FEC)* (Washington, DC: Department of Army, 31 January 1951): 31-32, 39-40. Long-range and short-wave frequencies were different for each broadcast to preclude enemy jamming. This tactic created major problems for the listener who had to constantly change frequencies every half hour. As Major Tom Matthews and Captain Max Dolcater worked to get Radio P'yongyang operational, the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, recently arrived in Tokyo, sent officers and soldiers throughout recently repatriated South Korea to rebuild stations. Captain Robert A. Leadley, Lieutenants Ernest H. Luick, William Eilers, and Robert J. Morris, and Corporals Devere D. Doerr and Arnold Tepfer covered South Korea, getting stations back on the air and then back into the network. Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 85.

5 Dolcater, "Evaluation of Enemy and Friendly Broadcasts with Respect to UN Military Operations and Pertinent Recommendations," 26-27.

Russian Daily Broadcasts to Korea

0800 to 0830 hrs on 8 frequencies (4 short-wave)

0900 to 0930 hrs on 8 frequencies (4 short-wave)

1130 to 1200 hrs on 10 frequencies (6 short-wave)

1245 to 1315 hrs on 13 frequencies (9 short-wave)

1500 to 1530 hrs on 13 frequencies (9 short-wave)

2100 to 2130 hrs on 8 frequencies (4 short-wave)

2230 to 2300 hrs on 8 frequencies (4 short wave)

Radio Peking Daily Broadcast to Korea

One hour in Korean (short-wave)⁵



MAJ Thomas O. Matthews (pictured) and CPT Max W. Dolcater managed to begin Radio P'yongyang broadcasts shortly before Thanksgiving 1950. In the course of obtaining power for the transmitter, they also restored electricity to the waterworks and a hospital. Photo courtesy of Judy Munske.

of iron and steel fell ringing on the roof like heavy hailstones while those hitting the streets shot off sparks.

Suddenly, there was a terrific explosion, far worse than any before, and then all the windows, frames, and sashes blew into the room. The explosion knocked everyone down, and the glass and flying debris struck, inflicting cuts and bruises, and overturning a heating stove to start a fire. While Dr. Kassel administered first aid, the stove was dragged outside. But, before anyone could recover, the building was racked by another explosion, louder and bigger than before. Colonel Munske and CPT Stack were physically lifted off the floor and tossed into the makeshift kitchen area. That caused Munske to yell, *Let's get out of here!* and lead everyone out the back door. *The brick buildings across the street were falling down, whole walls were collapsing, so we kept going down deeper into the Korean village. We finally stopped and huddled up, cold as hell, freezing, weather below zero, and a sorry looking lot. About 0500 hours, a few men went to check the trucks. Miraculously, not one of our vehicles was touched.*⁷⁰

After dawn, the cold and very disheveled group returned to its old building. The walls were pockmarked with shell craters and splattered with bullet holes. The yard looked like an iron scrap yard, bent and twisted iron all over the place, including some whole [mortar and artillery] shells which had not exploded. The only visible casualty—a dead dog.⁷¹ A couple officers were sent to the American Corn Products factory to tell the “official” North Korean refugees that no train was coming for them. Only seventeen of the two thousand were still there. The officers told them to leave.⁷² The P'yongyang city CA team chief had reached a decision point.

Colonel Munske crossed back over the Taedong to make a final reconnaissance. There was only a British tank company securing the bridgehead. At City Hall only the custodians remained. The building in the missionary compound that housed the EUSA advance headquarters contained only four Signal Corps soldiers awaiting final orders from the Signal Officer. Since there were no telephones and no one else around, COL Munske told them to leave. After burning all the papers in his office that he could not carry, the CA Team chief told the remaining policemen to seek safety across the river. CPT Vangen escorted them across the pontoon bridge while Munske mused.

*I sat there smoking a good cigar trying to think what to do next. I figured that it was time to leave. I had completed my mission, but was worried about the other three hundred thousand people still left in the city. About 85 percent of them were Christians, the largest number being Presbyterian, second largest Methodists, and third were the Catholics. He concluded that he could do nothing more for them and drove to the pontoon bridge, where the final calamity awaited him.*⁷³

At the bridge, MAJ Sullivan, commander of the POW military police detachment, stopped him to say that a train for the “official” North Korean refugees and the remaining eight hundred political prisoners in the jail had just arrived to take them to Chinnamp'o. Captain Gerard was dispatched to the prison where he found




“I sat there smoking a good cigar trying to think what to do next. I figured that it was time to leave.”—COL Charles R. Munske, P'yongyang, 4 December 1950



As UN troops withdrew from P'yongyang in the face of the Chinese offensive, they were forced to leave behind valuable equipment and supplies. In order to keep resources out of enemy hands, units destroyed vehicles, burned fuel, and generally followed a “scorched earth” policy during the evacuation.

that the guards had run away with the keys. As a parting gesture, CPT Gerard and the police delivered bags of rice to each cell for the inmates and helped the few remaining “official” refugees aboard their train. During Munske's last check of I Corps Headquarters, two civilian assistance officers asked to join him. Then, he met a patrol that told him that the Chinese were only four miles from the city. With only a British tank company between them and the approaching Communists, COL Munske led his convoy out of the city on the afternoon of 4 December 1950.⁷⁴

The UN civil assistance to P'yongyang ended when COL Munske and his CA convoy joined the thousands of refugees headed south along the main P'yongyang-Seoul road. The Chinnamp'o CA team did not depart North Korea until 6 December, when a naval covering force of two Australian, one American, and three Canadian destroyers escorted the ammunition ships and the landing ship tank carrying the CA team out of



U.S. and South African Air Force F-51 Mustangs were flying out of P'yongyang's East Airfield (K-23) by mid-November 1950. The F-51 squadrons had just completed their move to K-23 on 22 November when the Chinese offensive forced them to displace south after only ten days in the north. The F-51s never missed a day of air strikes, but the squadrons did destroy and abandon considerable equipment when they left P'yongyang.



During the retreat from P'yongyang, Army engineers were confronted with the disheartening task of destroying bridges they had so recently repaired or rebuilt. Engineers rigged this bridge near P'yongyang with explosives on 1 December, preparing to blow it once UN troops had passed. This was the bridge guarded by CPT Samuel S. Walker, 24th ID.

the river estuary.⁷⁵ Since the I Corps Advance at Sinmak had no wire or radio communications to contact the CA Sub-Team at Haeju, a light airplane was sent to tell them to withdraw to Seoul.⁷⁶

The CA team made quite a caravan when it departed P'yongyang. The October convoy of three Jeeps, one 1¼-ton truck, one 2½-ton (six-by-six) truck and a Korean civilian truck had grown to five Jeeps, two 1¼-ton trucks, one 2½-ton truck, and four Russian trucks loaded down with equipment plus rice, gasoline, clothing, refugees, and two geese. We had to leave the horse behind—couldn't get him on the truck. We looked like Delaney Street on the move. No one had washed or shaved for three days. All vehicle side curtains had been removed and the windows knocked out. Every officer, soldier, and civilian had their weapons pointed out as they 'ran the gauntlet' through guerrilla-held territory. It was quite a 'gypsy' caravan.⁷⁷

At 1500 hours on 5 December 1950, Radio Tokyo (Broadcasting Corporation of Japan) announced the official UN abandonment of P'yongyang. This was not broadcast on Psywar radio because it was not an official communiqué. Instead, on the night of 5 December, Psywar radio, limited to the UN Command directives, reported that "United Nations forces continued to consolidate defensive positions south of P'yongyang."⁷⁸

Sometime on 7 December 1950, COL Munske and his team reached Seoul. His team was disbanded and the officers sent to handle refugee problems. Colonel Munske was sent to Taegu on 9 December because *if the Eighth Army retreats any further, this city will become the headquarters, and that is why I am here. I was ordered to set up a rear echelon headquarters, and to write a report on the evacuation of P'yongyang. Truth be known, I think I got too*

*much publicity, and they are shoving me into the background for a while. I was outdrawing the general in newspaper articles, and that's not good.*⁷⁹

"When we withdrew through P'yongyang, the company passed a railroad spur where I counted thirty-two new Pershing tanks on flat cars. Soldiers were thrusting thermite grenades down their gun muzzles. It made me sick! And, when my first sergeant, Mitchell, and Sergeant Jim Huber were confronted by the major responsible for burning a heaping pile of winter clothing, they held a carbine on him while they loaded the truck, and were gone before reinforcements arrived."

— CPT Norman Allen, I Company, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division.⁶⁷

*going if we ever go back.*⁸⁰

What did the P'yongyang and Pyongdan-Namdo province Civil Assistance Team accomplish during their thirty-seven days in North Korea?

1. By 14 November, one trash truck had been rebuilt from several destroyed ones and was hauling refuse to the dumps. By 1 December, four oxcarts and four horse carts were also in service. Collection of city night soil was restarted with a "honey wagon brigade." Volunteer youth groups cleaned the streets.

2. Thirty-five hundred people were immunized against typhus, while four thousand received the smallpox vaccine.

3. Generally speaking, by the time the city was evacuated, law and order was fully established in the city and complete cooperation was being had from all units in the area.

4. Police in Chinnamp'o were fairly well organized and under the control of the city team.

5. Non-potable water had been brought into the water system and pipelines from wells on the Taedong River islands, but on a strict rationed basis. A CA team "alert detail" with Jeeps would rush to the valves in order to allow water to flow into the proper sector when a

fire was discovered. One fire engine was rebuilt from the wrecks of three, and a Fire Department was established in late November 1950.

6. North Korean, Russian, Japanese, and American medical supplies and equipment were collected and stored in a central warehouse for distribution throughout the capital and Pyongan-Namdo Province.

7. At Kaesong, Dr. Kassel set up a DDT dusting station. Local health officials were instructed to establish check points along the railroads and highways to dust and inoculate refugees. They agreed to provide certificates to each person processed.

8. Mr. S.A.C. Lord and Dr. A.K. Lee organized the capital into five medical districts with North Korean health officers (one per ten thousand people) charged with the prevention and control of infectious diseases. Almost thirty male and female indigenous DDT dusting teams were organized and equipped to dust people; fumigate suspect homes; and inspect barbershops, restaurants, cafes, food-preparing premises, and bath houses.

9. The buried machinery for the Central Water Works was located, recovered, and reinstalled about the time the two rebuilt local thermal power plants began producing electricity. The overhead viaduct and pipeline to carry water from the island pumping station was reconstructed the day before the evacuation.

10. All the personnel in the six orphanages in P'yongyang (245 children) were DDT dusted on 14 November, and medical and food supplies provided to all. Before evacuating, each was given a one month supply of food.


11. Food was plentiful. Insufficient transportation to distribute coal and salt was the biggest issue.

12. Two standby power plants were put into operation: one at the Sandong Coal Mine by U.S. Air Force engineers (822nd Engineer Aviation Battalion assigned to the 20th Air Force) and the other at the American Corn Products Refinery Company plant. A U.S. Navy power barge was brought to provide electrical power at Chinnamp'o.

13. The P'yongyang streetcar system had been repaired and only lacked power.

14. The railway bridge across the Taedong was to be completed by 15 December.

15. The local telephone system was ready for operation when the evacuation was ordered.⁸¹



The impending Chinese invasion sent millions of North Koreans south. Refugees from P'yongyang streamed across the remains of the Taedong River Railroad Bridge, climbing twisted girders and balancing on broken railroad ties.

Communist forces retook P'yongyang on 5–6 December 1950. Much of the city infrastructure and stockpiled military supplies had been dynamited or burned by U.S., British, and South Korean troops. The British liaison officer at Far East Command reported back to London on what he called "the unusual situation:" U.S. troops having to fight their way back through guerrillas while being harassed by Chinese from the North.⁸²

Despite all their frustrations in the process, COL Charles R. Munske in P'yongyang and CPT Loren E. Davis in Chinnamp'o managed major civil affairs feats in these two North Korean cities, with minimal assistance. Unfortunately, the tide of war radically changed with the massive intervention of the Red Chinese armies. Virtually all signs of progress were explosively demolished as the Eighth U.S. Army withdrew to the 38th Parallel and then further south to

SGM (Ret.) Ernest K. Tabata



USASOC's very own Ernest K. Tabata remembers attending the Bob Hope Show in P'yongyang as a lowly PFC demolition man with the 14th Combat Engineer Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division. After serving with the 11th Airborne Division in the mid-1950s, Tabata soon transferred his demolition skills to U.S. Special Forces, where he served for twenty years. He retired in 1981 as a Sergeant Major, after thirty years of service. Still unable to give up blowing up bridges, he has been teaching engineers at the Special Warfare Center and School since 1984. He still remembers the Bob Hope Show in P'yongyang with fondness; it was almost as much fun as watching trains being driven off the Taedong River Railroad Bridge during the evacuation.

regroup. Still, this is a tribute to the capabilities of CA officers and soldiers who were tasked *to make civil assistance happen* in North Korea in late 1950, and to today's Civil Affairs soldiers "making it happen" in Afghanistan and Iraq. ♣

The P'yongyang article would not have been possible without the assistance of Ms. Judy Munske, daughter of COL Charles Munske, who granted me access to her father's papers and family correspondence. Excerpts from his letters and reports enabled this experienced Civil Military Government officer to describe the numerous challenges of restoring order, rebuilding the infrastructure, and caring for the people in the North Korean capital and to share the small triumphs and myriad of frustrations while retaining his optimism.

Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and the Lodge Act.

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- 2 Charles R. Munske, Chief, P'yongyang and P'yong-dan Province CA Team, Eighth U.S. Army, Korea Forward, North Korea, undated handwritten notes, 19 October–5 December 1950, courtesy of Judy Munske, copies in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Munske Papers.
- 3 Munske Papers; Report on Activities of the Pyongan-Namdo Civil Assistance Team (n.d.), copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Munske Undated Report.
- 4 Loren E. Davis, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 2 February 2005, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, hereafter cited as Davis interview, 2 February 2005.
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- 15 Munske Undated Report.
- 16 Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, *Korea: The Unknown War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 107.
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- 23 Munske Papers.
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- 25 Munske Papers.
- 26 Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 2 November 1950, copy in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 27 Munske Papers.
- 28 Charles R. Munske, letters to his wife, 2 and 3 November 1950, copies in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 29 Munske Interim Report; Munske Undated Report.
- 30 Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 2 November 1950, copy in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. **Conditions in Seoul were not much better. Munske said their billets were like a refrigerator and the office was a constant icebox.** Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 24 October 1950, copy in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 31 Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 7 November 1950, copy in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 32 Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 7 November 1950.
- 33 Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 3 November 1950; Munske Undated Report.
- 34 Eighth U.S. Army Korea Civil Assistance Team, Pyongan-Namdo Province, APO 301, undated report, copy in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files. **(This is presumably the 30 November 1950 monthly activities report promised by Munske in his 12 November 1950 Interim Report).**

The UN Command kept refugees off the main roads for tactical reasons, so millions of North Koreans filtered south through the hills and valleys on cart tracks and footpaths, fleeing the Chinese "hordes" invading from the north.



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- 50 Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 16 November 1950, copy in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
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- 54 Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 53-54.
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- 56 Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 28 November 1950, copy in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 57 Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 23 November 1950.
- 58 D.M. Giangreco, *War in Korea 1950-1953* (New York, NY: Presidio Press, 1990), 128.
- 59 Frank McKeown, "Colonel Who Made It Hard Way Is Feted," *The News* (New York), 23 June 1957, M6.
- 60 Charles R. Munske, letters to his wife, 1 and 2 December 1950, copies in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Munske Undated Report.
- 61 Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 5 December 1950, copy in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. Date of this letter does not track with chronology of events cited in 7(?) December letter.
- 62 Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 5 December 1950.
- 63 Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 5 December 1950.
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- 70 Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 7(?) December 1950.
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Eighth Army troops withdrawing south from Sunch'on to P'yongyang after the CCF launches a massive counteroffensive.



THE IVANHOE SECURITY FORCE IN KOREA, 1950

by Charles H. Briscoe

The Ivanhoe Security Force (ISF) was a 2nd Infantry Division (2nd ID) counter-guerrilla unit that grew out of necessity shortly after the division arrived in Kyongsan, Korea, in September 1950. Since the 2nd ID was at full strength and fresh from the United States, its three infantry regiments were quickly moved into the defensive lines of the Pusan Perimeter. They replaced the 24th Infantry Division which was woefully understrength (down to 45% strength). But, their newly assigned defensive sector covered some 35 miles. The 2nd ID front stretched from the juncture of the Nakdong and Nam Rivers in the south to the town of Hyonpung in the north.¹ Facing them were the 105th Armored as well as the 4th and 8th Infantry Divisions of the North Korea Peoples Army (NKPA).² The 2nd Infantry was spread thin over an area that was plagued by refugees heading south. Enemy infiltrations behind friendly lines disrupted command posts (CPs) as well as resupply routes.

The threat prompted the creation of an American-led counter guerrilla force made up of South Koreans much like U.S. Special Forces (SF) trained and led indigenous Mike Forces in South Vietnam. The purpose of this article is to explain why the 2nd Infantry Division created this ad hoc, “off the books” indigenous counter-guerrilla force, who the American “advisors” were, and what role they had in organizing, manning, equipping, and fighting this element. They were doing what Army special operations forces (ARSOF) soldiers do today in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence) directed ISF missions, their actions became closely intertwined with the major actions of the 2nd ID from August until late November 1950 during the disastrous withdrawal at Kunu-ri, North Korea. The Ivanhoe Security Force was sent wherever there was trouble in the 2nd Infantry area.³

The first elements of the 2nd Infantry arrived from Fort Lewis, Washington, on 31 July 1950.⁴ Corporal (CPL) Joseph C. Howard, 2nd MP Company and ISF remembered: “Married personnel had little time to move their families. Those who had cars had to sell at half their value. Hundreds of replacements were rushed into the division to bring it up to strength. On the ship over we had to train them on their assigned weapons because replacements came from finance, quartermaster, etc. But, we had plenty of time; the ship took seventeen days.”⁵ The reality of war came quickly.

On 7 August 1950, A Battery, 15th Field Artillery was attacked in the early morning by enemy forces who had infiltrated behind the front lines and gotten into their firing position. It was a “wake up call” for the artillerymen. They drove off the attackers and killed fifteen North Korean soldiers.⁶ Bands of South Korean dissidents and bandits, who had long populated the Taebaek and southwestern mountains, joined four reduced divisions of the NKPA II Corps to conduct limited guerrilla operations above and below the 38th Parallel.⁷



Ivanhoe Security Force SSI





Displaced South Koreans carrying their most prized possessions fled the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) to seek refuge in the Pusan Perimeter.



MPs screen refugees for hidden weapons with mine detectors.

Hordes of white-clothed, steadily plodding peasants moved south along mountain trails and roads to saturate the division area as the infantrymen sought to drive off enemy patrols sent to scout ahead of a major attack. Intermingled among the displaced persons were Communist agents intent on collecting information, harassing, sabotaging, and attacking American forces behind the lines. They were very effective in those early days.⁸

While the burden of controlling the refugees fell to every unit on the front line and in the rear, it was the primary responsibility of the 2nd ID Provost Marshal, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Henry C. Becker, the agents of the 2nd Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment, and local South Korean police. Posted leaflet notices warned refugees that they would be shot for moving at night and advised them to stay clear of battle areas and unit positions. During daylight, MPs operated refugee screening posts on railroads, roads, and trails conducting cursory searches for weapons with mine detectors. Refugee assembly points were established at fifteen-mile intervals to allow rest and control movement. Food and water was provided before Korean police escorted groups through the division area to Susan-ni on the Nakdong River.⁹ However, these control measures proved insufficient as night attacks behind division lines continued.

WWII veteran Major Jack T. Young, the 2nd ID Deputy G-2, volunteered to organize and train a special security force to deal with the refugee problems, collect intelligence, and counter guerrilla activities in the division rear areas.¹⁰ The Chinese-American born in Kona, Hawaii,



MAJ Jack T. Young, Assistant G-2, 2nd Infantry Division and Commander, Ivanhoe Security Force.



(L to R) SGT Emmett V. Parker, NCOIC, and CPL Joseph C. Howard, 2nd MP Company, were the first two American soldiers selected by MAJ Jack Young to cadre the US-led indigenous Ivanhoe Security Force.

was a 1936 graduate of Fudan University, Shanghai, (bachelor's degree in business administration). In 1938 he attended the Kuomintang Military Academy. Then, he led Nationalist Chinese units for General Chiang Kai-shek until 1943. After fighting guerrillas in Shantung Province, Nationalist Chinese Colonel (COL) Jack Young, like American Flying Tigers pilots, was commissioned as a U.S. Army Reserve officer.¹¹ Fluent in Mandarin Chinese, Japanese, Korean and several Asian dialects, Young was commissioned in the Adjutant General Corps and assigned as aide-de-camp to Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell in the China-Burma-India Theater. Afterwards, while serving with the U.S. Military Mission to China, Captain (CPT) Young met the leading Chinese Communists, Mao Zedong, Chou En-lai, and Kim Il-Sung from Korea.¹²

As interpreter/aide for General George C. Marshall during his postwar China mission, Major (MAJ) Young became friendly with COL Laurence B. Keiser, who became 2nd Infantry Division commander.¹³ When war broke out in June 1950 and the 2nd ID was alerted for Korea, Major General (MG) Keiser asked AG Major Young to join his staff as the Deputy G-2. His experiences in Asia, language skills, and cultural background made Young a valuable asset.¹⁴

MAJ Jack Young, after assuming control of the South Korean police, began recruiting. He went looking for ROK soldiers sent home to recover from serious wounds, ex-soldiers and former policemen. Service with the Japanese was not a concern. While screening refugees MAJ Young was on the alert for military age males trying to infiltrate.¹⁵ Two of his early additions were South Korean Assemblymen, Kim Yong Woo, a University of Southern California graduate, and Kei Won Chung, who had a doctorate in literature from Princeton.¹⁶ These men proved to be very helpful with controlling the flow of refugees, assisting with their resettlement and helping to establish law, order, and local government.

On 2 September, Sergeant (SGT) Emmett V. Parker and CPL Joseph C. Howard, 2nd MP Company, working as refugee screeners, were told to abandon their posts if the enemy entered Yongsan. When the North Koreans did enter the city, the two MPs remained on post until the last American



MAJ Jack Young demonstrates silent kill, hand-to-hand combat techniques to Korean trainees in Ivanhoe Security Force.



CPL Joseph Howard (right rear) poses with the first Korean graduates of ISF counter guerrilla training.

vehicle left and then they joined the infantry to help hold a nearby hill overlooking the city. When a counterattack began, the two MPs advanced with the infantry and cleared the area around their posts and returned to duty.¹⁷ SGT Parker was awarded a Silver Star for gallantry in action. This attracted MAJ Jack Young's attention who decided to recruit him and Howard. After that he received a reluctant permission from LTC Becker, the Provost Marshal, to recruit CPLs "Moose" Thompson and Clark from the 2nd MP Company as well.¹⁸

Refugee problems grew steadily worse. More than 97,200 refugees had been collecting in Chang-do and the Division Artillery area. MAJ Young's South Korean police were combined with the 2nd MP Company to clear the sector. A division raider unit (later named the Ivanhoe Security Force) was to be formed to sweep the Chang'ing to Chong road as soon as possible. "Ivanhoe" was the code name for the 2nd Infantry Division.¹⁹ Young commented: "Our main missions were to provide security for the Division Forward Command Post and major supply installations along the Main Supply Route (MSR) and to conduct battlefield surveillance and anti-guerrilla warfare."²⁰

An unusual task force (Headquarters Company, 9th Infantry Regiment, three 72nd Tank Battalion tanks, and B Battery, 2nd AAA Battalion) started patrolling the Yongsan-Chang'ing road the second week of September to eliminate the guerrillas. Simultaneously, the Ivanhoe Security Force conducted Operation SAND FLUSH to clear enemy patrols from behind division lines. Reinforced with two squads of riflemen, six MPs, an 81 mm mortar section, and an M39 armored personnel carrier (APC), the ISF captured a seventeen-man, officer-led patrol reconnoitering the Chang'ing area for an attack.²¹ This operation validated the ISF as an intelligence collecting raider unit.

"Major Jack Young of the Adjutant General Corps carries a burp gun instead of a pencil. He formed his raggle taggle

army, mostly from South Korean policemen, after a full battalion of Korean Reds slipped through the American lines near Changnyong. The Reds had been raiding rear echelon American units. His group subsists on livestock, rice, and vegetables found in the abandoned fields. MAJ Young remarked: 'It is like fighting the Chinese Communists all over again. We have killed thirty Reds and captured twenty so far. Today we killed three and captured seven. We have to keep the supply routes open.'"²²

CPL Joseph Howard, one of the original four American non-commissioned officers (NCOs) with the ISF stated: "Our unit was made up of Korean officers and sergeants who were former Japanese soldiers and Imperial Marines.

They believed in strict discipline and severe punishment. We wore assorted clothing. The Chinese jackets and mittens were very warm. We carried an assortment of American and Russian weapons which we had collected from the dead. We drove captured Russian vehicles and 'appropriated' U.S.

Army Jeeps and trucks. Since our diet was heavy on rice, the Americans suffered from dysentery and jaundice. We laughed at the radio commentary of 'Seoul City Sue' as well as Communist loudspeaker broadcasts. We used their propaganda leaflets for toilet paper."²³

In the Eighth U. S. Army (EUSA) main effort (the Taegu-Kumchon-Taejon axis) on 16 September, 2nd ID was to drive directly west from its position. MAJ Young's ISF was to secure Chang'ing and clear all enemy east of the town.²⁴ Unbeknownst to the indigenous counter guerrilla unit the attack supported the Eighth Army breakout from the Pusan Perimeter after the Inch'on landing by the 1st Marine Division succeeded.²⁵

The 2nd ID, having led the breakout and follow-on northward attack, was given a breather on 10 October just as signs of Chinese involvement began to appear. All units of the Indianhead Division were moved into reserve between Suwon and Yongdong-po. Relocation took four days. Personnel and weapons were inspected,

"...We laughed at the commentary of 'Seoul City Sue' on the radio as well as the Communist loudspeaker broadcasts. We used their propaganda leaflets for toilet paper."

— CPL Joseph C. Howard

shortages identified and filled, and the training emphasis was to integrate the South Korean KATUSAs (Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army) assigned to the regiments. Critiques of small-unit actions were conducted and tactical training reinstituted. For the first time since being alerted for Korea in July 1950, the 2nd Infantry Division could “sit-down” and take stock of itself and its situation. There was much to be done while the EUSA continued the attack. However, the imminent capture of North Korea’s capital produced another mission.²⁶

On 16 October 1950, after the morning staff meeting, MG Keiser met privately with the G-2, LTC Ralph L. Foster, and his deputy, MAJ Young. Far East Command headquarters in Tokyo had ordered Eighth Army to organize an intelligence exploitation task force for P’yongyang “to secure and protect specially selected government buildings and foreign (Russian) compounds, until they could be searched for enemy intelligence materials.” The job was assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division. LTC Foster was to lead Task Force (TF) INDIANHEAD (2nd ID nickname) and leave as soon as possible.²⁷

P’yongyang, the oldest city in Korea, had long been the country’s capital. It was about forty miles northeast of the Yellow Sea. When the war started, the population was approximately 500,000. The Communist capital sat astride the Taedong River, one of the largest in Korea, and which empties into the Yellow Sea. The major part of the city, containing the important government buildings, was on the river’s north side. A large, relatively new industrial suburb sprawled on the south side. The two bridges of the Pusan-Seoul-Mukden Railroad crossed at the industrial area. Two miles upstream from them was the highway bridge. All three bridges had been dropped by Allied bombing. At P’yongyang, the Taedong River was four to five hundred yards in width and the current was very swift, which made it a major obstacle to north-south military movements.²⁸

TF INDIANHEAD elements began assembling on 17 October at Chuoe-Myon where the 2nd Reconnaissance (Recon) Company was bivouacked. A reinforced K Company, 38th Infantry with seven officers was the largest element in seven 2 ½ ton trucks. Five M26 tanks, one M4 Sherman tank, and a halftrack came from the 72nd Tank Battalion. Two M24 tanks and another halftrack came from the 2nd Recon Co. The 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion provided a demolition team (one officer and 14 enlisted men). One doctor was accompanied by two medical aidmen. The 82nd AAA section consisted of one M16 and an M19. The MP Company sent a reinforced squad. CPT Allen Jung headed the Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) agents and

interpreters. ISF completed the motorized element which carried a basic load of ammunition and fuel.²⁹

“I convinced my company commander that I should be assistant driver for CPL Parsons who was slated to drive a 38th Infantry deuce and a half. I really wanted to be part of the Ivanhoe Security Force,” said CPL L. Carl Heesch. “MAJ Young and SGT Parker had warned my patrol about a machinegun nest while we were patrolling near the Nakdong River. When I overheard Major Young say something in Chinese, I responded in kind and explained that I had served in Tsingtao and Shanghai in 1948 and 1949. That was enough to convince me that I ought to get in his ‘irregular outfit.’ When we used a bazooka on that machinegun, he was impressed and I was hooked.”³⁰

Second Lieutenant (2LT) John E. Fox, F Company, 38th Infantry explained: “There were six identically structured, platoon-sized (intelligence exploitation) operational elements. Each had a rifle squad, a light machinegun team, a 57 mm recoilless rifle team, and various specialists. My Team, #6, had two Korean guides from P’yongyang, LT Kang and SGT Kang. I had a medic, a radio operator, Nisei CPL Toshio Hasegawa

as my messenger, two CIC agents, Clavin and another Nisei named Azebu, two engineer demolitions men, a Korean translator, LT Oh and a civilian interpreter, Pak II. One of my West Point classmates (Class of ’50), fellow Texan Harry Dodge, was in charge of another team. The K Company commander, CPT Warden, was the only one that had a map. The

two CIC agents, Clavin and Azebu, jokingly explained that ‘CIC actually stood for ‘Christ, I’m confused.’ They actually ran the operation.”³¹

TF INDIANHEAD left the assembly area in three serials in the late afternoon of 17 October headed north. By 1830 hours, 18 October, two serials were in Sariwon and the other in Sinmak. Bucking traffic, the task force had managed to get ahead of the 5th and 7th Cavalry Regiments until the afternoon of 19 October when

MAJ Young’s Jeep was blocked at Hokkyo-ri by one “fuming mad” MG Hobart R. Gay, the 1st Cavalry Division commanding general, who “shook his swagger stick at me demanding to know who we were. He didn’t care if our orders were signed by MacArthur himself. ‘Nobody was going to get ahead of the 1st Cavalry!’” recorded Young.³² The 1st Cavalry’s aggressive drive north had earned them the honor of being the first UN forces into P’yongyang. But, since there were no bridges or suitable crossing sites on the Taedong River for motorized equipment, MG Gay had to wait for his engineer boats.³³

“Momentarily stunned, we halted long enough to gather our wits and plan our next move. While we were doing




2nd Infantry Division SSI

“... I really wanted to be part of the Ivanhoe Security Force... MAJ Young and SGT Parker had warned my patrol about a machine gun nest while we were patrolling near the Nakdong River...When we used a bazooka on that machine gun, he was impressed and I was hooked.”

— CPL L. Carl Heesch



38th Infantry Regiment DUI



School building where American POWs were held in P'yongyang. The school blackboard contained dates and names of POWs and the rooms had U.S. newspapers and documents abandoned by POWs. (Permission from Mrs. Tanya Sochurek.)

this, the ISF Koreans and Police scouts who had been dispatched to recon the neighborhood reported that they had encountered the ROK 1st Division preparing to cross the Taedong River to enter P'yongyang from the east. In the pouring rain I led Captain Hoe and a squad of ISF down a narrow, muddy trail, stepping around obvious mines, to see COL Paik Sun-yup, the ROK commander. He gave me a warm welcome. Paik, native to P'yongyang, spoke very good Chinese having served in Manchuria for many years. Some of his elements had already crossed the river and had met no resistance. He told me where the crossing sites were and generously offered me ten assault boats to get across the river. I gave CPT Hoe and his squad an SCR 300 radio, instructing him to cross and establish a base for us. I hurried back to bring SGT Parker and CPL Heesch and their two ISF platoons down to cross the river. By the time I had done this, CPT Hoe radioed that he had crossed with elements of the 15th Regiment, 1st ROK Division and they were outside the compound of Kim Il-Sung in the city," recorded MAJ Jack Young.³⁴

The rest of TF INDIANHEAD extricated itself from the 1st Cavalry column to go north. MAJ Young found the crossing sites just before dark. It would be 20 October 1950 before the remainder of INDIANHEAD entered the city from the northeast as the 1st Cavalry came in from the southeast.³⁵ Thus, the ROKs and ISF get credit for being the first UN forces into the capital...the day before the 1st Cavalry.³⁶

"The ROKs had no plans to secure the North Korean capitol grounds which encompassed the palace of Kim Il Sung. SGT Parker split our ISF Koreans into two groups and we headed for the capitol grounds, securing police weapons found in abandoned stations. We moved right into the grounds, collected the civilian employees standing about to put them under guard, and then systematically searched the three main buildings. Inside the buildings it was dead quiet and they were rather ghostly. Parker and I each acquired a North Korean flag. There were two large busts in Kim's office: one of himself and the other of Stalin. On the wall along the stairs there was a 'much bigger than life' portrait of Kim Il Sung," said CPL Heesch.³⁷

Locating the whereabouts of American Prisoners of War (POW) was an additional TF INDIANHEAD mission. "After some questioning the civilian workers revealed that the American POWs had been moved the day before. When we asked about MG Dean, (MG William F. Dean, 24th ID commander, had gone missing in action in July 1950), they knew nothing. A third small building in the rear served as a commissary and was filled with booze, six crates of champagne, and cases of caviar and chocolate. It was in there that SGT Parker found six Browning 12-gauge semi-automatic shotguns," said CPL Carl Heesch. "Then, we started roaming around the city."³⁸

"MAJ Young had told us to look for MG Dean and the American POWs that had been moved north to P'yongyang when the Eighth Army broke out. They were allegedly held in a school in the capital. We did find the school and

"...The only evidence of POWs that remained was a blackboard in one of the class rooms that still had a list of American names in chalk..."

— SGT Emmett V. Parker

a caretaker confirmed that the POWs had been held there, but they had been put on railcars a few days prior going north. The only evidence of POWs that remained was a blackboard in one of the class rooms that still had a list of American names in chalk. We

traced the route supposedly used by the POWs but only found a couple of American GIs and an Air Force pilot who had slipped away during the night movement and an elderly sick American priest who had been abandoned because he could not keep up," said SGT Emmett Parker.³⁹

"That's when we found out that the Korean Police had seven to ten Russians in custody. Parker and I headed for the Russian Embassy with its horseshoe driveway out front. We found a six foot tall, blond, blue-eyed, well-dressed diplomat and his wife and bodyguard among several others in partial Soviet uniforms. We put five of them under guard in Kim's air raid shelter that had a barber chair, music room with an organ, and a large liquor stash. We locked the last two in a wooden water tower behind the buildings," stated CPL Heesch.⁴⁰ "Before we crossed the river MAJ Young told us to grab and hide any Russians that we found. CPT Hoe posted guards and CPL Heesch and I took turns checking the guard posts all night," remembered SGT Parker.⁴¹

"When the rest of TF INDIANHEAD showed up the next morning, we told LTC Foster and MAJ Young about our captive Russians. Foster immediately asked us whom we had told. 'No one' was our reply. All I know is that at 3:00 a.m. the next morning, we loaded them into a fully-canvassed 2 ½ ton and took them to the P'yongyang airfield. When a blacked-out C-47 landed about 4:00 a.m., we put the seven onboard and the plane allegedly flew straight back to Tokyo," recounted Heesch.⁴² Boxes of Russian war bonds, propaganda, North Korean documents, and orders were catalogued and air transported to Tokyo daily.⁴³ The seized paperwork included numerous letters in which Mao Tse-tung promised Kim Il-Sung military aid and support for his invasion of South Korea. Some were dated as early as late 1948.⁴⁴

Life magazine photo-journalist Howard Sochurek reported: "The evidence of Russian advisement and direction is everywhere in P'yongyang. Proof of the fact that Russian troops not only advised at a high level in the North Korean command is the Russian graveyard at Song Sin Lee. Here, 668 numbered graves, many still newly topped with now browned flower and wreath displays, mark the Russian war losses. There is the grave of the Russian adviser to Chief of Staff Kang Keun. Graves topped by miniature concrete obelisks and red stars mark the burial place of six Russian instructor pilots killed by a bomb at P'yongyang airport on 29 June 1950. There are also graves of Russian anti-aircraft crewmen killed while manning Russian-built AAA guns at the airfield."⁴⁵

The arrival of the TF INDIANHEAD vehicles enabled the ISF to expand its search of the city and begin regular patrols. "We checked out the hospitals and collected up weapons while 2nd ID engineers dynamited government and bank vaults. North of the city I discovered an abandoned string of boxcars. That's where I found the South Korean *won* money plates (stolen from Seoul earlier in the war). One of our ISF patrols helping the 6th ROK Division search for the American POWs was 'captured' by the 187th Airborne near Sunch'on. Being mistaken for the enemy was the reason why Major Young never traveled without one of us 'Americans,'" laughed Parker.⁴⁶ Twenty-plus American POWs managed to survive the Sunch'on-Myongucham massacres. After being examined and treated at the 8036th MASH on P'yongyang airfield (K-23), they were flown to Japan before returning home to the United States.⁴⁷

MG Hobart A. Gay established 1st Cavalry headquarters in the granite buildings of the North Korean Military



Life magazine photo journalist Howard Sochurek took this picture of Kim Il-Sung's camouflaged palace with ROK soldiers and truck in front.



Life photographer Howard Sochurek captured this evidence of Soviet propaganda and influence in P'yongyang.



LTC Ralph L. Foster, the TF INDIANHEAD commander, sits at Kim Il-Sung's desk in the Communist leader's palace.



North Korean B-29 Cigarette pack, NKPA armband, and North Korea military shoulder boards found by CPL L. Carl Heesch, ISF, in Kim Il-Sung's palace in P'yongyang.



Academy, ten miles southwest of P'yongyang on the Chinnamp'o road. He was responsible for the internal security and order of P'yongyang after its capture. On 23 October, MG Gay appointed COL Marcel B. Crombez, 5th Cavalry Regiment commander, to be his Civil Affairs officer because of the latter's post-WWII service in Korea. His regiment was disposed in the southern outskirts of P'yongyang. The 8th Cavalry Regiment was in the northern suburbs, and the 7th Cavalry Regiment had been dispatched to Chinnamp'o on 22 October.⁴⁸

"I was sent down to Chinnamp'o with 15 to 20 of our ISF Korean soldiers to determine the feasibility of getting prisoners out of the port. While down there we confiscated three truckloads of milled rice which Major Young sold to the ROKs so we could pay our Koreans. While I was at the port, SGT Parker found a stash of American cars, tires, and parts in P'yongyang. He presented a 1950 Chrysler sedan to MAJ Young to serve as his 'command car.' By then, we had accumulated more Russian vehicles to add to the Jeep and truck that we acquired at Nakdong and a 1930's Model A Ford panel truck ambulance," chuckled Heesch.⁴⁹ "We painted over the Red Cross markings and used it to transport our six female nurses, but it was also used for prisoner interrogations," remembered SGT Parker. Another chance encounter paid big dividends.



COL Marcel B. Crombez, 5th Cavalry Regiment Commander and 1st Cavalry Division Civil Affairs Officer.



Russian "Jeep" captured by ISF vicinity of Nakdong.



ISF Korean drivers paint a captured Russian-made Studebaker military truck.

"We were driving down the road one day when Kim Tae-nae, our linguistics professor interpreter, pointed out that a Korean elder in traditional dress was actually a military officer. His posture was too erect. We turned around quickly. I got out, grabbed him, and put him in the Jeep. But, instead of him being treated like a POW, the intrepid major recognized him from his WWII service with the Nationalist Army in China. It turned out that Colonel Lin, the commander of the 94th *Independent Chinese Volunteer Regiment*, wanted to surrender and agreed to work for Jack Young. Realizing how valuable Lin was, Major Young quietly "accepted his surrender" and hired him as another



Chinnamp'o, some forty miles southwest of the capital, P'yongyang, was the major western port for North Korea.

ISF interpreter. He spoke Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Russian. Mr. Lin later became a platoon leader and then commanded the ISF attack company. It was a strange way to handle a captured enemy officer, but that was typical for Major Young," said SGT Parker, the senior ISF sergeant.⁵⁰

2LT John Fox, 38th Infantry, TF INDIANHEAD explained: "I was overwhelmed by the stacks of propaganda magazines in the post office. They were all in Korean, but many of them were filled with pictures, often in color, depicting scenes and telling stories which were easy to understand. One thing came across loud and clear. The pictures were all chosen to show Communism at its best. Here for the first time, as I paged through the magazines, I began to realize the enormous value and effectiveness of propaganda as a political tool and the extent to which it had been and was being used by the Communist Party of North Korea. As luck would have it, one of the teams found a well-stocked brewery in their sector with more than enough booze to go around. There was no scotch or bourbon, but all six exploitation teams were supplied with all the vodka they could cart away."⁵¹ The Ivanhoe Security Force, slow to discover the brewery,



ISF female interrogator, Lee Sun Duk, was called "Calamity Jane" by the Americans.

found that the hard liquor was long gone.

"The 1st Cav was securing a brewery. MAJ Young persuaded them to share their beer. We carried it off in five-gallon 'Jerry' cans. The NKPA prisoners were initially assembled on an athletic/parade field by Kim's palace, but when the ISF moved to the Military Academy, the 1st Cavalry MPs had a transfer facility down there," said CPL Heesch.⁵² "The Military Academy had a large parade field (fifteen to twenty acres) with a reviewing stand and practical exercise classrooms with sand tables to depict battles and work out tactical problems," remembered 2LT Fox, 38th Infantry, TF INDIANHEAD.⁵³ ISF, 2nd Infantry CIC agents, and 1st Cavalry MPs conducted interrogations of the POWs to collect tactical intelligence.

"One of our female interrogators, Lee Sun Duk, called 'Calamity Jane' by us, spoke Chinese, Korean, and Japanese. She

worked with the 2nd ID CIC agents and the 1st Cav MPs. Asian male prisoners 'lost considerable face' when delivered naked to a female interrogator. Calamity pulled no punches and got results. After interrogation the prisoners were shipped south by train. That was one reason why I was sent down to Chinnamp'o earlier. Almost ten thousand POWs were collected in and around the capital," reported CPL Heesch.⁵⁴

"Calamity also arranged to hire tailors to make all ISF personnel two winter uniforms and greatcoats from Russian cloth found at the academy. The heavy wool overcoats were green with white linings. Worn reversed they provided excellent camouflage in the snow. We even had fur pile caps made," commented Heesch.⁵⁵ MAJ Young and the ISF worked closely with the Civil Affairs personnel of the 1st Cavalry Division and then the UN Civil Assistance team assigned to P'yongyang.

To provide some law and order in the North Korean capital, a UN-supported police force had to be formed, trained, and posted throughout P'yongyang. The UN Civil Assistance team for the Communist capital was led by COL Charles R. Munske. He had to downplay the unification rhetoric of South Korea's President Syngman Rhee

because it was contrary to UN resolutions. "MAJ Young and CPT Goodman, the 2nd MP Company commander (a former WWII POW of the Japanese) trained the first two groups of North Korean police for COL Munske, the official military governor for Pyongdan-Namdo Province. We 'graduated' a hundred and twenty, armed them with Japanese weapons, and had them posted in the city by the time President Rhee got to town," said Heesch.⁵⁶ However, the massive political rallies staged by Rhee in P'yongyang and Wonsan raised major concerns in Washington and New York.⁵⁷

TF INDIANHEAD, facing no opposition, was able to concentrate on collecting and recording the Communist documents found in the city. They did capture the two radio stations which had been rendered inoperable by the North Korean military before they withdrew. On 25 October 1950, having completed all assigned missions, TF INDIANHEAD, minus ISF, returned to division and all elements reverted back to their parent units.⁵⁸ Ivanhoe Security Force remained in the

"...Asian male prisoners 'lost considerable face' when delivered naked to a female interrogator. Calamity pulled no punches and got results...."

— CPL L. Carl Heesch

Communist capital several days longer to train more police for COL Munske and help rebuild one fire truck from three wrecks.⁵⁹ The ISF was in P'yongyang when the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) hit the 1st Cavalry Division.

In three days (1-3 November 1950) the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, near Ansung was effectively destroyed by the Chinese. Very strong, determined CCF regiments launched furious attacks that separated the battalion units. Then, they systematically destroyed the companies piecemeal. Artillery batteries in transit on roads and rifle companies in foxholes found themselves under devastating small arms, machine gun, mortar, and rocket fire.⁶⁰ After the CCF delivered this ferocious warning by fire to the Americans in early November 1950, there was an enigmatic lull in the fighting which furthered doubts about Chinese intervention. It was another three weeks before a multi-front Chinese assault was delivered with maximum force against the U.S. and ROK divisions that resumed the EUSA offensive.⁶¹ The sidebar reveals how powerful the Chinese warning was in early November 1950.

On 4 November a Chinese POW revealed that fifty thousand CCF troops had crossed the Yalu River into Korea. But, to add confusion and foster more disbelief,



MAJ Jack Young (center) questions NKPA POW in P'yongyang.



COL Charles R. Munske, UN Civil Assistance Team commander for P'yongyang, was really the military governor of the Communist capital.



NKPA POWs were initially brought to the ceremonial field below Kim Il-Sung's government office building in P'yongyang.



The Ivanhoe Security Force trained a P'yongyang police force for COL Charles Munske and the UN Civil Assistance Command.

The CCF Warning, November 1950

"The word of B Company's successful expulsion of the first blow, a two hundred man effort, had barely reached battalion headquarters before the Communists attacked in earnest. Rockets fired in succession from multiple mass launchers hammered down in a staccato pattern while mortar concentrations fell on the 1st Battalion positions. Then, enemy hordes appeared almost at arm's length behind their perilously close high trajectory fire. The Reds seemed heedless to their heavy losses. Those attackers that survived their own barrages and the withering fire of the defenders broke into B and C Companies and then charged down a ridge to hit the 3rd Battalion CP in the valley below. As more and more Chinese stormed through the broken defenses, the growing enemy pocket in the 8th Cavalry rear got organized and quickly cut the road to the 5th Regiment. As this was happening, two more Red attacks, equally as strong as those required for the breakthrough, smashed into E and G Companies, 8th Cav and A, B, and C Company of 5th Cav after heavy rocket and mortar barrages. Huge masses of enemy infantry hurled themselves against the American positions. E and G Companies, 8th Cav pulled back to avoid penetration. B and C Companies were surrounded by



8th Cavalry
Regiment DUI




5th Cavalry
Regiment DUI

1st Cavalry
Division SSI

the enemy while A Company had been isolated from the rest of 1st Battalion, 5th Cav. The Chinese turned abandoned 81 mm mortars on the American troops. Receiving fire from all sides, all semblance of a perimeter defense was gone and American dead covered the ground. Those not seriously wounded fought independently. Every position became a separate battlefield. Identification became impossible because the Reds were everywhere and using American weapons. Familiar characteristic gunfire sounds that normally signaled friendly rally points were lost. The noise of battle was deafening as mortar rounds and rockets crashed down in the midst of the close quarters fighting. The screaming of the Chinese in response to bugle calls and whistles added to the din. Organized withdrawal became virtually impossible with the enemy all around."⁶²



Ivanhoe Security Force leadership. Americans in front row L to R: SGT Emmett Parker, CPL Joseph Howard, Korean, MAJ Jack Young (center), CPL L. Carl Heesch, Korean, CPL "Moose" Thompson with Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR).



This CCF movement direction marker scratched into a rock could not be seen from the air.

the Chinese began disengaging all along the line the next day. When the cold weather came in earnest on 10 November, a lot of troops were caught without winter clothing. Though priority of issue went to the front-line troops, there was not nearly enough to go around. Frigid wind chill and frostbite compounded their misery. Thus,

by the time all 2nd Infantry units had reverted back to division control to prepare for the resumption of the EUSA offensive, reports were prevalent that large Chinese forces had already massed above and below the 2nd ID command post.⁶³ The Ivanhoe Security Force had captured several Chinese soldiers and provided many of those reports.



The assembled Ivanhoe Security Force with its American military cadre seated in the front row: 4th from left CPL Joseph Howard, 5th from left SGT Emmett Parker, 7th from left MAJ Jack Young, 9th from left CPL L. Carl Heesch, 12th from left CPL "Moose" Thompson.



Typical assembly area in and around 2nd ID forward command post.



MG Laurence B. Keiser, CG, 2nd Infantry Division.



CPL Carl Heesch, ISF, wearing his reversible Russian greatcoat and holding the "requisitioned" chickens lost to the Communist Chinese later that evening near Kunu-ri.


The Communist Chinese were employing an old mobile defense strategy to counter a superior force. The doctrine was not built around holding key terrain, but in destroying enemy forces with violent, brief actions. The underlying strategy was to invite attack by conducting delaying actions. When the attackers, moving in an offensive formation, had penetrated deep, the CCF would launch a massive counterattack where and when the enemy was least prepared to deal with the assault... normally at night after a long day's march.⁶⁴

Since the Chinese had infiltrated the preponderance of its forces well behind screening units, patrols from EUSA in the east and from X Corps in the west had only encountered outposts after mid-November. A combination of superb fieldcraft and camouflage, non-use of radios, movement after dark, no vehicles, and a lack of supply dumps blinded Far East Command (FECOM), EUSA, and X Corps commanders as to CCF intentions and locations.⁶⁵ Showing little knowledge of Chinese military strategy, UN leaders had assumed that the light contact after early November meant that the CCF intervention was small scale because the

Chinese had voluntarily withdrawn north into static defenses. With unwarranted optimism, both EUSA and X Corps began attacking north towards the Yalu River on 24 November.⁶⁶

This optimism was not held by LTC Ralph Foster, the 2nd ID G-2 and ex-TF INDIANHEAD commander.

The Ivanhoe Security Force had captured and interrogated numerous CCF soldiers in November and his anxiety had grown daily. MG "Dutch" Keiser did not share the fears of his G-2. It was only a matter



After darkness Chinese soldiers boldly stabbed rifle bayonets through the seat slats of the American 2 ½ truck beds as the 2nd Infantry Division ran the seven mile long “gauntlet” of fire ambushes south of Kunu-ri, North Korea, 30 November 1950.
(Illustration by Mariano Santillan)

of time before something terrible happened.⁶⁷

All hell broke loose the night of 25 November. Three CCF regiments slammed into the offensive-oriented 2nd ID infantry regiments. Simultaneously the major Chinese force hit the II ROK Corps on the 2nd Infantry’s right causing withdrawals the next morning that exposed that flank. While the division staff struggled to close gaps, regroup, and pull exposed units back, the attacks continued. After battalion command posts (CPs) were overrun, the 9th Infantry Regiment began pulling back with heavy losses of personnel and equipment.⁶⁸

Radio communications broke down and the extraordinary intensity of the enemy attacks stunned 2nd Infantry commanders from division to platoon who struggled to rouse and organize tired troops to meet a major threat. Along the length of the Ch’ong ch’on River valley, American soldiers in sleeping bags were awakened by a terrifying cacophony of bugles, drums, rattles, and whistles that was quickly followed by a heavy volume of small arms fire and grenades, and then waves of screaming Chinese Communists flooding at them. Again and again, Chinese assault elements smashed through ill-prepared front line perimeters and broke into vehicle parks, rear areas, and CPs after overrunning infantry and artillery gun positions.⁶⁹

CPL Carl Heesch, Ivanhoe Security Force, recalled: “We were positioned on the left forward flank of the 38th Infantry and the right flank of the 9th Infantry. Having just gotten my mail from my old unit, G Company, 38th Infantry, I was trying to figure out where to hide three small chickens that I had ‘requisitioned’ for the next day’s meal. While I was doing that, we were hit very hard by hordes of Chinese—they came fast-stepping down the road like they were passing in review. It seemed like thousands of them. First, we engaged the Chinese columns as they came by. Then, we broke contact to avoid being surrounded. It was a running gunfight until we pulled back to a point about a half mile from the pass at Kunu-ri, which was just

“...we were hit very hard by hordes of Chinese... It seemed like thousands of them... It was a running gunfight until we pulled back to a point about a half mile from the pass at Kunu-ri...”

— CPL L. Carl Heesch

south of the road junction and the Division CP. They must have gotten my chickens,” regretted Heesch.⁷⁰ As IX Corps units pulled back across the partially frozen Ch’ong ch’on River, the CCF again struck hard, causing the three-division ROK II Corps to collapse and fall back in disorder, leaving guns, vehicles, and equipment behind.⁷¹

As the haggard remains of units moved exhausted into their new positions they found the enemy already upon them. The frozen ground prevented digging in even if there had been time, so there was little cover and no concealment. The 2nd Division CP came under small arms fire on the 29th and it displaced for the third time in nineteen hours, six miles south of Kunu-ri. Communications were lost with the regiments. Unbeknownst to EUSA and IX Corps, the CCF had committed eighteen divisions to their offensive.⁷² At 1630 hours, MG Keiser relayed a message to IX Corps for help: “Serious roadblock [*in reality, a series of fire block/ambushes*] to South. Estimate enemy battalion or more [*woefully inaccurate*]. Air strikes, artillery and infantry company attacks have failed. Road jammed with vehicles prevents movement North or South. Request immediate assistance from the South to relieve situation [*not realizing that he was surrounded*]. Please notify action taken as all infantry elements definitely [*decisively would have been more accurate*] engaged.”⁷³ A CCF fireblock consisted of men firing small arms and automatic weapons from dug-in positions on both sides of the road. There were no physical roadblocks on the road itself, but the Chinese were reinforcing the defensive fighting positions by directing highly accurate mortar and heavy machine gun fire on the road separating them.⁷⁴

During the night of 29-30 November an attack on the 2nd ID command post was repulsed by ISF and other division elements.⁷⁵ 1LT Chew-Mon Lee, H Company,



9th Infantry Regiment, succeeded in rallying his unit after his company commander was killed at Kunu-ri. The unit had suffered heavy casualties during several enemy human wave assaults, but they managed to repel all attacks. LT Lee led a successful counterattack against an enemy sniper and he climbed atop a tank to man its .50 cal machinegun and direct tank fire on the enemy to break up another attack. A badly wounded LT Lee was lying on a stretcher beside the road, covered by a padded Chinese jacket when he called out to MAJ Young nearby, "Please, help me. I'm an American." Young recognized the Chinese-American lieutenant and loaded him aboard a vehicle that carried him to safety. LT Lee was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) for extraordinary heroism.⁷⁶

By then the situation was desperate. By noon the haggard remains of the division, minus the 23rd Infantry were fighting near the Division CP or attacking the *fireblocks*. Sniper fire was harassing soldiers in assembly areas when the Division moved out to run the "roadblocks." The 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion and A Battery, 503rd Field Artillery, firing its 155 mm howitzers point blank, covered the withdrawal.⁷⁷

Map shows the seven mile long "gauntlet of *fire ambushes*" on the road going south from Kunu-ri, where the 2nd Recon Company was stopped, where ISF CPL Heesch ran his Jeep into that of BG Joseph S. Bradley, the 2nd ID Artillery commander, and the combat patrol route of the Ivanhoe Security Force to clear the left flank of the convoy; Map depicts the routes of the ISF combat patrols sent forward to clear the *fire blocks* on the left flank of the column and escape routes. The CCF (red) positioned their mortars and heavy machineguns behind the infantry positions on the left side of the road to strengthen the *fireblock* positions on both sides of the road to strengthen the *fireblock* positions on both sides of the road to extend the weapons fire fan coverage.

The lead vehicles had moved less than a mile when heavy enemy fire from both sides of the road halted the column. Men riding in the trucks fired their weapons at the Chinese as they swarmed down from the hills. Burning, disabled trucks halted progress until they were pushed aside by tanks in the column. The CCF fired mortars, machineguns, and small arms to create a seven-mile systematic *fire ambush* or *fireblock*. Airstrikes along the ridges flanking the single lane road in a defile provided some relief for the column.⁷⁸ "The accuracy of the Chinese and North Korean mortars was phenomenal," said CPL Joe Howard, ISF.⁷⁹

Committed, the division had no choice but to press forward. Automatic weapons fire at point blank range tore through the packed trucks. Dead either fell off or got pushed overboard from the trucks. Wounded were held aboard by others. Displaced passengers sought shelter in ditches and then tried to clamber aboard anything moving. Some headed off towards the hills, hoping to evade the enemy and walk to safety. Unit cohesion collapsed. Command and control by division was nonexistent.⁸⁰ The 2nd Infantry Division's senior leadership appeared to be in a daze, paralyzed by the intensity and size of the CCF.





All that remained after those fateful days when the 2nd Infantry Division ran the "gauntlet" of fire blocks at Kunu-ri were those abandoned and destroyed vehicles that the Chinese could not "cannibalize."

Despite having fought the Chinese almost five days, the intelligence picture was pathetic.⁸¹

"Since we had to bolt when the Chinese smashed into the 9th Infantry, our food supplies got left behind. Just before the column got halted, I spotted a house about a half mile away on the right. When we had worked the area before, MAJ Young had us bury some C-rations under the fire hearth. Despite the enemy gunfire all around I made a beeline for the house in my Jeep, parking it nose out. We all ran inside and started digging for those rations. Just when we started to leave, Chinese appeared at the open windows and began firing inside. We grabbed the cases of C-rations and jumped into our Jeep, escaping in a cloud of dust. Miraculously, none of us were hit. Then, I heard someone yelling 'Parker, Parker! Wait! Wait!' I turned to look over my shoulder and saw Mr. Lin running full tilt after us. I slowed down just long enough to pull him aboard, and raced off," related SGT Parker. "It was one of those crazy things you do in war, but we were really hungry."⁸² When the sergeant passed out the rations among the ISF, he was the hero of the moment when things were looking really bad for the 2nd ID.

With his command Jeep disabled, MG Keiser had begun fighting like a rifleman, engaging the enemy with his M1903 Springfield rifle and urging his men forward. The rear of the 2nd ID column, composed of towed artillery pieces and anti-aircraft assets, was particularly hard hit, but the half-track-mounted quad-fifties and twin 40 mms were life savers, keeping the Chinese at bay. Still, they were not enough to break the *fire ambushes*. They had to be counter-attacked to relieve the pressure in the "gauntlet."

"After CPT Kydland was badly wounded, the 2nd Recon Company attempt to clear the flanks of the 'gauntlet' ground to a halt. MG Keiser ordered MAJ Young to attack along the left flank with the Ivanhoe Security Force. The ISF consisted of a half-dozen Americans, about 120 Korean troops, and a few attached Turkish

stragglers. The major organized us into two large combat patrols to clear the left flank south to the pass. SGT Parker, CPL Parsons and I, along with CPT Underwood, were to lead the first group along the higher east side ridge while MAJ Young, SGT 'Moose' Thompson, and CPL Joe Howard trailed behind us in a second group. They were following a lower finger that paralleled the left side of the road. Though we couldn't see each other, we both had clear views of the road from our positions. As I approached the first crest, I dropped down and belly-crawled up. What I saw was enough to ruin one's perfectly new underwear. Stretched out below me were more Chinese than I had seen in eighteen months in Shanghai! Everyone was busy setting up mortars and crew-served weapons or digging in.

They had to know we were near, but they were simply ignoring us. Their weapons were spread as far as we could see," said CPL Carl Heesch.⁸³

"Just as we got ready to engage them, an MP lieutenant down below in the rice paddy, shouted to clear the hill because an air strike was coming in," said CPL Heesch. "As I glanced skyward I saw the planes were already lined up to make their runs. The warning shout also got the attention of some Chinese hiding behind us in some scrub bushes that we had walked right by. Needless to say, we bailed out immediately. Some took off straight down the hill towards a tank providing covering fire. The rest ran back north down another finger. SGT Parker, Parsons and I ran towards the tank at the base of the hill as some Chinese troops, twenty meters away, began moving towards us. The strafing runs and the napalm just made them increase their fire. My rifle got hit and would not work. Parker gave me his .45 pistol because his M1 with sniper scope was still good. By then the sun had gone down behind the hill. We were hiding in some brush. Then, the tank started backing up to get away from the mortar fire. The Chinese were almost on us. It was obvious that we were going to be KIA or POWs if we didn't make a break for that tank. On the count of 'Three,' we all were going to make a run for the tank about 150 meters away. As I jumped up and began running, I noticed that I was so close to a startled Chinese soldier that I could have shook hands with him!" stated CPL Heesch.⁸⁴

"I ran for my life, zig-zagging and high stepping as bullets, buzzing like bees, zipped by my head. As I jumped for cover behind the tank, I noticed that I was alone. I looked around the tank track and saw neither of my comrades in the open. I grabbed the tank intercom and asked if they could see anyone. A crewman said that I was the only one who made it. A thought occurred to me that maybe they had stopped or fallen in the ditch, so I asked the tankers to cover me with fire so I

could go back and check on them. But, the mortar fire had bracketed the tank again and they had to pull back or risk losing the tank and crew. When we reached the bridge I discovered MAJ Young and some of his patrol down in a ditch,” said Heesch.⁸⁵

“I told MAJ Young what happened and told him we had to go back and get our guys. The major said it was impossible. We had to assemble on the right side of the road. After that night’s staff meeting at the Division CP, I learned that we were going to run the ‘gauntlet’ again the next morning,” remembered CPL Heesch.⁸⁶

“The ISF was to join the column behind BG Joseph S. Bradley [the Division Artillery commander]. I was to drive, MAJ Young was in the right passenger seat, and CPL Joe Howard was to ride ‘shotgun’ in the back seat. In the midst of the ear-piercing noise [of enemy small arms & mortar fire nearby], and chokingly thick dust, I reentered the stopped general’s Jeep. It put ours out of action. As I sputtered an apology, the general said, ‘For *!#!*! sake, forget the Jeep. Get it off the road so we can keep moving!’” said Heesch.⁸⁷

“We did just that and then the three of us ran to catch up with BG Bradley, Joe Howard on one side and me on the other. He walked upright and straight with bullets flying all around, as if passing in review. He never flinched, ducked, or broke step except to talk with and encourage the soldiers. Howard and I scrambled to pick up wounded and load them aboard any vehicle we could find. When we caught up to MG Keiser, we continued our task, protecting the generals by firing on Chinese attackers that got too close until MAJ Young and Joe Howard were wounded,” remembered Heesch. “SGT ‘Moose’ Thompson was shot in the neck by a sniper when he ran to pick up a combat photographer’s camera that he had dropped. We loaded the dead Thompson on a truck and kept moving.”⁸⁸

“MAJ Young and CPL Howard finally gave up trying to ride aboard a tank; it was too uncomfortable. The major was ‘butt shot’ and Howard had a leg wound. I dog-trotted and the two of them hobbled along until dusk when we reached the first British tank. The 2nd ID salute given the Brits was a raised middle finger. Our American KIAs were Parsons and Thompson; Parker was MIA,” recounted Heesch.⁸⁹

By the time the 2d Infantry Division fought its way to safety on 1 December, it had lost a third of its troops (five thousand officers and men), sixty-four pieces of artillery, hundreds of trucks and tractors, almost all engineer equipment, and much of its signal equipment. The Indianhead Division was rated “combat ineffective.”⁹⁰ MG Keiser continued to move what remained of his command towards Chunghwa, south of P’yongyang.⁹¹

Thus, the Ivanhoe Security Force, a specially-trained, lightly-armed *ad hoc* indigenous long-range patrol and counter guerrilla unit created to combat enemy infiltrations, keep supply routes open, collect intelligence, and to protect the division CP, like the GHQ Raider and the Ranger companies in Korea, was employed as conventional

light infantry in desperation. Unfortunately for this predominantly Korean element, these “friendly indigenous” were often mistaken for enemy by U.S. ground and allied air forces. While the fighting in the Kunu-ri area devastated the 2nd Infantry Division, rendering it combat ineffective, the combat-depleted ISF would be expanded and employed as an independent light infantry battalion that specialized in counter guerrilla missions. It was the effective employment of the ISF South Koreans against the North Korean and Chinese Communist Forces that made them invaluable to 2nd Infantry Division in the Korean War.

EPILOGUE-IVANHOE SECURITY FORCE

By the end of January 1951, the Ivanhoe Security Force had been reconstituted. There were twenty-five Americans assigned to lead eight hundred KATUSAs and one hundred Korean Service Corps troops. The Force was organized into a Combat Company, a Security Company, and a Headquarters and Service Company. Radios were manned twenty-four hours a day. The unit was wired into the Korean Police telephone network. ISF became a tactical intelligence unit for 2nd ID, tracking road and bridge conditions, capturing enemy prisoners, conducting prisoner and refugee interrogations, and supporting “line crosser” operations until the end of the war.⁹² On 16 May 1951 as part of Task Force ZEBRA, the 35th ROK Regiment at Oron-ni and the ISF in a nearby blocking position on Hill 625 were both overrun. The 23rd Infantry Regiment assumed the TF ZEBRA mission and control of the Ivanhoe Security Force.⁹³ When ISF was reconstituted again, Lieutenant William H. Cole and several sergeants from 1st Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne) spent a week in July 1951 training them in the care and handling of Soviet, Chinese, and Japanese weapons.⁹⁴

EPILOGUE II- SGT EMMETT V. PARKER, ISF, MIA

SGT Emmett V. Parker was taken prisoner at daybreak 30 November. Wounded and unconscious, Parker had lain on the battlefield overnight. He was jolted awake by excruciating pain in his left hand as a Chinese soldier tried to cut a finger off with a bayonet in order to free his gold wedding band. Parker’s scream caused the enemy soldier to jump back, giving him just enough time to pull the ring free and hold it out for his life. As he sat up the American sergeant noticed CPL Parsons lying dead nearby and realized that his own rifle, web belt and ammunition, and dog tags were gone.⁹⁵

Mrs. Edi Guliana Pressello Parker, Route #3, O’Donnell, Texas, was notified on 3 and 9 January 1951 that her husband, Sergeant Emmett V. Parker, missing in action on 29 November 1950, was actually killed in action on that date. By then, SGT Parker and a Turk were prisoners of war; first of the North Koreans, and then the Communist Chinese. He joined sixteen other American and British sergeants, branded as “Reactionaries,” to be isolated totally apart from all other UN POWs at Camp 2. The “Reactionaries” would be held until Allied

negotiators, having learned that some POWs had been separated from the others, demanded their immediate release. On 2 September 1953, seventeen “Reactionary” survivors were turned over to UN officials. They became the final helicopter lift of Operation BIG SWITCH.⁹⁶

It would be almost twenty years later that two soldiers, then first sergeants supervising police call at the Presidio of Monterey, California, would bump into one another again. First Sergeant (1SG) Carl Heesch could not believe his eyes as he recognized that 1SG Emmett Parker, Ivanhoe Security Force, MIA 29 November 1950, presumed dead, was actually alive...and like himself, still in the Army! ♣

Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and the Lodge Act.

Endnotes

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- 20 Young, “History of ISF.”
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- 23 Howard survey. CPL Joseph Howard was awarded the Silver Star and Purple Heart for his valorous actions at Kunu-ri. The badly wounded corporal spent 41 months in military hospitals.
- 24 Munroe, *Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951* and “The 2nd Infantry Division during the Korean War: Terrain Sketch – Naktong River,” <http://www.2id.org/naktongriver.htm> dated 16 March 2010.
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- 32 Young, “History of ISF” and EUSAK, Office of the Commanding General letter 17 October 1950, SUBJECT: Special Task Force, TO: All Commanders of Eighth Army and Republic of Korea Troops, BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALKER and signed by MG Levin C. Allen, Chief of Staff.
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- 37 Heesch interviews, 15 December 2005 and 17 April 2006, Parker interview, 30 January 2006 and Fox memoirs.
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- 40 Heesch interview, 15 December 2005, Parker interview, 30 January 2006, Parker letter, 31 July 2005, and Young, “History of ISF.”
- 41 Parker interview, 30 January 2006.

- 42 Heesch interview, 15 December 2005.
- 43 Heesch interview, 15 December 2005 and Parker interview, 30 January 2006.
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- 45 Unpublished Howard Sochurek dispatch to Don Burke, *Life* magazine, from Tokyo, 2 November 1950, courtesy of Mrs. Tanya Sochurek, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Sochurek dispatch with date.
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- 47 Briscoe, "The Sunch'on/Myongucham Massacre" sidebar in "The UN Occupation of P'yongyang," *Veritas*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 30-31. **The POWs had been housed in a P'yongyang school for about a week when they saw flares at night over the city. They knew that meant the UN forces were close by. The North Koreans quickly herded the prisoners out of the school house. At least a third of the prisoners were killed outright—the invalids. The rest were marched to a train and loaded aboard. They traveled only at night, hiding from UN aircraft in tunnels during the day. On the morning of 20 October, the steam engine was stoked to the maximum in the tunnel in an effort to asphyxiate the prisoners with smoke. When that effort proved too slow, the guards began taking groups of forty off the train to execute them with their machine guns. Lloyd Kreider, "Into the Tunnel," in Rudy Tomedi, *No Bugles, No Drums: An Oral History of the Korean War* (NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1993), 57-59.**
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- 50 Parker interviews, 30 January 2006 and 22 March 2010 and Heesch interview, 17 April 2006.
- 51 Fox memoirs.
- 52 Heesch interview, 15 December 2005. **When the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (Rakasans) was ordered to P'yongyang on 23 October 1950 they had accumulated more than thirty-eight hundred prisoners of war. Hoyt, *On to the Yalu*, 242-243.**
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- 56 Heesch interview, 15 December 2005.
- 57 Briscoe, "The UN Occupation of P'yongyang," 21 and Heesch interview, 15 December 2005.
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- 62 *The First Team: The First Cavalry Division in Korea, 18 July 1950 – 18 January 1952*.
- 63 Munroe, *Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951* and "2nd Infantry Division during the Korean War: Busy Interlude," <http://www.2id.org/interlude.htm> dated 16 March 2010.
- 64 Mossman, *Ebb and Flow*, 59-60.
- 65 Hastings, *The Korean War*, 137.
- 66 Mossman, *Ebb and Flow*, 59-60.
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- 68 Munroe, *Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951* and "2nd Infantry Division during the Korean War: Busy Interlude," <http://www.2id.org/interlude.htm> dated 16 March 2010.
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- 72 Hastings, *The Korean War*, 141-142.
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- 75 Russell A. Gugeler, "Artillery at Kunu-ri," in *Combat Actions in Korea* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1987): 49.
- 76 Young, Munroe, *Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951*, and "2nd Infantry Division during the Korean War: Busy Interlude," <http://www.2id.org/interlude.htm> dated 16 March 2010.
- 77 Munroe, *Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951* and "2nd Infantry Division during the Korean War: Busy Interlude," <http://www.2id.org/interlude.htm> dated 16 March 2010.
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- 84 Parker interview, 22 March 2010 and Heesch, "The Ivanhoe Security Force," 13.
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Korean CPT Hoe, ISF, briefs attack platoon leaders before a patrol.

IN THEATER

A GIANT ENTERS THE BATTLE: ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE UN AND CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES IN KOREA, NOVEMBER 1950

by Troy J. Sacquety

After Inch'on and the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) breakout from the Pusan Perimeter, the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) reeled back in shambles, their supply lines cut. On paper, the NKPA had a total of eight corps, thirty divisions, and several brigades, but in reality most were combat ineffective.¹ Many North Korean units had fled north of the Yalu into Manchuria in order to refit and replenish their numbers. Only the IV Corps with one division and two brigades opposed the South Korean I Corps in northeastern Korea, and four cut-off divisions of II Corps and stragglers resorted to guerrilla operations near the 38th Parallel.

With the war appearing won, only the Chinese and Soviet response to the potential Korean unification under a democratic flag worried U.S. policymakers. Communist China was the major concern. Having just defeated the Nationalist Chinese and reunified the mainland, the seasoned Red Army was five million strong. In fact, some of the best soldiers in the Chinese Communist Army were among those "volunteers" who intervened early in the Korean War.² When the stream of Chinese "volunteers" became a flood, Allied optimism for a quick end of the war vanished despite much improved capabilities since July 1950.

FOUR MONTHS INTO WAR: THE ALLIED ORDER OF BATTLE: NOVEMBER 1950

Surprised by the North Korean attack on 25 July 1950, the Allies lost no time in building a larger and more capable force to counter the Communist aggression. By 23 November 1950, the Allies had massed 553,000 troops (the majority of whom were American and South Korean); counting 55,000 air force and 75,000 naval personnel.³ UN members also contributed forces.

On 7 July 1950, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 84, condemning North Korean aggression. Resolution 84 authorized member states to furnish military forces under a U.S.-led UN Command to help restore the balance. Fortunately for the United States, the Soviet Union, a permanent Security Council member with veto power, boycotted the UN because the Republic of China and not the (Communist) People's Republic of China, held a permanent seat on the Council.



South Korea provided soldiers, called "KATUSAs" to serve in U.S. divisions alongside American soldiers. This soldier, nicknamed "Joe" served in the 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division.

Ground forces came from the United Kingdom (11,186), Turkey (5,051), the Philippines (1,349), Thailand (1,181), Australia (1,002), The Netherlands (636), and India (326). Sweden furnished a civilian medical contingent (168). France contributed an eleven hundred-man battalion that arrived at the end of November. Air forces from the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and South Africa, quickly responded as did naval forces from the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, The Netherlands, Colombia, and Thailand.⁴

From the four divisions committed by August 1950, Washington's response grew exponentially. All services rushed units into theater to participate in General (GEN) Douglas A. MacArthur's offensive to free the south from Communist domination. To increase the combat power of the weakened U.S. infantry divisions, South Korea provided as many as 8,300 KATUSAs (Korean Augmentation to the United States Army) to most American divisions.


The Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA), led by Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, and the X Corps, commanded by Major General Edward M. Almond, were the two major U.S. ground combat commands in Korea in late 1950. EUSA had two Corps (I and IX), four divisions (1st Cavalry, and the 2nd, 24th, and 25th Infantry divisions), the separate 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, and an EUSA Ranger company (see Eugene Piasecki's *Eighth Army Rangers: First In Korea*). Most of the Republic

Organization of UNC Ground Forces in Korea

23 November 1950

XXXXX

UNC



Engineer	E	Corps	XXX
Airborne Infantry	AI	Division	XX
Cavalry	C	Brigade	X
Medical Corps	M	Regiment	III
Infantry	I	Battalion	II
Operational Control	- - -	Company	I
		Platoon	ooo
		Section	oo



In the first months of desperation, many WWII veterans were recalled back to duty to serve in Korea. The author's grandfather, MSG Chester R. Wilson (left), had served in WWII with the 399th Infantry Regiment, 100th Division before being recalled for service from 1950 to 1951 with the 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division.

of Korea Army (ROKA) served under EUSA control; two corps (II and III) with eight divisions (1st, 2nd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 11th). Several UN contingents also bolstered EUSA, including the 1st Turkish Armed Forces Command, the 27th British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade (with Australian and Indian troops attached), the 29th British Independent Brigade Group, the Thai 21st Regimental Combat Team, and the battalion-sized Netherlands Detachment, and the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team.⁵

Meanwhile, X Corps, which made the amphibious assault at Inch'on on 15 September 1950, was controlled by the Far East Command (FECOM). X Corps had two U.S. Army infantry divisions (3rd and 7th) and the 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv), recently brought up to strength with reservists and 2nd Division Marines. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was absorbed by the



X Corps SSI



I Corps SSI



IX Corps SSI



187th Regimental
Combat Team SSI



1st Marine
Division SSI



3rd Infantry
Division SSI



7th Infantry
Division SSI

1st MarDiv. The South Korean I Corps (3rd and Capital divisions), and the regimental-sized 1st Korean Marine Corps completed Seoul's contribution. The British 41st Independent Commando, Royal Marines, U. S. 2nd Special Engineer Brigade and the GHQ Raiders filled out X Corps. (see Dr. Charles H. Briscoe's *Born of Desperation: Early Special Operations in the Korean War*) The U.S. units now had heavier support weapons.

Chief among them were heavier tanks and artillery support. Each infantry division had nearly eighty assigned tanks, either M4A3 Shermans, M26 Pershings, or M46 Pattons, or a combination thereof.⁶ All were heavier than the M24 Chaffees the U.S. had when it entered the war. The U.S. divisions had heavier artillery support with the addition of 155 mm and 105 mm howitzers, and infantry regiments used 57 mm and 75 mm recoilless rifles and 4.2 inch, 81 mm, and 60 mm mortars. Because UN forces had air superiority, crew-served anti-aircraft weapons were used against enemy personnel.

The UN allies dominated in airpower. By late June Lieutenant General (LtGen) George E. Stratemeyer, commander of Far East Air Force (FEAF), requested these reinforcements: 164 F-80Cs; 21 F-82s; 22 B-26s; 23 B-29s; 21 C-54s; 64 F-51s; and 15 C-47s.¹⁰ Although insufficient numbers existed in the Air Force inventory, Stratemeyer wanted to "fill up" squadrons under his control with a ten-percent attrition reserve. The main fighter first used in FEAF was the F-80C Shooting Star. Because more WWII-era F-51 Mustangs were available than the F-80Cs, Stratemeyer converted six squadrons back to F-51s.¹¹ Although slower, the F-51 had longer range, a larger bomb load, and could operate from rough and unimproved Korean airstrips. The next jets to arrive were F-84E Thunderjet and F-86 Sabrijets. Strategic bombing duties were done by B-29 Superfortresses while B-26 Invaders carried the operational load. Cargo was transported by C-54, C-119, C-47, and C-46 aircraft. By August, FEAF was averaging 238 close-air support sorties a day.¹²

The U.S. had developed better medical care of its wounded than it did in WWII. Helicopters became the primary method for the evacuations of critically-wounded soldiers quickly from the battlefield, allowing better and more advanced treatment facilities. For immediate and advanced care, the most seriously wounded were brought to a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH). Each of



Allied units soon had more firepower, even at the lowest levels. Here, American troops prepare to fire a 75 mm recoilless rifle.




The M26 Patton heavy tank (above) and other models soon arrived in Korea. They supplemented the M24 Chaffee light tank, which had been no match for North Korean T-34s.

the four MASHs in Korea had the capacity of 150 beds and were located just close enough to the front to be out of artillery range. By war's end, only 2.5 percent of all soldiers who reached a care facility died, compared to 4.5 percent in WWII.¹³ Helicopters overcame the poor road and rail infrastructure of Korea.

Unfortunately for the UN forces, the poorly developed and war-damaged transportation network greatly hampered the movement of supplies. The Korean rail system had been heavily damaged by allied air attacks early in the war. Trucks had to carry the logistical burden and poor roads and constant use reduced the fleet.¹⁴ It was aerial resupply that enabled UN forces to maintain their pursuit of the retreating NKPA.

The U.S. Navy committed a huge force early in the Korean War. Among the nearly two hundred ships that participated in the Wonsan landings were aircraft carriers, such as this one. They carried a range of aircraft, including jets like the F9F Panther.



Disposition of FEAF Units 1 Nov 1950

K-2
49 FTR BMR GR
7 FB SQ
8 FB SQ
9 FB SQ
543 TAC SUPPORT GP
8 TAC RCN SQ (PJ)
162 TAC RCN SQ (MP)

K-3
35 FTR INTCP GP
39 FI SQ
40 FI SQ
77 RAAF SQ

K-9
18 FTR BMR GP
12 FB SQ
67 FB SQ


K-14
8 FTR BMR GP
35 FB SQ
36 FB SQ
51 FTR INTCP GP
16 FI SQ
25 FI SQ
80 FB SQ

K-16
FLT F 3 RESCUE SQ
(MINUS 1 FLT)

K-24
ROK AF UNIT
6147 TAC AIR CONTROL SQ
FLT F 3 RESCUE SQ (1 FLT)

BRADY
437 TROOP CARRIER GP (ADV)

ITAZUKE
452 BOMB GP
729 B SQ
730 B SQ
21 TROOP CARRIER SQ
68 FTR (AW) SQ



ASHIYA
314 TROOP CARRIER GP
37 TC SQ
50 TC SQ
61 TC SQ
62 TC SQ
347 TROOP CARRIER GP
6 TC SQ
22 TC SQ
FLT D 3 RESCUE SQ

IWAKUNI
3 BOMB GP
8 B SQ
13 B SQ
731 BOMB SQ

ITAMI
ELEMENTS 1 MARINE AIR WG

KOMAKI
45 TAC RCN SQ

TACHIKAWA
1 TROOP CARRIER GP (PROV)
47 TC SQ (PROV)
48 TC SQ (PROV)
US NAVY PATROL SQ 6

YOKOTA
98 BOMB GP
343 B SQ
344 B SQ
345 B SQ
DET A 84 BOMB SQ

JOHNSON
41 FTR INTCP SQ (MINUS 1 FLT)
339 FTR (AW) SQ (MINUS 1 FLT)
31 STRAT RCN SQ
6204 PM FLT
2 SAAF SQ (ADV)
FLT A 3 RESCUE SQ

MISAWA
41 FTR INTCP SQ (1 FLT)
339 FTR (AW) SQ (1 FLT)
512 RCN SQ
FLTS B C 3 RESCUE SQ



The use of helicopters, such as this Sikorsky H-6, allowed immediate air evacuation of casualties.



The introduction of Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH) saved countless lives. They allowed critically-wounded soldiers to receive near-immediate care.

THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ENTER THE FRAY

Immense in numbers, the five-million man Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) were primarily a light infantry force composed of ten thousand-man divisions, lacking artillery, tank, or air assets. They relied heavily on mortars for fire support. Their primary offensive tactic was to get close enough to Allied units to overwhelm them with sheer numbers. Possessing a limited logistical capability, the Chinese Army relied on primitive—but effective technology. They used simple communications like bugles, whistles, and flutes. Normally, three divisions comprised an Army [the approximate size of a U.S. Corps]. Up to six Armies would be controlled by an Army Group. Three Army Groups made up a Field Army, the highest organizational level.¹⁵

As the UN forces approached the Yalu River in late 1950, Beijing's response was to intervene militarily. Named the "People's Volunteer Army" to avoid overt conflict with the United States and United Nations forces, troops infiltrated in large numbers to surprise the allies. Maintaining strict operational security and avoiding aerial detection and attack, they hid by day and marched only at night. They also employed deception by referring to Armies as "units" and divisions as "battalions," thereby disguising the size of elements.¹⁶ In the first contact on 25 October, ROKA soldiers captured some Chinese soldiers.¹⁷ Despite facing real evidence, FECOM refused to acknowledge that large, organized CCF units were in Korea, and consistently downsized enemy troop



Allied airpower destroyed North Korean infrastructure such as bridges. Unfortunately, this hampered the movement of supplies north, and slowed the speed of the allied offensive.



Because the bridges and railroads were destroyed and truck transportation was inadequate, supplies piled up in ports.



The large-scale intervention of Chinese Communist Forces, such as this one guarded by a soldier of the 3rd Ranger Company, surprised American combat commanders.

numbers. When the Chinese struck in force on multiple fronts on 26 November, U.S. Army commanders could no longer deny that the war had not only taken a new turn, but as GEN MacArthur noted on 28 November, “we face an entirely new war.”¹⁸

As with the North Koreans, it is difficult to establish with any precision the exact numbers of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) that intervened in November 1950. At the time, U.S. intelligence estimates placed the number of CCF at sixty to seventy thousand, a woeful underestimate.¹⁹ The official U.S. Army history, using intelligence estimates from later in the war, placed thirty CCF divisions [300,000 troops] in North Korea by the third week of November 1950.²⁰ Eighteen divisions in the XVII Army Group opposed the Eighth U.S. Army, and twelve Chinese divisions of the IX Army Group attacked X Corps. Still, these figures may be quite low. From November 1950 forward, the CCF carried the Communist effort until the Armistice. ▲

Troy J. Sacquety earned an MA from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln and his PhD in Military History from Texas A&M University. Prior to joining the USASOC History Office staff he worked several years for the Central Intelligence Agency. Current research interests include Army and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) special operations during World War II, and Special Operations units in Vietnam.

Endnotes

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- 3 Mossman, *Ebb and Flow*, 23.
- 4 Mossman, *Ebb and Flow*, 24.
- 5 Mossman, *Ebb and Flow*, 26.
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- 10 Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950–1953* (Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 68. Found online at http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/fulltext/usaf_in_korea.pdf, accessed 29 March 2010. **The F-82 was soon withdrawn from Korea due to a lack of airframes and spare parts.**
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CIVIL AFFAIRS

"DO WHAT YOU CAN!": UN CIVIL ASSISTANCE, CHINNAMP'Ō, NORTH KOREA, NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1950

by Charles H. Briscoe

Initial efforts by Republic of Korea (ROK) military forces and General Douglas A. MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP) and the Commander in Chief, Far East Command (FECOM) to halt the North Korean invasion on 25 June 1950 proved unsuccessful. Poorly-led ROK ground forces with their American advisors were easily routed. MacArthur committed minimally trained and woefully under-strength elements (three regiment divisions of two battalion regiments) piecemeal to bolster ROK units, hoping to stem the advance, trading space for time. When Lieutenant General (LTG) Walton H. Walker, the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) commander, chose to form a defensive bastion around the southeastern port of Pusan, General MacArthur directed special operations behind enemy lines to reduce pressure on depleted ROK and American forces withdrawing towards that sanctuary (see C.H. Briscoe, "Born of Desperation: Early Special Operations in the Korean War").¹

After fighting desperately to hold its lines along the Pusan Perimeter, the Eighth Army broke out immediately following General MacArthur's daring X Corps amphibious landing at Inch'on in mid-September 1950. That offensive maneuver severed the major enemy supply lines, enveloped several North Korean divisions, and opened the way for the liberation of Seoul. ROK elements pushed north across the 38th Parallel before U.S. President Harry S. Truman approved the destruction of North Korean military forces with one caveat: as long as no Chinese or Soviet forces had entered, or threatened to enter the divided country. The limit of advance would be the borders and only ROK soldiers were to operate along them. Once the South Korean capital was secured, rapid advances to reach the Yalu River border along west and east coasts were planned. The race for North Korea was on, but the EUSA would get the "plum," P'yongyang, the capital city. Ancillary to the advances was UN occupation and control of the enemy cities (see C.H. Briscoe, "The UN Occupation of P'yongyang").²

The Eighth Army staff scrambled to identify experienced U.S. Army civil military government and trained civil affairs officers to perform "civil assistance" missions. The United Nations did not like what those military skills represented, namely post-war Allied occupation governments that still existed in Europe and Japan. While the UN Civil Assistance (CA was the acronym used by the UN during the Korean War) Team for P'yongyang had specific government requirements as its primary

mission, that was not the case for the CA Team sent to Chinnamp'ŏ, the principal port for the Communist capital. They were to organize the local governments and manage the population to support U.S. Army port operations and to keep any refugees from interfering with the EUSA logistics effort that was key to continuing the drive to the Yalu River. That CA team enabled the logisticians to totally focus on resupply and evacuation of the wounded by sea. The purpose of this article is to explain this U.S. Army-unique civil assistance mission by describing the team organization and duties and what it accomplished in a very short time. These CA personnel in Chinnamp'ŏ had to be just as flexible and capable in Korea in 1950 as are Civil Affairs today throughout the world.


Civil military units were needed to restore law and order and rebuild vital infrastructure in occupied cities, to control refugees, and prevent epidemic outbreaks which could hinder Allied operations. General MacArthur, conducting an economy of force action, allocated his limited maritime assets to reload the X Corps for a second amphibious operation at Wonsan to launch the UN drive north in the east. That meant that Inch'on would become the port by which the EUSA, pushing north in the west would receive resupplies. That caused LTG Walker to limit his advance just beyond the Communist capital. Hence, opening the port of Chinnamp'ŏ thirty air miles to the south on the Taedong River, was essential to continue the drive to the Yalu River. Civil Assistance was needed



1st Cavalry
Division SSI



3rd Logistical
Command SSI



The sea lanes leading to the North Korean port of Chinnamp'o, 35 miles south of the capital, P'yongyang, had to be cleared to expand logistical support to sustain the UN northern offensive to the Yalu River.

to allow logisticians to focus on their monumental tasks. Infantry Captain (CPT) Loren E. Davis, Headquarters & Headquarters Company (HHC) commander for 3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division was enroute to the Yalu River when he was unceremoniously reassigned to EUSA headquarters in Seoul.³

"There were no orders, only an Eighth Army radio message. CPT Craxton, a World War II tanker who served in Military Government in Germany afterwards, and I, after being accused by the battalion commander, LTC Brachton, of having 'friends' at division, were instructed to report to Eighth Army headquarters in Seoul. We collected our personal gear and 'hitchhiked' rides to the capital," said LTC Loren Davis.⁴ Finding his own way was a portent of how he would get things done in Civil Assistance.

Davis, a 71st Infantry Division veteran wounded 4 May 1945 in Germany, was discharged after the war. Accepting a Regular Army commission in 1946 led to a three-year overseas assignment with a military government unit on Okinawa as a Chief of Police and Provost Judge (somewhat like a Justice of the Peace). With the EUSA occupying




COL Charles R. Munske, Chief, UN Civil Assistance Team, P'yongan-Namdo Province, North Korea, October-November 1950.

parts of North Korea in September 1950, soldiers with civil military government experience were needed. A personnel records screen for this qualification found him. When CPT Davis reported to the Military Government section of G-3, Eighth Army, Brigadier General (BG) William E. Crist, the recently designated Military Governor of North Korea, instructed him to form a Civil Assistance sub-team for Chinnamp'o. The element would be subordinate to Artillery Colonel (COL) Charles R. Munske, the Pyongan-Namdo Province CA team leader in P'yongyang. Munske was a WWI and WWII veteran with extensive civil military government experience in the Philippines and was the

Military Governor of Kyushu in post-war Japan.⁵ Davis' team was hastily pulled together.

Coast Artillery Major (MAJ) Oswaldo Izquierdo from the Puerto Rican Army National Guard would be the nominal commander. But, General Crist was simply ridding himself of a problem officer.⁶ BG Crawford F. Sams, the director of the U.N. Public Health and Welfare Detachment, explained common refugee medical problems and assigned CPT Francis H. Coakley, a public health physician, and Canadian Red Cross epidemiologist, Reginald Bowers, to the Chinnamp'o sub-team. CPT Davis was to recruit another officer, three enlisted men, and interpreters as well as collect the equipment needed for a sustained effort.⁷

"The port was vital to resupplying Eighth Army. We were to appoint a mayor, police chief, and other city government positions and insure that law and order were restored. All North Korean refugees were to be controlled and prevented from clogging up roads used by the advancing UN forces. Medical evacuees from the front were to be prepared for shipment elsewhere. We were to handle any civilian problems in the city so that the



The high west coast tides and shallow channels made clearance of the sea approaches to Chinnamp'o dangerous and very challenging.

logisticians could concentrate on running port activities," remembered Loren Davis. "Stated simply it was: 'Go to Chinnamp'o and see what you can do.'"⁸ While Davis recruited, organized, and equipped the CA sub-team for its mission, the 1st Cavalry Division with the 24th Infantry Division on its left flank was leading the I Corps charge towards the North Korean capital city.⁹ Capturing the port of Chinnamp'o was initially a secondary mission.

After securing P'yongyang, the 1st Cavalry commander, MG Hobart R. Gay, had the 7th Cavalry Regiment force march the thirty-five miles southwest to Chinnamp'o to secure the port city in the dead of night, 22 October.¹⁰ As they approached, the North Korean military, after mining the channel approaches, withdrew. But, it was the damage to the lines of communications between Seoul and P'yongyang by the American Air Force that slowed the EUSA offensive to a crawl beyond the capital.

UN airpower had seriously damaged or destroyed all bridges and rail track from Seoul to the coast and north to P'yongyang as well as the harbor facilities at Inch'on. To further complicate the EUSA logistics problem, the long (seventy miles), narrow channel to Chinnamp'o was mined. In the Communist capital there were no usable rail bridges across the Taedong River that divided the city. Hence, all military supplies had to be trucked from Pusan and Inch'on to the south side of the river, loaded aboard ferries, and carried across to the north side. Then, the supplies were transferred to railcars to go further north.¹¹

EUSA supplies were handled by the 2nd Logistical Command (BG Crump Garvin). The subordinate 3rd Logistical Command (BG George C. Stewart) provided port, depot, and transportation units in the Inch'on-Seoul and Chinnamp'o-P'yongyang areas.¹² Additionally, the

two logistical commands operated POW camps in Pusan, Inch'on, and P'yongyang holding 130,921 captives.¹³ It was no wonder that a CA sub-team was needed to work alongside the port unit at Chinnamp'o.

While EUSA pushed towards P'yongyang, CPT Loren Davis was recruiting at the various Army replacement depots in Seoul. First Lieutenant (1LT) George A. Brown, a WWII infantry veteran of the 32nd Infantry Division in the Philippines, had recently arrived from the Far East Command (FECOM) GHQ (General Headquarters) in Tokyo and was slated for assignment to the 25th Infantry Division. Davis convinced LT Brown to accept the Police Advisor position on the CA sub-team and the two started looking for enlisted men.¹⁴


After civil military government in postwar occupied Okinawa, CPT Davis wanted experienced infantrymen on this wartime effort. "Two wounded corporals returning from the hospital fit the bill. Infantry Corporal (CPL) F.R. Wade, North Carolina, who exuded a positive 'can do, will do' attitude had two Purple Hearts and his buddy, a somewhat slovenly CPL Shawver, a thirty-year-old farmer from Kansas, wounded three times, was headed back to the front having almost recovered from his wounds. They had earned a better assignment and were more than ready to join the team," recalled Davis. "The two of them recruited SGT Nick to be the mess sergeant. Nick epitomized Sergeant Rizzo from the old TV series, 'MASH'."¹⁵

However, as it turned out the two most valuable recruits came looking for CPT Davis and LT Brown. "Kim Sam Yul, a married, out-of-work college professor, spoke academic English very slowly and precisely. As a boy he had been schooled by American missionaries. 'Samuel Kim' was also fluent in Japanese, Mandarin

Breaking the EUSA Logistics Logjam: Chinnamp'o Mine Clearing & Rail Repairs




Above: US Navy LCD reels in a Soviet mine for destruction. Right: Map of the North Korean port of Chinnamp'o.



The Minesweeper CMS *Mocking Bird* explodes a mine in Chinnamp'o harbor, November 1950.

Martin PBM-5 Mariners destroyed mines in the Chinnamp'o approach channels.

Chinnamp'o, ten miles upstream from the tidal Taedong River, on the north side of its estuary, was more than thirty miles by rail and highway southwest of P'yongyang. The entire Yellow Sea approach into the Taedong River estuary (thirty miles) had to be swept for mines first. Then the thirty miles of channels had to be cleared to the Chinnamp'o docks. The U.S. Navy minesweeper force, clearing Wonsan harbor on the east coast for X Corps, had lost two vessels while trying to speed up the effort. Thus, it was 29 October before the first vessels arrived to start the seventy mile sweep to Chinnamp'o. With helicopters to assist, the Navy learned the minefield pattern by 2 November. Some 217 moored and 25 free floating magnetic mines were laid in 5 lines across the main channel north of Sok To Island and one line south of it. Large jellyfish, more than four feet in diameter, drifting a few feet below the surface, confused search efforts because they triggered false visual alarms.²⁴ After several days of sweeping against twelve knot currents the North Korean harbor pilot who had helped the Russians lay the mines was located. He led the first ships into Chinnamp'o aboard a "U.S. Navy-rented" North Korean tugboat while the Navy navigator aboard plotted the route.²⁵ On 3 November a small South Korean vessel safely navigated the cleared channel.



The PBM-5 Mariner nicknamed "Hotogo," Fleet Air Wing Six, is hoisted aboard the seaplane tender, USS *Curtiss* (AV-4), following the destruction of nineteen mines off Chinnamp'o, 8 November 1950.



Some tugs and barges made it up the Taedong channel in the following days. When a Japanese-crewed Landing Ship, Tank (LST) reached Chinnamp'o on 10 November, the western approach and southern channel were considered cleared. In contrast to the Wonsan clearing operation, there were no lives or ships lost clearing the minefields along the long, twisting approach to the port.²⁶ By 17 November, fourteen ships had reached Chinnamp'o and daily discharge was fifteen hundred tons and five trains running about one hundred cars were carrying two thousand tons of supplies into P'yongyang daily. Three days later, some forty thousand tons of supplies had been unloaded at Chinnamp'o and the USHS *Repose* had arrived from Inch'on. With his logistics effort moving into a higher gear, General Walker set the 24th as the date for reopening his offensive.²⁷

Chinese, and two Chinese dialects. He had left his family in Pusan and returned to Seoul hoping to get a job with the American military. It didn't matter where we were going. His timing couldn't have been better. We needed an interpreter and Sam was a godsend," said Davis.¹⁶ The second "interpreter" from Japan became the sub-team's cook.

"Mr. Oh'Ashi, a former Japanese Army supply sergeant and amateur gourmet cook, had adopted the Korean name of Song Ho Jung. Discovered by a general while cooking in an officers' mess, SGT Oh' Ashi went to Paris to serve the military attache until the war ended. The ex-prisoner of war (POW) was shipped home. He went to Korea to work in an American officers' mess where LT Brown met him. Since we weren't authorized a cook, I hired him as an interpreter. After all, he could say, 'Yes, my captain,'" laughed Davis.¹⁷

It took CPT Davis more than two weeks to assemble the eight-man CA sub-team and get it equipped with weapons, winter clothing, tents, sleeping gear, and supplies. "Finding a down-filled winter 'mummy' sleeping bag for LT Brown was difficult. The 6'5" former University of Illinois football player was 290 pounds of muscle. The NCOs made sure that we were well-armed. Everyone got a .45 automatic and M-1 carbine with 'crescent clips' plus they managed to scrounge a couple M-1 Garands and a 3.5" bazooka. Since we'd be operating on our own, the infantrymen were trying to cover all the bases. Our final obstacle was transportation. We needed four Jeeps and two 3/4 ton trucks with trailers to carry us, our gear, and enough supplies for thirty days. The Corporals Wade and Shawver solved that with 'midnight requisitioning.' I doubt that the paint was dry when we loaded up. Taking no chances we left Seoul in the dark," chuckled Davis.¹⁸ The CA vehicles easily wove in and out of a steady stream of six-by-six (6x6) trucks hauling supplies, ammunition, and gasoline north to the EUSA units. The trucks were Eighth Army's lifeline.¹⁹

"Most wounded spent below freezing nights in the open just covered with a single Army blanket. No one complained. Everyone patiently waited their turn for food." — CPT Davis

Unbeknownst to the CA team, the overloaded Korean rail system had broken down in October, coincident with EUSA's rapid advance northward. That calamity put an extraordinarily heavy burden on trucks with long hauls from ports and railheads over bad roads. Spare parts were not available to keep the fleet operating on a 24-hour basis. By mid-October when P'yongyang fell, the daily number of operable trucks was so low that Far East Air Force had to airlift supplies into the city from Ashiya Air Base in Japan and Kimpo Airfield near Seoul.²⁰ A lack of supplies caused the EUSA drive north to peter out.

The EUSA G-4 (Logistics), COL Albert K. Stebbins, estimated that a daily flow of at least four thousand tons was needed to sustain a three-corps offensive.²¹ Airlift from Kimpo was carrying one thousand tons daily to P'yongyang and by October's end most planes were hauling ammunition.²² To push north of the Communist capital the main rail line from the south bank of the

Imjin River had to be repaired all the way into P'yongyang and the Chinnamp'o port had to be opened.²³ The time required to do this forced LTG Walker to slip his offensive start date of 15 November. It was this logistics logjam that provided the Chinnamp'o CA team the time needed to get law and order restored and city government established

while the port operations were organized and the U.S. Navy cleared the entry channel of mines.

The dust-covered Chinnamp'o sub-team reported to COL Charles R. Munske, the P'yongyang province CA team leader, on 12 November 1950. The colonel's team was ensconced in the city government building on the north side of the Taedong River in the center of the city. "Clearly overwhelmed with tasks at hand, COL Munske gave us a short brief on the situation, provided the names of his personnel by position, and closed by saying that the 7th Cavalry Regiment securing the area had appointed a mayor and police chief in Chinnamp'o. Since the legal currency was to be the North Korean *won*, I asked for some money. The colonel had little because the major city bank vaults had been dynamited by ROK troops and though 'worthless,' five and ten *won* notes were taken away in large rice sacks. We would have to use promissory notes until he could get accumulate more. He wished us well and sent us on our way to reach Chinnamp'o before darkness fell," commented 1LT George Brown. "It felt like we were getting the 'bum's rush' from the cigar smoking colonel."²⁸ Things were better down south.

"Entering the port city we saw no battle damage. The port was bustling with activity. The 1st Cavalry soldiers had occupied the old North Korean defensive positions outside the city. They directed us to the city government buildings where the mayor and police chief were waiting to take us to our 'headquarters.' That was strange because none of us had called ahead. A walled school compound on the side of the major hill overlooking the port was provided. We couldn't



The USS Foss (DE-59) was one of seven WWII destroyers converted into Turbo-Electric Generators.



Nearly 4,000 wounded ROK soldiers filled the Chinnamp'o dock area as they waited to be evacuated. Fifty-five gallon "burn barrels" provided some semblance of warmth for the casualties during the below freezing nights and ambient light to assist the medical personnel tending them. (Illustration by Mariano Santillan)

have asked for more," remarked CPT Davis. "We introduced ourselves to the U.S. Army Port Commander, COL Wilson, and his 3rd Logistical Command staff. We were attached to them for logistical support. That night we had tea in the mayor's office with the key people of the city."²⁹ A positive aspect of the Communists' flight was the predominantly anti-Red feeling among the civilian leaders.

Davis remembered: "The first days were spent getting organized in the school and visiting the police station, hospital, arranging for food and cooks to support the wounded. Those first days were very hectic. CPT Coakley and Dr. Reginald Bowers established basic medical screening procedures, hired interpreters, and trained the citizenry to recognize signs of infectious disease and do records administration. Then, COL Munske radioed from P'yongyang to tell us to get ready to handle a thousand wounded Korean soldiers coming down by train."³⁰

"It was a great plan," Davis said, "but trains from P'yongyang kept bringing more and more wounded ROKs until nearly four thousand filled every available space in the hospital and warehouse. Then we spread them out wherever there was flat ground by the warehouse and just off the docks. COL Munske sent down another doctor, CPT Truxton Morgan, and his team Public Health Officer, Dr. Frank K. Cassel (World Health Organization), to help."³¹ The Korean medical staff assisting CPT Coakley and Dr. Bowers was simply overwhelmed. "Since the triages by

trainloads had been 'first come, first served,' the effort had become sporadic and some serious cases were missed," recalled CPT Davis.³²


"Most wounded spent below freezing nights in the open just covered with a single Army blanket. No one complained. Everyone patiently waited their turn for food. Walking wounded fought for cigarettes because some soldiers were looking after several friends confined to stretchers. Fifty-five gallon 'burn barrels'

were lit at night to provide some warmth and to illuminate the patient area for medical workers. At daybreak those who had died overnight were carried off for burial in the hills. CPT Brown, detailed as Graves Registration Officer, insured honors were rendered and diligently recorded all burial places, marking each grave, and submitted those reports," said CPT Davis. "Conditions

changed with electricity, but the burn barrels stayed."³³

Some tugs and barges had made it up the channel to Chinnamp'o by the first week of November. One of the barges was a mobile electrical station.³⁴ On 11 November, the USS *Foss* (DE-59), one of the seven WWII destroyer escorts converted into Turbo-Electric Generators (TEG) arrived from Inch'on. This "Powerhouse Ship," provided electricity to shore facilities at Chinnamp'o.³⁵ Portable generators powering light sets enabled ship unloading twenty-four hours a day. The key to that operation becoming a success was money to pay stevedores.

"We worked around the clock for two and a half days. Our litter hoists and boatswains chairs were lifting wounded aboard without a bobble. We didn't pull out until the ship's wards were filled to the brim,..." — Captain C.H. Perdue



The USHS *Repose* treated and evacuated almost 800 wounded Allied troops from Chinnamp'o. The cooks aboard the hospital ship prepared Thanksgiving Dinner



for the 1,500 U.S. military port operations soldiers and the CA team working there.

Fewer and fewer workers showed up to help the CA team as time passed; promissory notes were no longer sufficient. COL Wilson could not help because he needed Korean labor to unload ships and reload the cargo aboard trains and trucks. That was critical. So, CPT Brown and CPLs Wade and Shawver headed north to P'yongyang to get help from COL Munske.³⁶

By mid-November, COL Munske had accumulated enough North Korean currency to finance his efforts (between one and two million *won* per day) and those at the port.³⁷ In a letter home, the colonel wrote his wife: "Every vault was dynamited and blown up. Paper money was scattered on the floors everywhere. We had to gather up all of this money as it is the only available.

Trying to pick up the money out of the rubble is a job, but we are getting to it."³⁸

Fortunately, the ROK Army units began discarding what they had stolen earlier because they could do nothing with it. The P'yongyang CA personnel recovered forty-six million *won* in five and ten-*won* notes. Thus, salaries for contract workers were often stuffed in large rice sacks and carried away in oxcarts. That was how little the North Korean notes were worth.³⁹ "A few bags of *won* easily fit in a Jeep trailer and we were able to catch some of the Bob Hope Show at the K-23 Airfield before heading back," said CPT George Brown.⁴⁰ The fifteen hundred American logisticians and the CA team at Chinnamp'o enjoyed Thanksgiving dinner in

U.S. Army Medical Corps LTC Louis N. Altshuler

U.S. Army Medical Corps LTC Louis N. Altshuler was a public health doctor in the Eighth U.S. Army Surgeon Office, Tokyo until war broke out in Korea. In July 1950, then MAJ Altshuler was sent to Korea to the 8054th Evacuation Hospital in Pusan. After the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter in October 1950, newly promoted LTC Altshuler was attached to UN Civil Assistance Command and sent north to P'yongyang to assist COL Charles R. Munske. After the withdrawal of UN forces from North Korea in December 1950, Altshuler was key to establishing hospitals and medical clinics for the refugees resettled on Cheju-do and internal medical care for the prisoner of war population on Koje-do. He was awarded a Bronze Star and a Legion of Merit for his distinguished contributions to public health during the war. LTC Robert A. Altshuler was later an instructor at the U.S. Civil Affairs School, Fort Gordon, GA, with LTC Loren E. Davis. He was the father of MG Herbert R. "Buz" Altshuler, the Commanding General of U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) from 2003-2008.



Medical Corps LTC Louis N. Altshuler worked to reestablish medical facilities in P'yongyang in conjunction with the UN Civil Assistance Team in the Communist capital.

MG Herbert R. "Buz" Altshuler was the Commanding General of USACAPOC, 2003-2008.



the schoolhouse thanks to the cooks aboard the USHS *Repose*.⁴¹

The glimmering, 15,000-ton white ship with big red crosses painted on her sides treated more than 1,300 wounded UN troops from 28-30 November 1950 and carried 750 when it left. "We worked around the clock for two and a half days. Our litter hoists and boatswains chairs were lifting wounded aboard without a bobble. We didn't pull out until the ship's wards were filled to the brim," said Captain C.H. Perdue. The senior medical officer, Captain E.B. Coyle of Tacoma Park, MD, commented: "It was a big problem to feed that many people. But we did. The laundry worked twenty-four hours a day to maintain our high standards of cleanliness in the wards."⁴²

Shortly after lunch on Sunday, 3 December 1950, while making final preparations to evacuate the Communist capital, COL Munske was surprised to see CPT Loren Davis from Chinnamp'o. He had come north with a Jeep and a couple of 3/4 ton trucks to collect more medical supplies from LTC Louis N. Altshuler, an UNCAC Public Health doctor. "I told him that I needed what you would need for three thousand wounded men lying on a warehouse floor. You know more about that than I do," said Davis.⁴³ In reality, the wounded awaiting evacuation had grown to seven thousand. Dr. Altshuler was more than happy to accommodate because the huge mounds of medical supplies for the EUSA drive north were to be destroyed. Unaware that the UN withdrawal was so imminent, CPT Davis had planned to spend the night.⁴⁴

COL Munske explained how precarious things were in the capital and ordered him to return to Chinnamp'o with the medical supplies because the engineers were preparing to blow up all the bridges across the Taedong. Davis was not to await further orders from him. His CA team was to depart when the 3rd Logistical Command left. CPT Davis remembered: "I jumped back into my Jeep, collected our loaded truck, and raced off. Sure enough, an Engineer captain at the Taedong Rover flagged us down to ask if I was CPT Davis because they planned to destroy the bridge after we crossed. We set a speed record getting back to the port, but it was some comfort that the Chinese couldn't use the road to get to Chinnamp'o."⁴⁵ News that UN forces were



CPT Loren E. Davis, Civil Assistance Team, Chinnamp'o, just managed to get clear of P'yongyang with critical medical supplies as U.S. Army engineers destroyed the bridges across the Taedong River when the EUSA withdrew in early December 1950. (Illustration by Mariano Santillan)

abandoning P'yongyang and heading south would soon reach the port. They had to expect refugees fleeing south from the capital city.

"Having seen P'yongyang abandoned, I was determined to help our loyal North Koreans reach safety. The wounded would be guaranteed space on ships. The Army port unit was already planning its evacuation so I asked that two thousand civilians be added to the numbers requiring safe passage. Then, we assembled

the city officials, police, hospital personnel and loyal laborers to explain that they would be evacuated with the Americans. I passed out two thousand locally printed 'boarding passes' and explained that once the wounded were loaded, they had to be ready to get aboard. One suitcase per person was all that was to be allowed," stated CPT Davis.⁴⁶

"While reassuring, it was emotional and distressing because Chinnamp'o was their home and not all could

"...not all could be evacuated... We knew that those left behind were as good as dead and that many, as soon as they learned that they would be abandoned by the Americans, would turn against us..."
— CPT Davis

be evacuated. Action started, reversed, and was started again trying to determine who would leave with us, and pleading for more space. We knew that those left behind were as good as dead and that many, as soon as they learned that they would be abandoned by the Americans, would turn against us. These loyal civilians who had worked with us would pay with their lives when the Reds returned. The city leaders had already volunteered to stay behind as long as we took their families. There were three different assembly areas with a CA officer assigned as the official escort [CPT Brown-police; MAJ Coakley-hospital personnel; MAJ Izquierdo-mayor and city officials],” remembered Davis.⁴⁷ The threat to the port appeared to be real and imminent.

The Communist Chinese entry into the Korean War in November 1950 heralded a series of UN setbacks and posed a threat to Chinnamp’o, necessitating an emergency evacuation. U.S. Navy Transport Squadron 1 with APA attack transports *Bayfield*, *Bexar*, and *Okanogan* and AKA cargo ships *Agol* and *Montague* were steaming north in the Yellow Sea towards Inch’on from Japan on 3 December when the commander, Captain S. G. Kelley, intercepted an urgent EUSA message to Navy Far East to divert to Chinnamp’o to assist with an evacuation. Having changed course, Kelley was relieved to discover that six destroyers were available to protect his transports. A hundred Korean sailing vessels had assembled to shuttle refugees away in the next two days.⁴⁸

By mid-afternoon 4 December, the *Bayfield*, *Okanagan*, *Agol*, and *Montague* were in Chinnamp’o harbor. While

anchored Captain Kelley kept all guns manned and steam up as all boats were lowered and loading commenced and did so until mid-morning of the 5th. Shortly after noon, the American transports began leaving the anchorage individually. When the beach was practically empty, three thousand more refugees suddenly materialized. Fortunately, the *Bexar* had continued on with the mission. The transport arrived in time to load these people and join the “powerhouse” Destroyer Escort *Foss* to leave just about dusk. By then, twenty thousand refugees had already escaped south aboard sampans and junks.⁴⁹

A Canadian Naval Task Group awaiting orders to assist received an emergency message from Lieutenant Commander Henry J. Erikson commanding USS *Foss*, the “Powerhouse” vessel providing electricity to the port: “We are uncovered. Take necessary action immediately.”⁵⁰ On the night of 4 December 1950, the Canadian-led

naval element entered the Taedong estuary to protect allied ships being diverted to the port to evacuate personnel.⁵¹ Two vessels ran aground and were forced to turn back, but the remaining ships (*Cayuga*, *Athabaskan*, *Bataan*, and *Forrest Royal*), led by the HMCS *Cayuga*, reached the harbor at 2:40 A.M., 5 December, after a nerve-wracking night passage through shallow, confusing channels.⁵²

“When we woke up on 5 December, the harbor was filled with ships. After all the angst the day before it was a relief even if some of them were half-filled with ammunition,” recalled CPT Brown. “After finding space aboard ships for every North Korean who wanted to leave Chinnamp’o, the evacuees were allowed to bring industrial equipment. Dr. Kim got the hospital X-ray equipment aboard and the Fishermen’s Association dismantled and loaded their ice-making machinery. It was time to finalize our withdrawal plans.”⁵³

CPT Davis made arrangements to destroy the classified documents and codebooks and supplies. CPLs Wade and Shawver soaked them in gasoline and then poured twenty fifty-five-gallon drums of gasoline down the street gutters emptying into the city below. Since the naval destroyers were going to shell the port facilities the CA team chief wanted to add to the destruction.⁵⁴ As CPT Davis made a final sweep of the port offices, he noticed an Army field telephone still hooked up.

The CA officer wondered what would happen if he tried to call P’yongyang. When he cranked the phone, an operator answered, “Washington,” the signal code word for Seoul. Davis quickly identified himself and asked to be connected to “Washington Six,” BG Crist, the UNCAC chief. The general answered and asked the captain where he was, when he was leaving, and what he could do to help him. Davis evasively replied, “I’m where I’m supposed to be and will remain until I have finished. I had no idea if the Chinese had tapped the line and were monitoring the conversation.”⁵⁵

“The city is dead. From the porthole of my cabin I can see crematory fires rendering the lifeless body to ashes...There is no one left in the city, which only a few days before was home to 70,000 souls.”

— CPT Davis

BG William E. Crist, CG, UN Assistance Command Korea, seen here visiting an orphanage at Chonju, talked with CPT Loren Davis just before the Americans abandoned Chinnamp’o on 6 December 1950.



The Chinnamp'o CA sub-team spent the night anchored in the harbor aboard one of two LSTs that had brought the U.S. Army port unit of 1,500 soldiers.⁵⁶ The two Australian, one American, and three Canadian destroyers opened fire at 5:35 P.M., 5 December, on the railway yards, the cement factory, the shipyard and port facilities, and the few fuel storage tanks. Within minutes the industrial district and waterfront had become an inferno. Smoke from the fires could still be seen as the LSTs, the *Bexar*, and the destroyers cleared the channel the next day.⁵⁷ As the CA team watched the port destroyed, CPT Davis reflected on his mission of three-plus weeks.

"The city is dead. From the porthole of my cabin I can see crematory fires rendering the lifeless body to ashes. All friendly elements have cleared the shore and the Navy's big guns are making sure nothing of military value will fall into Red hands. The Koreans were told that the shelling would begin at five o'clock, but that was unnecessary. Space on numerous unscheduled ships that came to our rescue enabled us to take everyone off. There is no one left in the city, which only a few days before was home to seventy thousand souls."⁵⁸ Shortly after daybreak, 6 December, the four destroyers escorted the LSTs down the channel into a blinding snowstorm that raged at the mouth of the Taedong and Yellow Sea.⁵⁹

Despite their short tenure in Chinnamp'o, the CA sub-team assigned there did accomplish all missions. They established a city government for the North Korean port, trained and armed a police force to maintain law and order, screened everyone for infectious diseases, and operated an efficient medical treatment center to feed, care for, and facilitate the maritime evacuation of more than seven thousand wounded allied soldiers sent from P'yongyang. The Civil Assistance efforts allowed the U.S. Army port unit to totally focus on the critical logistical build-up to support a resumption of the Eighth U.S. Army offensive north to the Yalu River on 24 November 1950. When massive Chinese intervention thoroughly disrupted that effort and forced the withdrawal of allied forces from North Korea, the CA team at Chinnamp'o was instrumental in the successful evacuation of all wounded, the more than seven thousand citizens that had served American occupation forces, eight thousand refugees, and another twenty thousand that left aboard private sailing craft.⁶⁰

In a serendipitous twist of fate, the CA sub-team for Chinnamp'o was reassigned to Cheju Island after the December 1950 evacuation. They were surprised to discover one morning that the city's seven thousand American supporters had been dropped off there. "It was just like a big family reunion. The mayor and police chief were quite happy to see us. Dr. Kim had his prized X-ray machine. The Chinnamp'o group was already organized as a community, so they just needed food, water, shelter, and some work," recalled CPT Loren Davis. "The doctors and medical personnel became the core of the island's primary hospital that eventually cared for more than fifty thousand refugees and orphans."⁶¹

Despite all their frustrations, CPT Loren E. Davis in Chinnamp'o and COL Charles R. Munske in P'yongyang accomplished major civil assistance feats in these two large North Korean cities with minimal assistance. Sadly, virtually all signs of progress were explosively demolished or burned when the Eighth U.S. Army withdrew south to regroup. CPT Davis' CA team exceeded its tasking from BG Crist to "Do what you can in Chinnamp'o" in December 1950 much like today's Civil Affairs teams are doing in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, and Haiti. ♠

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Endnotes

- 1 Charles H. Briscoe, "Born of Desperation: Early Special Operations in the Korean War," *Veritas*, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2009, 30.
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- 23 Mossman, *Ebb and Flow*, 44.
- 24 Appleman, *Disaster in Korea*, 32.
- 25 Unpublished history "Iron Men in Wooden Boats: A History of Small Boat Minesweeping" at www.navsource.org/archives/10/12/pdf/10/120401.pdf accessed 15 March 2010.
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- 27 Mossman, *Ebb and Flow*, 44. **Having learned from Wonsan, serious efforts were made to develop intelligence on the extent of mining in the approaches to Chinnamp'o. Fixed and rotary wing aircraft were used to determine the extent and placement of mines in the channel. Captured North Koreans provided information on the types of mines and the minefield patterns. And, unlike the *ad hoc* mine clearing force assembled at Wonsan, the Allies massed a large minesweeping element of small craft, minesweepers, support ships, and used helicopters to assist.** Peter J. Fanta, student paper, "Sea Mines at the Operational Level of War," (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 16 November 1995), 9.
- 28 Brown interview, 7 February 2005. **The reality was that COL Charles R. Munske, the CA team chief for the Pyongdan-Namdo Province, was also the "military governor" of the North Korean capital responsible for restoring water, electricity, and law, order, and safety to the city as well as instituting infrastructure repairs and distribution of food collected from the countryside. His CA team consisted of four officers, two UN civilians, six enlisted soldiers, and two Korean interpreters. Attached to his team were two ROK legal officers and their clerk/drivers. Pre-war population estimates for P'yongyang were nearly 625,000 people, not including other cities, towns, and villages in the Pyongdan-Namdo Province. When the Americans arrived the city population was about 300,000.** Briscoe, "The UN Occupation of P'yongyang," *Veritas*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 21, 27.
- 29 Brown interview, 7 February 2005.
- 30 Davis, "Korean Diaries," 67, 68 and Brown interview, 7 February 2005.
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- 33 Brown interview, 7 February 2005 and Davis, "Korean Diaries," 71.
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- 46 Davis interview, 31 January 2006.
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- 48 Appleman, *Disaster in Korea*, 333.
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- 50 William P. Sparling, "Transitions: The Sheepdog Navy Goes to Korea," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Fall 2004, 7:1, 7.
- 51 Sparling, "Transitions: The Sheepdog Navy Goes to Korea," 7.
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- 54 Davis interview, 31 January 2006 and Brown interview, 7 February 2005.
- 55 Davis interviews, 2 February 2005 and 31 January 2006, Undated EUSAK CAC Pyongdan-Namdo Province Report, Munske letter to his wife dated 7 December 1950, and Davis, "Korean Diaries," 70-71. **The 507th Signal Battalion communications sergeant looked up CPT Loren Davis in Seoul to explain the connection. "It seems that when he was taking out his switchboard in P'yongyang, he looked at the line from Chinnamp'o and on a whim connected it directly to the Seoul trunk line."** Davis, "Korean Diaries," 71. **According to William Rush, the U.S. Army 507th Signal Battalion had teams at P'yongyang and Chinnamp'o. He left Chinnamp'o aboard the Japanese LST "Q 90" on 6 December 1950,** <http://www.koreanwar.org/html/units/507sig.htm?set=25> accessed 29 December 2009.
- 56 Dennis M. Giangreco, *War in Korea: 1950-1953, A Pictorial History* (NY: Random House, 1990), 128, and Briscoe, "The UN Occupation of P'yongyang," *Veritas*, 1:2, 35.
- 57 "Canadians in Korea," *Legion Magazine*, July 2003 reprinted in <http://www.legionmagazine.com/en/index.php2003/07/canadians-in-korea/> dated 29 December 2009.
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Mineman Seaman Apprentice Harold Elston said that while sweeping north up the Taedong River from Chinnamp'o on Thanksgiving morning 1950, Koreans waved American and South Korean flags. Returning south, the peasants were waving North Korean flags and shooting at them. The five-man crew took cover behind the diesel engine of their wooden landing craft.¹

Endnote

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SUMMARY

THE PRICE OF STABILIZATION

by Robert P. Wettemann

Headquarters, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) maintains that five truths guide the development and employment of modern Special Operations Forces:

- *Humans are more important than hardware.*
- *Quality is better than quantity.*
- *Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced.*
- *Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.*
- *Most Special Operations require non-SOF Assistance.¹*



United States Army Special Operations Command SSI

The above conclusions are the product of more than sixty years of Army Special Operations (ARSOF) experience that began in WWII. The war to defeat Germany and Japan prompted the Allies to create specialized units to perform long-range infiltration and covert missions, conduct psychological operations, and establish military governments in occupied areas. The return to peace in 1945 led to rapid demobilization of almost all special units except those involved in post-war civil affairs. The first "hot war" of the Cold War rekindled interest in all facets of unconventional warfare. When the war in Korea began, the initial eleven months of the conflict forced the U.S. Army to mobilize, train and deploy new units to perform old tasks. The Korean War validated the need for a constant Special Operations capability within the U.S. Army and forced the consideration of what would become the ARSOF truths, for it was difficult, if not impossible, to organize and fill SOF units with experienced personnel once the conflict began.

Beginning in June 1950, hastily formed provisional units drawn almost entirely from Far East Command (FECOM) assets performed a variety of special missions while the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) stabilized the Pusan Perimeter and prepared for the Inch'on landings. In August 1950, the GHQ Raiders joined U.S. Navy Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs) and Royal Marine Commandos in maritime raids against a tenuous North Korean People's Army (NKPA) logistics network,

destroying the railroad infrastructure and conducting reconnaissance missions before the Inch'on invasion.² In September 1950, the U.S. Army activated the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (1st L&L), ordering it from Fort Riley, Kansas, to begin conducting tactical psychological operations in Korea, though it would be months before the unit was operationally effective.³ After the 15 September 1950 landings at Inch'on, the Eighth Army Ranger Company [8213th Army Unit (AU)], began carrying out counter-guerrilla patrols and eliminate pockets of enemy resistance behind Allied lines.⁴ On the heels of these efforts, the U.S. Army began organizing and training additional Ranger companies to augment individual infantry divisions at the recently established Ranger Training Command at Fort Benning, Georgia.⁵

After the success at Inch'on and the liberation of Seoul, General Douglas A. MacArthur convinced President Harry S. Truman that the NKPA had to be destroyed. By then, Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) troops had already crossed the 38th Parallel. Their victories over the NKPA and the ensuing UN advance led to the reconsideration of South Korean President Syngman Rhee's desire for a unified peninsula. By October 1950, the UN advance into North Korea required the employment of Civil Assistance (CA) teams in the North Korean capitol of P'yongyang, as well as the ports of Chinnamp'o and Hungnam.⁶

In mid-October 1950, MacArthur and Truman met at Wake Island to discuss the president's concerns about an expanded war and possible Soviet or Chinese intervention. As UN forces neared China's southern border on the Yalu River, Mao Zedong ordered more than thirty Chinese divisions (300,000 soldiers) to surreptitiously cross the border to stop further UN advances. Undetected by UN reconnaissance efforts, the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) attacked as the EUSA and X Corps launched their final push northward to the Yalu. Beginning on 25 November 1950, the battle-hardened CCF smashed the U.S. and ROKA units and then hammered UN forces trying to plug gaps on both sides of the peninsula. This offensive drove UN troops southward, changing the course of the war and ending U.S. and South Korean efforts to "liberate" North Korea. The war would not be won by Christmas as General

MacArthur had boasted. Lieutenant General (LTG) Walton H. Walker in the west, and Major General (MG) Edward M. Almond, commanding X Corps in the east, ordered the withdrawal of UN forces south of the 38th Parallel. After establishing occupation governments and starting the reconstruction process in North Korea, UN Civil Assistance teams assumed evacuation duties to rescue ROKA, U.S. personnel and civilians trapped at P'yongyang, Chinnamp'o, Wonsan and Hungnam. What General MacArthur soon labeled "an entirely new war" prompted President Truman to meet with British Prime Minister Clement Atlee. They rejected President Syngman Rhee's goal of reunification, and agreed to seek an armistice predicated on the recognition of two Koreas.⁷


When EUSA commander General Walker died in a 23 December 1950 Jeep accident, LTG Matthew B. Ridgway took command of a dispirited force left in chaos by the CCF offensive. Ridgway soon rejuvenated the "fighting spirit" of EUSA by launching a series of offensives: Operation THUNDERBOLT in January 1951, ROUNDUP in February, KILLER in late February, RIPPER in March, and RUGGED in April, that collectively drove the Communists back to the 38th Parallel.⁸ Again, special units played a significant role, in the process further validating the ARSOF concept. The six Ranger companies trained at Fort Benning were in Korea and had begun infiltrating behind the lines to attack enemy command posts, artillery, tank parks, and key communications centers or facilities in the rear areas. By April 1951, the fully operational 1st L&L began delivering loudspeaker broadcasts and propaganda leaflets.

As the "ebb and flow" began on the Korean peninsula, General MacArthur became increasingly critical of civilian decision-making that tied his hands militarily. The outspoken general went so far as to advocate expanding the war by direct military action against China, Truman's decision to accept a negotiated peace notwithstanding.⁹ As UN forces moved north towards the 38th Parallel, MacArthur boldly announced that there was "no substitute for victory" in the war against

The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company arrived in Korea in October 1950. By April 1951, they began making loudspeaker broadcasts and propaganda leaflets for use by UN troops.



GHQ Raiders CPL Melvin J. McCarty, PFC George A. Barry, SFC Leslie A. Lepley, SGT Jamie F. Lee, and PFC John W. Connor engaging in a spirited discussion over Coca-Cola in Korea, 1951.



North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The Korean conflict must be considered against a backdrop of an American strategic commitment to contain Communism elsewhere on the globe, a struggle that emerged in the aftermath of WWII. Although many looked to the UN to ensure international stability, the United States, despite having taken the lead in forming the new organization, increasingly looked to regional alliances to provide collective security. In March 1948, Britain, France and the "Benelux" countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) signed the Brussels Pact, a fifty-year treaty of mutual defense and economic cooperation. In April 1949, the five Brussels Pact signatories joined the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal in a European defense agreement organized under the auspices of the United Nations.¹ The twelve charter members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) pledged that an "attack against one or more of them . . . shall be considered an attack against them all."² President Harry S. Truman looked to NATO as "a shield against aggression and the fear of aggression – a bulwark which will permit us to get on with the real business . . . of achieving a fuller and happier life."³ When the U.S. Senate ratified the NATO treaty in 1949, the United States entered into its first peacetime pact since the Franco-American Alliance of 1778.⁴

While the United States appropriated \$1.3 billion in military aid for NATO in the October 1949 Mutual Defense Act, the outbreak of war in Korea prompted the NATO

Council to develop an integrated defense force designed to prevent the Communists from launching a similar surprise attack against the member nations in Europe. In September 1950, President Truman committed an additional four U.S. Army divisions to Europe to reinforce the two already there, supporting the "Forward Strategy" developed by the council at an earlier meeting. In December 1950, the NATO Council subsequently named General Dwight D. Eisenhower to head the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE).⁵ After the creation of the Psychological Warfare Center in 1952, the 10th Special Forces Group, 301st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, and 6th Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne) eventually made their way to Germany as part of the American commitment to Europe above and beyond the forces already under NATO control. The United States remained a major supporter of NATO throughout the Cold War, and continues to honor the terms of the original 1949 treaty, although current NATO membership has grown to twenty-eight nations.

Endnotes

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Flag of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization founded in April 1949.

French President Vincent Auriol welcomes General Dwight D. Eisenhower to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Paris, France, on 2 April, 1951.





At Hungnam, UN Civil Assistance teams aided in the evacuation of more than ninety-eight thousand civilians to South Korea.



General MacArthur and President Truman met on Wake Island on 15 October 1950. Privately critical of MacArthur, Truman ultimately cited failure to respect the authority of the Commander in Chief as his rationale for relieving the popular general.



General Matthew B. Ridgway, U.S. Army, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, with UN delegates at initial Armistice talks meeting, 10 July 1951. (Left to right): Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, U.S. Navy, Major General Laurence C. Cragie, U.S. Air Force, Major General Paik Sun Yip, Republic of Korea Army, Vice Admiral Turner C. Joy, U.S. Navy, Chief Delegate General Ridgway, and Major General Henry I. Hodes, U.S. Army.

Communism, and that the conflict must be won at all costs. These statements were subsequently leaked to Congress. Despite his popularity, this open defiance prompted President Truman to relieve General MacArthur from command and name LTG Ridgway as his replacement.¹⁰

Riding out the political tempest stemming from General MacArthur's removal, Washington stuck to a "limited war" policy in Korea that freed resources to contain Communism elsewhere in the world. Even before the Korean War began, President Truman had demonstrated the American commitment to Europe in May 1950 by approving a modest aid package for the French, who were already fighting

the Viet Minh for control of Indochina. Support for the recently formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe took on increased importance on 2 April 1951, when General Dwight D. Eisenhower took command of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), a post he held until announcing his presidential candidacy in early 1952.¹¹

As the U.S. furthered its global commitments to contain Communism, special operations forces continued to prove their mettle in Korea. The stabilization of the situation in Korean along the 38th Parallel, however, led to a quiet transformation of the nature and composition of special units. In the early phases of the conflict, the employment of special operations forces represented little more than a scramble to hamper Communist offensives on the peninsula, as these units enabled the withdrawal of ROKA and U.S. Army units into the Pusan Perimeter. Trading space for time allowed forces in the United States to be mobilized and brought into the fight. From 1951 until the armistice was signed, a variety of special units continued to be organized and employed by the U.S. Army. While some represented a perpetuation of the hastily prepared units formed at the war's outset, others took on a greater semblance of permanency as the U.S. Army came to recognize what today are referred to as the ARSOF truths.

The chaotic first months of the Korean War forced U.S. Army leadership to recognize the utility of cultivating and perpetuating knowledge of special operations in both war and peace, since quality special operations units could not be mass-produced after a crisis emerged. By the signing of the Korean armistice, individuals drawn from recently established SOF units validated their

training by serving as advisors, intelligence gatherers, and covert action specialists. UN efforts to stabilize the peninsula also witnessed employment of a fully organized psychological warfare (Psywar) group that more effectively directed strategic and tactical Psywar. Before the Korean War ended, the Department of the Army had begun planning for future special operations units. The creation of the Psychological Warfare Center, established at Fort Bragg, North Carolina in 1952, not only helped meet these new demands for unconventional warfare, but served to centralize doctrine, development and schooling for U.S. Army Special Forces and Psywar. ♣

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Endnotes

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- 5 **The Ranger Companies formed during the Korean War will be covered in the second *Veritas* special issue on the Korean War.**
- 6 Charles H. Briscoe, "The UN Occupation of Pyongyang," and "'Do what you can!': UN Civil Assistance, Chinnamp'o, North Korea, November-December 1950" appearing elsewhere in this issue.
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During the war, millions of Koreans, uprooted from their homes by bombing, shelling or fear, attempted to flee to safety. Pusan and other cities in the south became giant refugee camps with people sleeping in the streets. When the war shifted north, this scene was repeated at P'yongyang, Chinnamp'o, Wonsan and Hungnam as the allied forces withdrew and civilians sought to escape before the cities were taken by the North Koreans. *Defense Department photo.*



MEMORIAL WALL

UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

In 1995, the US Army Special Operations Command constructed a Memorial Wall to honor the fallen warriors of Special Forces, Rangers, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Special Operations Aviation. A Memorial Ceremony is held annually to commemorate casualties from the past year. In this solemn event, USASOC honors the ultimate sacrifice of each warrior and demonstrates its commitment to preserving their memory.

On 27 May 2010, the Command shall dedicate a newly renovated Memorial Wall. This renovation was made possible by dedicated patriots from the private sector and the hard work of USASOC's staff and contractors. It shall feature polished granite sheathing and etched nameplates for each of the nearly 1,100 ARSOF warriors on the original Memorial Wall. Atop the wall is our "Eagle Rising," guardian of the USASOC Fallen Warrior Memorial Wall. It symbolizes the indomitable and eternal warrior spirit of our heroes who have sacrificed all in the defense of Liberty.

IN MEMORY OF OUR FA



"Roll Call"

The USASOC History Office would like to thank the following individuals for their generous support and unwavering dedication in honoring our Fallen Warriors.

USASOC:

MAJ Stephen M. Roman
MSG Alvie W. Louth
David B. Walker
Michael Kunik
Valaida Bradford
MAJ Jared Reid

Association*

COL (Ret.) Andrew Milani
COL (Ret.) Edwin W. Anderson

Contractors:

Lorenzo E. Ghiglieri
VoStone Inc.
Interpretive Graphics
Andrew Consulting Engineers
Gattis Construction
Johnston Architecture LLP
Parker Monuments Inc.
Sandhills Commercial Lawn



*USASOC Soldier, Family, and Command Support Association (USASOC - SFCS)

FALLEN SPECIAL OPERATIONS SOLDIERS

Welcome Kinsman, Comrade, Friend.
Recorded here on this humble wall are the
names of our fallen Heroes. They were
and will always be cherished Soldiers of
Army Special Operations, our comrades in arms,
know that they eagerly sought and accepted
our Nation's most difficult missions against
our most dangerous enemies. Know that
they willingly endured hardship and danger
and, at the end, sacrificed all for us.
With solemn pride, know that in doing so
they proved true to their oath to the Constitution and
duty to the Citizens of the United States of America.
To them, their example and their memory
we humbly dedicate this Memorial.





Commander, USASOC
ATTN: AOHS (*Veritas*)
E-2929 Desert Storm Drive
Fort Bragg, NC 28310

Upcoming Special Edition...

ARSOF in the Korean War: Part II

This *Veritas* special issue, "U.S. Army Special Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Part II," highlights the formation and operations of the Ranger Infantry Companies, the training and deployment of new Psychological Operations units and the first use of Special Forces in combat as advisors to the United Nations Partisan Infantry-Korea. This issue further explores of the rebirth of Army special operations as it developed during the Korean War.



**Men of the 3rd Ranger Infantry Company
in combat in Korea.**